



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-051
Thursday
16 March 1995

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-051

CONTENTS

16 March 1995

NOTICE TO READERS: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Serbia: Sustained UN Sanctions 'Instigating War' [TANJUG] 1

ALBANIA

Berisha: Papoulias Visit 'New Page in Relations' [Tirana TV] 2
 Berisha Reviews Bilateral Talks at UN Summit [Tirana TV] 2

BULGARIA

Pavlov Reports to Security Council on Visit [Sofia Radio] 5
 Denies Prompting Grachev Statement [24 CHASA 12 Mar] 5
 Concern Over Pavlov, Grachev Statements [STANDART NEWS 11 Mar] 5
 Moscow's Attitudes Toward Pavlov Visit Viewed [24 CHASA 13 Mar] 6
 Commentary: 'What Promises' Did Pavlov Make? [DEMOKRATSIYA 13 Mar] 7
 Kozloduy Reactor Shut Down After 'Malfunction' [Sofia Radio] 7
 BSP, Patriotic Alliance Sign Cooperation Accord [Sofia Radio] 7

SLOVAKIA

Ministers Meet Russia's Lobov, Sign Protocol [Bratislava TV] 8
 Military Cooperation Agreement [Bratislava Radio] 8
 Envoy to U.S. Protests New York Editorial [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 11 Mar] 8
 Defense Minister Views Army Readiness, NATO [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 13 Mar] 8
 Hungarian Parties Cite 'Critical' Situation [Budapest TV] 10
 Three Platforms Formed in Coexistence Movement [SME 13 Mar] 10
 Culture Minister: Media Situation 'Unbearable' [PRAVDA 11 Mar] 11

HUNGARY

Treaty With Romania Not Ready by 20 Mar [Budapest Radio] 12
 Kovacs Discusses 'Difficult' Slovak Negotiations [Budapest Radio] 12
 State Secretary Tabajdi Views Basic Treaties [MAGYAR NEMZET 14 Mar] 12
 Bank Launches New Forint Devaluation System [NEPSZABADSAG 16 Mar] 13
 Article Says Budget Deficit Continues To Grow [NEPSZAVA 11 Mar] 14
 MIEP Leader Accuses Government of 'Dictatorship' [Budapest Radio] 15
 'Extreme-Right-Wing' Leader Addresses Gathering [Budapest Radio] 15
 Compensation via Land Said Damaging Agriculture [NEPSZABADSAG 13 Jan] 15
 Political Scientist: SZDSZ Controls Media [BESZELO 23 Feb] 16

POLAND

Presidium on NIK, Presidential Election [NOWA EUROPA 16 Mar] 19
 Oleksy Answers Glomp on Communists in Government [Warsaw TV] 19
 Oleksy Remarks on 'Unfriendly' Media Atmosphere [Warsaw Radio] 19
 Plenipotentiary on Reform of Economic Ministries [RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Mar] 20
 Okonski Outlines Criteria for Army, Arms Industry [Warsaw Radio] 21

ROMANIA

Minister Thanks Citizens for Behavior on 15 Mar [Bucharest Radio]	22
Military Cadres 'Placed on Reserve Duty' [EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 10 Mar]	22
Marko Denies UDMR Wants Close Ties to PDSR [ADEVARUL 11 Mar]	22

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Ganic Predicts Recapture of Occupied Territories [Vienna TV]	23
'Revival' Deadline for Bonn Agreement Too Short [Moscow ITAR-TASS]	23
Silajdzic: West Trying To 'Suppress' Problem [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 15 Mar]	24
Delic: Arrests Made Over Santic Disappearance [AFP]	24
Delegation To Investigate Case [Sarajevo Radio]	24
Government Authorities Arrest UN Interpreter [AFP]	25
UN Protests Serb Attack on British Troops [London PRESS ASSOCIATION]	25
Silajdzic Opposes Herzegovinan Import Taxes [Sarajevo Radio]	25
More on Imposed Tax [AFP]	26
Mostar SDA Criticizes Koschnick's Comment [Sarajevo Radio]	26
WFP: Serbs Strengthening Blockade on Bihac [AFP]	26
3d Corps Commander Predicts Victory in Doboj [Sarajevo Radio]	27
Fikret Abdic Interviewed on Division of Bosnia [NIN 17 Feb]	27
Muslim-Croatian Federation Problems Examined [OSLOBODJENJE 23 Feb]	29
Local Government Problems, Cooperation Debated [OSLOBODJENJE 23 Feb]	31
Government Conflicts Reflect Federal Problems [OSLOBODJENJE 23 Feb]	31

CROATIA

RSK Army Will Maintain Combat Readiness [Korenica Radio]	34
Parties View Decision on New UN Mandate [VJESNIK 14 Mar]	34
Tudjman, Valentic Set Government Program [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	36
Iran Delegation Offers Support of Federation [GLAS SLAVONIJE 23 Feb]	38
State Border Commission Chairman Interviewed [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	39
HEP Director Assures Electric Power Supply [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	40
HDZ Becoming Largest Party in Istria [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	41
Article Discusses Possible Return of Communists [BORBA 24 Feb]	42
Air Defense Brigade Prepared for Battle [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	43
Croatian Deputies Criticize Z-4 Plan [VJESNIK 16 Feb]	43

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Skopje Asks Butrus-Ghali To Change UN Mandate [TANJUG]	45
PDP Participates in Assembly, Explains Return [MIC]	45
Gligorov Remarks on Social Development Summit [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 14 Mar]	45
Diplomatic Relations Established With Estonia [MIC]	45
Continued Political Unrest in Tetovo Expected [BORBA 24 Feb]	46

SLOVENIA

EU Negotiations To End During French Tenure [Ljubljana Radio]	47
Kucan Affirms Nation's Desire To Join EU [Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 14 Mar]	47
Coalition Parties 'Almost' Coordinate Budget [Ljubljana Radio]	48
Minister Declares Self-Defense Groups Illegal [VEECER 20 Feb]	48
Personnel Reassigned in Defense Ministry [VEECER 24 Feb]	49
Finance Ministers Discuss SFRY Debt [SLOVENEK 16 Feb]	49
Slovene Debt to Croatian Health Insurance [DNEVNIK 10 Feb]	49
Central Bank Requires Deposits for Foreign Loans [VEECER 11 Feb]	50
Interior Ministry Secretary on Public Safety [DELO 11 Feb]	51

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Army Officers Arrested for Spying for Croatia [TANJUG]	54
Statistics Detail Feb Industrial Production [TANJUG]	54

Serbia

DSS Leader: Prospects for Peace in Danger [TANJUG]	54
Commentary: Martić's Defeat Over Confidence Vote [DNEVNIK 10 Mar]	54
Seselj Doubts Sanctions Will Be Removed [BORBA 24 Feb]	55

Kosovo

Kosovo Albanians and Tetovo Conflict Examined [BORBA 24 Feb]	56
--	----

Vojvodina

Peace Groups Protest Tank Movements to Serbia [BETA]	57
New Vojvodina Hungarian Party Outlines Policy [TANJUG]	57

Serbia: Sustained UN Sanctions 'Instigating War'

LD1503194295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1722
GMT 15 Mar 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Madrid, March 15 (TANJUG)—Chairman of the Serbian Parliament Foreign Policy Committee Slobodan Jovanovic on Wednesday said that further sustaining of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia was instigating war.

Speaking at the headquarters of the Socialist Party of Spain, Jovanovic said that the sanctions encouraged militant circles throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic heads a parliamentary delegation of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia on its several-day return visit to the Spanish Parliament.

'We appreciate Belgrade's efforts, which are more than evident, and we urge that the (U.N.) sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be lifted,' secretary for foreign relations of the parliamentary group of

Spain's ruling Socialist Party Raymond Obiols said at a meeting with the Serbian delegation on Wednesday.

Belgrade is an unavoidable factor in global settling of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Obiols said.

He added that the coming period, after Spain takes over the European Union presidency, should be used for finally restoring peace in the Balkans.

The Serbian parliamentary delegation on Wednesday also met with Ramon Espasa, a representative of the parliamentary group of the united left, Izquierda Unida.

'We were against the premature recognition of the secession of the former Yugoslav republics, which was imposed by Germany,' Espasa said.

He said there was a consensus in the Spanish Parliament that additional efforts should be invested to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Espasa said the predominant view among the Spanish MPs was that all warring sides were equally responsible for the situation.

Berisha: Papoulias Visit 'New Page in Relations'

*AU1503181595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in
Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The President's Press and Information Office provides the following information:

I am happy about your visit to Tirana and the results you achieved yesterday with Foreign Minister Serreqi. I consider this visit to be a new page in relations between our two countries, President Berisha told Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias.

I am convinced that this visit constitutes a very important step in normalizing and developing our bilateral relations. I think the Albanian and Greek peoples, as the oldest neighbors in this region, have composed a code of good behavior during their history of coexistence. It is our duty not only not to allow fanatics and extremists to trample this code underfoot but to enrich it with new values of friendship. Within this framework, I do not forget that you and Prime Minister Papandreou gain historic merit in abolishing the Greek law on a state of war with Albania, and I hope that you have taken this step to open the way to cooperation and friendship between our two countries. That is why I have proposed and insist that work begin on drafting and signing a friendship and cooperation treaty on the basis of OSCE principles and traditional Albanian-Greek relations, the most brilliant pages of which are the pages of friendship.

I agree with the creation of a joint Albanian-Greek commission under the leadership of Messrs. Starova and Gheorgiou, as well as subcommittees for special issues. I would like these committees to start their work as soon as possible. I also understand your attitude on the problems of Cam ownership and their examination by judicial experts from the respective ministries, Berisha continued.

It is in the interest of both countries to work toward legal approval for Albanians who work in Greece and toward liberalizing visas for businessmen and investors. We welcome the approval of our request for opening new border points.

The exchange of parliamentarians and people of culture is also useful to increase the level of understanding between our two countries. We are grateful to the Greek Government and people for the assistance rendered to Albania during the transition period and expect Greece to help Albania in its integration into Europe and European institutions, which is our primary goal; however, I think this is also in the interest of Greece and the entire region, President Berisha further stated at the meeting.

I would also like to confirm that Albania will participate in the multilateral military maneuvers that Greece is to conduct in Pireus within the framework of the Partnership for Peace.

President Berisha said that the time has come to hold a conference of Balkan foreign ministers, which would serve to increase good faith in our region. I have talked with Bulgarian President Zhelev about this problem, who broached the issue with Turkish President Demirel, Berisha said. I think that our countries' foreign ministries should be committed to organizing this.

President Berisha asked Mr. Papoulias to convey to Greek President Stephanopoulos his invitation to visit Albania.

Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias assessed highly the talk with President Berisha and his interest in and determination to improve relations with Greece, and expressed his full support for the president's proposal to start work on a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our two countries.

Papoulias said: I am convinced, that such a treaty would have great importance for relations between the two countries and very great reverberations in the European Union and outside it. You will have Greece's full support in your participation in European institutions and integration into Europe, Papoulias said. This is in the interest not only of Albania but also of Greece, because we Greeks have many things in common with Albanians.

Papoulias also expressed his pleasure regarding the reactivation of work by the Albanian-Greek commission with the respective subcommittees.

I am happy about the idea of holding a Balkan conference and I support it, Papoulias stressed. At the meeting, he praised the care shown by Albania in its treatment of the Greek minority.

President Berisha honored the historical and present contribution of this minority once more at the meeting. I am happy with the standard achieved, Berisha said, and I assure you that this is a dynamic standard that will rise both for minority peoples and Albanians. Freedoms and rights will be increasingly expanded for all citizens of Albania. Schools for minority peoples will unhesitatingly be opened everywhere the general numerical criteria is met, and Greek language courses will be established in Dropull high schools to the extent necessary.

Both President Berisha and Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias stressed at the meeting the need to work intensively and expeditiously to implement the points agreed upon during this meeting.

Berisha Reviews Bilateral Talks at UN Summit

*AU1503191395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in
Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Mar 95*

[Interview with Albanian President Sali Berisha by Reis Cico in Copenhagen "at the end of the UN summit"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cico] Mr. President, how do you assess the world summit on social development, in which you participated?

[Berisha] This summit, organized by the United Nations in the framework of the 50th anniversary of the founding of this organization, aimed at two major goals: First, to address social problems, causes, and the consequences of these problems; second, to determine the most efficient ways and means of overcoming these problems.

I think the first goal was greatly accomplished in the sense that various countries, or all countries, were able to bring to the center of world public attention the kind of social problems they are experiencing.

Thus, we expressed our concerns and problems. Social problems are always problems that are related to political and economic issues. In Albania, they are a consequence of one of the most woeful of inheritances, of transition that creates its own pains, and of the embargo imposed on us. Thus, I think that the goal of presenting the causes of social problems and their existence was achieved. The second goal, that of defining efficient measures, is far from being realized.

Two currents came to the fore here: [first] that of developed countries, characterized by an insistence on increasing aid from developed countries and pardoning debts, and thus a greater nobility on the part of these countries. The other current was also of developed countries but characterized mainly by an insistence on efficient handling of the aid granted.

As regards debts, there was no positive echo apart from Austria and a certain other country, which declared they would pardon bilateral debts. There was no other great desire to join this initiative. Thus, the second goal remains. In general, the countries with social problems should try to resolve these problems through their energy, work, cooperation, a system of reforms, and a more sound social policy.

[Cico] You met various personalities at this summit. Where does the value in these meetings lie?

[Berisha] Thanks to a perfect organization of the conference by the Danish Government, I availed myself of every possibility to hold a series of important meetings, among which I would single out the meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, held just a few days after the very successful visit of German President Herzog to Tirana.

At this meeting with Chancellor Kohl, we extensively discussed the development of bilateral relations. I expressed my deep gratitude to Germany, its chancellor, its president, and its institutions for the very great assistance they have rendered during this period. I also acquainted him with the great difficulties we are experiencing today in the reform process and especially as regards the infrastructure which, due to the country's

rapid development, is making development and the life of Albanian citizens even more difficult.

I also acquainted him with the consolidation of democracy in Albania. The chancellor showed great interest in these achievements and pledged that Germany and he personally will assist Albania in regenerating and reconstructing its infrastructure, mainly in supplying the populace with water and restoring the electricity network.

Another topic in the discussions with the German chancellor was Albania's integration into Europe. Kohl affirmed once again that Germany will be Albania's advocate in all European institutions. In this connection, he stated that he will be personally committed in agreeing to Albania's association and other fields of cooperation.

An important place in these talks was taken up by the situation in the region: Bosnia, Kosova, as well as Albania's relations with its neighbors. I think we had a great understanding and I am convinced that this meeting will provide another great stimulus in relations between our two countries.

At the same time, I held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Moriama, whom I thanked and to whom I expressed my deep gratitude and that of Albania for the assistance the Japanese Government has rendered to Albania both in bilateral relations and through international institutions.

Japanese Prime Minister Moriama assured me that Japan follows developments in Albania with special interest and salutes Albania for its achievements. He reiterated the thesis of his forerunner Prime Minister Hata that Japan is very interested in Albania's stability and will support our efforts to embark on the market economy and build democracy.

During my stay here, I had an important meeting with European Commission president Jacques Santer, with whom we discussed the developments of relations between Albania and the European Commission, assistance and cooperation in this direction. We also reconsidered the possibilities of opening negotiations on the association agreement, and European Investment Bank [EIB] commitment in establishing an infrastructure in Albania.

Mr. Santer told me that in accordance with existing economic criteria, of course Albania cannot be compared with Hungary, Czechia, Poland, and other countries—but the European Commission considers developments in Albania to be very positive and will address the opening of negotiations in due time, with the possibility of negotiating the association agreement with Albania, just as it will encourage the EIB to commit itself to establishing an infrastructure in Albania on the basis of projects presented by the Albanian side.

During my stay, I also held a series of other meetings with heads of states of countries in the region, such as

Turkish President Demirel, Bulgarian President Zhelev, and Croatian President Tudjman. Bilateral relations, the situation in the region, and the strengthening of cooperation were the main topics at these meetings.

I also held meetings with the Dutch, Danish, and Swedish prime ministers, the Danish foreign minister, and the prime minister of Luxembourg. In all these meetings, the strengthening of bilateral relations and these countries' support for Albanian integration into European institutions were the main topics of discussion. We also focused on the situation in the region and the dire situation of Albanians in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in Kosova.

I met with the Malaysian prime minister and the amir of Kuwait, who guaranteed me that their countries will continue to financially support Albania and reforms in Albania.

I held a meeting with Mr. Holbrooke [U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs], with whom we discussed the situation in the region and the development of bilateral relations.

I also met with Mr. Spath [name as heard], the United Nations Development Program [UNDP] general director, and discussed various fields in which the UNDP will be engaged in the future. I again presented my demand that the UNDP consider Albania as among the poorest countries, and this is a special status. Although we do not actually meet the criteria to receive this status, we are situated among rich countries and this can be taken into consideration, as our poverty becomes more spectacular due to our geographic position. Mr.

Spath told me that he will think again about the UNDP's continuing future assistance to Albania.

I also held a meeting with the Finnish president, with whom we discussed bilateral relations. We also discussed the assistance we expect from Finland through international institutions, and particularly Albania's integration into the Council of Europe and European Union institutions.

At a meeting with the Czech prime minister, we discussed the strengthening of bilateral relations. I requested his technical assistance in the process of privatization. Czechia is among the most advanced countries in the process of privatization in East Europe, and one of the most advanced countries in Europe as far as this process is concerned.

The Czech prime minister expressed his full readiness to send a delegation to cooperate with ours.

Apart from these, I exchanged ideas with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, to whom I expressed my satisfaction with the very good level of the development of friendly relations between our two countries.

I also met Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky there. I exchanged ideas with Italian Prime Minister Dini who assured me of Italy's determination to assist Albania as a priority in the region, as well as Romanian President Iliescu and Hungarian President Goncz. The three of them promised to come visit Albania.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Danish Government for their impeccable organization of the conference and the facilities created to organize such meetings, which are always very important for us.

Pavlov Reports to Security Council on Visit

AU1503110995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Consultative Council on National Security at the Presidency held a meeting today that lasted for almost 90 minutes.

Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov reported on the talks he conducted in Moscow and on the documents on Bulgarian-Russian military-technical cooperation that were signed during his visit.

Interior Minister Lyubomir Nachev briefed the members of the Consultative Council on National Security on the situation with the draft bills that affect the activity of the national services at the interior ministry and the timetable for submitting these bills to the cabinet and the National Assembly.

The participation of the interior ministry, together with other ministries, in working out draft bills related to the struggle against crime and the protection of public order was also discussed.

A working group must complete its work on the national security doctrine by June, so that it can be submitted to the Council of Ministers for discussion. Afterward, the doctrine will be submitted to parliament.

The participants expressed the unanimous opinion that draft bills related to national security and the protection of public order must be a priority matter for the National Assembly.

Denies Prompting Grachev Statement

AU1503170695 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 12 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Lyubomir Denov: "Dimitur Pavlov: I Did Not Give Grachev Any Reason for His Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Neither I nor the members of the delegation gave General Grachev any reason for his categorical statement regarding the Bulgarian Government's foreign policy, Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov said on 11 March upon his return from Russia.

"We salute the fact that the Bulgarian Government has embarked upon a firm course of coming together with Russia," Gen. Grachev said during the official talks with Pavlov in Moscow.

Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Deputy Asen Agov described Gen. Grachev's statement as scandalous and has submitted an interpellation to parliament in which he is asking whether Minister Pavlov provided the Russian defense minister with a reason for his assessment.

The visit of the delegation I led had professional and not military-political goals, Dimitur Pavlov said. He and his

people prepared the military part of the coming meeting between Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Zhan Videnov on 23 March in Sofia.

Prior to the official talks at the Russian Defense Ministry, the two ministers had a 30-minute private meeting. However, even then the two ministers did not discuss any sharp change in Bulgaria's foreign policy. On the contrary, I reminded Mr. Grachev of Bulgaria's general consensus on associating the country to the Euro-Atlantic and European structures, Minister Pavlov said.

He pointed out that he rather views Grachev's statement as an expression of benevolence toward Bulgaria and its army.

However, according to observers, the scandal in parliament will postpone the supply of spare parts for the Bulgarian Air Force for an indefinite period of time.

Concern Over Pavlov, Grachev Statements

AU1503170495 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 11 Mar 95 pp 1, 32

[Article by Ognyan Stefanov and Vesela Petkova: "Generals Negotiate Behind Zhelev's Back"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his talks with General Pavel Grachev, Russian minister of defense, in Moscow, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov proposed a meeting of the defense ministers of Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, and Turkey.

Grachev accepted the proposal because he considers it a good alternative to the Sofia-Athens-Ankara triangle proposed by President Zhelev. The Russian defense minister explained that the new configuration has been necessitated by exacerbated Greek-Turkish relations. Mr. Pavlov thus seized the initiative in Bulgarian-Russian relations from President Zhelev while the president was preparing for his flight to Copenhagen.

We do not welcome NATO's expansion in Central and East Europe. We puzzle at NATO's attempts to come closer to Russia's borders. We must seek more contacts between us, General Grachev said to STANDART NEWS.

Mr. Agov [deputy chairman of the Central Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS] has described the Russian defense minister's statements as scandalous. It emerges from these statements that Bulgaria has deviated from its foreign policy course, which is aimed at an equal approach to Bulgaria's partners. Such policy contradicts the declaration of intentions of the Videnov cabinet, the SDS deputy said.

In his capacity as deputy chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission, Asen Agov has officially asked Defense Minister Pavlov to clarify the statements he made in Moscow.

The deputy is concerned with the assurance Mr. Pavlov gave his Russian counterpart to the effect that the incumbent Bulgarian cabinet is following a firm course of coming together with Russia.

Russia has been placed in third place in the priorities of the Foreign Policy Commission, after European integration and relations with the Balkan states. Deputies think that if Moscow becomes a first rate partner, an eventual clash between the cabinet and parliament is possible.

Moscow's Attitudes Toward Pavlov Visit Viewed

AU1503212295 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 13 Mar 95 p 10

[Commentary by Lyubomir Denov: "We Are the Losers From the Furor Caused by Grachev's Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whether or not deliberately, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has involved his Bulgarian counterpart Dimitur Pavlov in a parliamentary scandal.

At the official talks in Moscow between the two countries' military delegations, General Grachev declared that "he welcomes the Bulgarian Government's firm line toward closer relations with Russia." Only hours later, in Sofia Asen Agov, National Assembly deputy of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), described the statement as scandalous and submitted a parliamentary question to Minister Pavlov, asking whether he had given Grachev any reason to say such words.

Those who caused this furor are no doubt banking on the fact that Minister Pavlov has only recently appeared on the political scene, and they were well on the way to succeeding in their ploy. On his arrival at Sofia Airport, the defense minister displayed hesitation in his answers to journalists' questions. He even denied the military-political nature of this Moscow visit by claiming that it was essentially professional, although at the start of the talks Grachev announced four or five typical issues of military policy on the agenda, including the attitude to NATO's possible expansion at the expense of Central and East Europe, the Partnership for Peace initiative, and the situation in the Balkans.

However, the furor will not last long. Grachev's statement can only shock anyone if it is taken out of the context of current Bulgarian-Russian relations. Today, even a blind man can see that the severe slump in the Bulgarian economy can be halted if we quickly return to the immense Russian markets.

For our army, there is simply no other solution. NATO vessels may make a good impression in Varna port, and the U.S. "Blue Angels" attracted the eyes of the public near Plovdiv, but none of this has made our troops any stronger.

Our tanks and aircraft need Russian spare parts. For better or for worse, our weapons are Russian. At the moment we are producing Kalashnikovs, armored personnel carriers,

and ammunition for ourselves, and we have even learned how to service MiG-29 aircraft, but it is beyond our powers to do everything. Furthermore, our whole defense industry is dependent on Russian spare parts and replacement assemblies. If they are not available, entire plants have to shut down—as is the situation at the moment, incidentally.

Our new defense minister, who until three years ago was a vice admiral, is painfully aware of all this, but both he and others should realize that, unless we breathe the new life into the stagnating Bulgarian-Russian relations, the army is unlikely to receive the spares it yearns for.

This is not a matter of returning to the old rut—which is the second key component of the furor that has been provoked. Grachev made no mention of this phrase in his statement. We may never find out who put these words into the Russian general's mouth. Quite apart from this, today it is impossible, in practice, to return to the past in this way, even if anyone wanted to. Today's realities are simply different. Even Moscow itself will not permit the restoration of the "eternal, indestructible Bulgarian-Russian friendship." When the official talks were in progress, Russian journalists, for example, showed no interest whatsoever in the state of our army, but asked their Bulgarian colleagues about our Socialist government's first moves. Some of them were unpleasantly surprised by the new medical drugs act, while others were literally shocked by Videnov's attempt to force us to accept a state emblem that departed from tradition.

The Russian defense minister also had some other good words to say about Bulgaria in the historical context. The Bulgarian delegation mainly interpreted both these comments and the above-mentioned statement as an important signal that our army will at last receive the supplies it needs to save the situation.

The question of the Russian foreign debt to Bulgaria has been hanging fire for four or five years now. Four governments sent delegations to Moscow, which reduced the debt from the original \$600 million to a modest \$100 million. All the delegations received evasive promises on the matter of spares, and in the meantime our air force planes started crashing all over the place. Two first-class pilots also lost their lives.

If in two weeks time Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin fails to initial the agreement to supply spare parts, our troops might just as well put up the shutters. This would also be a severe blow to the ruling party, which will miss this decisive opportunity to strengthen its influence among the troops. The SDS did not manage to stop the rot in the army, but some of its leaders do not want their political opponent to succeed where they failed.

We do not want to be bad prophets, but even without knowing about Asen Agov's parliamentary question, the Russian journalists displayed a certain amount of reserve in their attitude toward the military delegation sent by Bulgaria's first Socialist government in five years.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Minister Pavlov was received only by his counterpart Grachev. The previously arranged meeting with Chernomyrdin did not take place. The Russians kept the delegation waiting all day, only to finally tell it that the prime minister had flown off urgently to Copenhagen. On previous visits, former Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov was also received by Vice President Rutskoy, while Khristo Tomov, Aleksandrov's deputy minister responsible for military-economic affairs, met First Deputy Prime Minister Suskovets and Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov.

In fact, Grachev's manner was somewhat reminiscent of Brezhnev's time. It showed up in the needless references, on both apposite and inapposite occasions, to Russia's line on NATO's expansion. It is to Dimitur Pavlov's credit that he reacted to the pressure with enviable calm. Without being affected by Moscow's standpoint, he reminded the Russians that the Bulgarians have not run into NATO's arms, but that public consensus has been reached regarding our integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, because the Odessa Military District no longer exists, and the Warsaw Pact umbrella has long been consigned to the past.

Commentary: 'What Promises' Did Pavlov Make?

AU1603091695 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
13 Mar 95 p 3

[Commentary by Yonko Kalpazanov: "In the Vicious Circle of Kremlin Machinations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It could be argued that war is the continuation of politics through other means. However, the fact that the military should stay away from politics in times of peace is an axiom of parliamentary democracy.

What words did retired Admiral Dimitur Pavlov utter and what promises did he make to prompt his Russian colleague to note that "the present Bulgarian Government has embarked upon a firm course of coming together with Russia..."? And if he did not give the Russian defense minister any reason for his statement, why did he not protest immediately against the lack of political tact, which is so characteristic of the "hero" of Chechnya? Now denials to journalists are insufficient and a parliamentary discussion is inevitable. The same applies to a reaction on the part of the president and the government.

According to the Constitution, Bulgarian foreign policy is determined not by admirals and generals but by parliament, the president, and the government. Our foreign policy course has been determined with sufficient clarity (still!). Even the Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] election program did not say anything about a "firm course toward coming together with Russia." It only pointed out that "accelerated integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and military structures is Bulgaria's leading foreign policy task." Are the Socialists going to relinquish even

this preelection commitment? Would they again apply a double standard: one for purposes of agitation; the other for secret cabinet games and intrigues? Will they again lead us toward "voluntary" subjugation to the big brother's dictate and the loss of our national independence?

Recently, relations between Russia and the United States have cooled visibly. How could we explain that, precisely now, we are signing military agreements with a state viewed by the entire democratic world as an aggressor who violates the human rights of a small but freedom-loving nation? Ostensibly, we are negotiating about the payment of the Russian debt to Bulgaria in spare parts, but simultaneously... "we are demonstrating an interest in certain ultramodern Russian weapon systems..." (see Minister Dimitur Pavlov's statement in BULGARSKA ARMIYA) [statement given to Moscow SEGODNYA and reprinted in BULGARSKA ARMIYA 10 March]

We are trapped in the vicious circle of the "fraternal" Russian hug: together with spare parts, they are also foisting new weapons on us. Afterward, we will have to buy spare parts for the new weapons, then buy new weapons, and so on until the end of the world.

How, then, is Bulgaria going to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures—since, prior to that, we must equip our Army with weapons of the Western type? It would be expensive and time-consuming, but this is something on which our national independence depends. Therefore, we must begin as soon as possible, especially now, when, after the crushing of Iraq and the battlefield (rather than firing range) comparison between NATO and Russian weapons, there can be no doubt as to which side is superior.

Kozloduy Reactor Shut Down After 'Malfunction'

AU1603111795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our correspondent Veronika Pantaleeva reports that last night, after a request by the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant addressed to the Central Control Administration, the nuclear power plant's Reactor No. Five was disconnected from the country's power grid. The reason is a leak of cooling hydrogen from the reactor. The malfunction is not in the nuclear part of the reactor and has no relevance for the radiation level, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant Press Center reports.

BSP, Patriotic Alliance Sign Cooperation Accord

AU1403210195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 14 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) coalition and the Patriotic Alliance have signed an agreement on mutual preelection cooperation, announced Patriotic Alliance spokesperson Svetlana Sharenkova.

A joint working group on applying the agreement will be formed.

Ministers Meet Russia's Lobov, Sign Protocol*LD1503221995 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Juraj Schenk met Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, in Bratislava today.

According to Minister Schenk, Slovakia is interested in creating a Pan-European security system, which is impossible to build without the Russian Federation. In his view, the current level of bilateral commercial and economic cooperation of the two countries falls short of their potential. Minister Schenk spoke in favor of boosting this cooperation.

Oleg Lobov was also received by Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek today. Vladimir Strashko, deputy interior minister of the Russian Federation, who was also present, and the Slovak interior minister signed a protocol on the intentions to cooperate in the sphere of science and technology. The possible cooperation will include the assessment of possibilities for supplying special technology, fire-fighting equipment, and other equipment necessary for police, as well as for the training of special units using dogs or crime-fighting units.

Military Cooperation Agreement*LD1503204695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Two documents concerning cooperation of the Armies of the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation were signed in Bratislava today by Major General Leopold Bilcik, the head of the department of logistics of the Ministry of Defense, and Colonel General Anatoliy Sitnov, the Armed Forces chief of armaments of the Russian Federation.

According to the Slovak representative, the documents specify the conditions of the development of cooperation ranging from mutual exchange of information up to detailing plans of the individual activities.

Envoy to U.S. Protests New York Editorial*AU1503182195 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Mar 95 p 1*

[TASR report: "Misleading Information; Slovak Ambassador to the United States Writes to THE NEW YORK TIMES"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington—It is misleading to report that a few Slovak newspapers struggling for independence are the latest target of communist-style repression. Last week, Slovak Government officials gave an assurance that a higher value-added tax would not be levied on any Slovak media, writes Branislav Lichardus, the Slovak Republic's ambassador to the United States, in a statement addressed to the editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES in response to an editorial published in

that paper on 7 March. Regarding the description of Prime Minister Meciar as a "communist boss," Lichardus stated that such formulations do not contribute to THE NEW YORK TIMES's reputation as a newspaper resolved to interpret reality truthfully.

Defense Minister Views Army Readiness, NATO*AU1503143595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Mar p 9*

[Interview with Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek by Miroslav Sasky; place and date not given: "Letter of Recognition From the UNPROFOR Commander"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When Jan Sitek accepted the post of defense minister, he certainly did not expect a peaceful and idyllic life. The first months in the office, however, surpassed all of his expectations. The control officers were coming and going all the time at the ministry, the "pontoons" scandal was investigated, in which even the former minister was implicated, and, as if that were not enough, another scandal was not long in coming: Slovak Army General Staff officers were caught selling tank machine guns. It certainly was a bitter pill to swallow for you, the newly appointed minister.

[Sasky] What are the results the arms control you ordered at the unit level?

[Sitek] Regarding the machine-gun infraction, I adopted several measures. Among other things, I ordered General Staff officers to conduct physical control of arms and ammunition. During my garrison visits, particularly in Roznava and Jelsava, I personally checked that my order was carried out. I also checked the arms-register books, which bore clear evidence that the arms check was actually done. No shortcomings were discovered, and the arms were stored and registered precisely as prescribed. The Slovak Army chief of staff reported on 17 January that the measures I ordered had been carried out. No flaws were discovered. Nevertheless, I must observe that the participation of professional soldiers in this scandal does not shed a good light on the Slovak Army General Staff. I am convinced, however, that, acting on my orders, the Army chief of staff adopted measures that will prevent such an event from happening ever again. An inventory of the emergency stock warehouses is currently in progress. It is a long process, and we must be ready for some problems, which could have arisen from the speedy partition of the federation. Namely, we inherited not only property but also shortcomings that can now rise to the surface. Therefore, strict control must be emphasized, above all, so no leaks occur in stores of ammunition or other material.

[Sasky] Inasmuch as you mentioned the partition of the federation, has the problem of housing for the officers who came from the Czech Republic been solved?

[Sitek] This problem is more or less solved. There are still occasional instances of ministry or General Staff

officers who still reside in Bohemia, but all of these questions should definitely be concluded by the end of the first quarter.

[Sasky] The professionalization of the Army has been discussed for some time now. What course do you imagine this process to take?

[Sitek] Regarding this problem, even the government policy statement states that the "readiness of the Army personnel will improve from the vantage point of the fulfillment of tasks by a gradual professionalization of selected positions." Immediately upon my first visits to garrisons, I learned that approximately 30 percent of the lowest command posts are filled. This means that the posts of platoon and unit commanders will have to be professionalized first, and this will reflect on better preparedness as well as in the financial effect. If a professional is in charge of a tank, for instance, and is responsible for the machine, the maintenance and handling of the tank will certainly improve. This will result in a longer lifespan of military hardware and facilitate keeping it in better condition.

[Sasky] How many Slovak Army soldiers currently operate abroad? Are they deployed in any other countries in addition to former Yugoslavia?

[Sitek] The Slovak Republic is greatly interested in the operation of these missions. An engineer battalion is currently operating in former Yugoslavia, wherein 582 positions of the defined strength of 606 are filled. As you know, this battalion was the first to receive the highest honor—the letter of recognition from the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander. The battalion troops carried out all of the assignments given to them, and the transport across the Neretva River that they arranged was praised worldwide. During the winter period, the Slovak troops maintain the roads—snow teams are working here—and they also participate in mine-removal operations and build housing units.

In addition to this battalion, there is a Slovak observer mission operating in Angola, an EU monitoring mission in the former Yugoslavia, and, within the framework of Partnership for Peace, Slovakia has its representatives with NATO in Belgium. We also have representatives in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna and at the UN Secretariat in New York.

[Sasky] Can you tell us about military attaches in Slovakia?

[Sitek] A total of 27 military attaches from 27 countries have been accredited to Slovakia. Cooperation with these military air force attaches is very good, and I have met with them personally several times.

[Sasky] As far as our admission into NATO is concerned, stances casting doubt on the expediency of this step have also emerged among the ranks of the Association of

Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS]. What is your view?

[Sitek] Look, here is the government's policy statement, which was approved categorically by all of the ministers, including the ZRS and SNS representatives. Although there are certain doubts here about the expediency of our entry into NATO, the policy statement that was approved by all of the coalition parties and passed by their representatives in parliament is binding. The Slovak Republic also signed the Partnership for Peace document in January 1994, in which we express our interest in creating political stability in the Central European region. Incorporation into these structures gives us certain security guarantees, but it is a long-term process.

[Sasky] Do you have a specific idea of when we could become a member of NATO?

[Sitek] I believe it is realistic to say sometime during this government's term in office.

[Sasky] Have any analyses been conducted regarding how much the necessary rearmament would cost us?

[Sitek] No. As far as I know, no such analyses have been conducted. I do not think, however, that it would be necessary to change our entire ordnance. After all, we have high-quality products and the Zuzana [a howitzer] and the Tatravan [a vehicle], and, in my opinion, our new modernized tanks are compatible with the ordnance of NATO armies. The compatibility of communications and command systems is more important for our incorporation. From this point of view, I am convinced that our entry into NATO would not cost us such a great amount of money.

[Sasky] There would be no problems as far as our Air Force is concerned?

[Sitek] At the moment, we have the modern MiG-29 aircraft. In view of our foreign trade balance with the Russian Federation—it is obvious that, apart from special technology, we will not be able to import anything else—we should fully resolve, first and foremost, issues regarding the standard of the Air Force.

[Sasky] During the federation's breakup, there was an obvious attempt to assign the obsolete aircraft to Slovakia. Therefore, your statement is welcome. Do we, however, already have combat helicopters?

[Sitek] Every state protects its territorial integrity, and the air force and air defense have their irreplaceable role in it. So, we are devoting a great deal of attention to this sphere, and, as I have already said, we have not only modern aircraft, but also combat helicopters among our ordnance. Following receipt of the further deliveries we are expecting from the Russian Federation within the framework of its debt repayment, this sphere should also be provided for sufficiently.

[Sasky] Doubts about our Army's capability for combat have been cropping up regularly since 1990. What is the situation regarding this?

[Sitek] Of course it is combat ready, even though the reserves are not being called up and a certain reduction has been discernible in recent years. Nevertheless, the Army is fulfilling the tasks it is set. Finance is a specific problem; this means that the social conditions are not quite what they should be in the Army. Because we require a soldier or a commander to fulfill his tasks, we should also take this sphere into consideration.

[Sasky] Hazing has always been a problem in the Army. Many people expected that the reduction of the conscription duty would bring a change in this sphere and that the problem would gradually disappear. Nevertheless, the reality is different. Are you trying to deal with this problem?

[Sitek] Hazing is not a specific Army problem. This nuisance exists also in schools, particularly vocational ones. My visits to garrisons also focus on the area of interhuman relations within the Army. In several instances, I had particular suspicions investigated, and I received reports on all extraordinary events in the garrison. On 1 February, a section was established for developing and securing human resources, directed by Lieutenant Colonel Stegena, who is a psychologist, and one of his tasks is to deal with hazing. A hot line was set up, which soldiers can call, even anonymously, so an end has been put to the troubles in the Army. If it is demonstrated that relations between officers and conscripts are neglected and that this results in hazing, the appropriate conclusions will result, even regarding professional soldiers. An important role could be played here by Army administrations, which should place soldiers in units not only by their qualifications but also by their characters so as to preclude the gathering together of soldiers leaning toward hazing.

[Sasky] Could the introduction of a chaplaincy in the Army help?

[Sitek] Certainly. A chaplaincy should contribute to the overall spiritual revival in the Army, to the development of the spiritual life of the troops and to the solution of the problem of interhuman relations. The introduction of this service is also included in the government policy statement. The important issue now is that rapport is reached by the churches in Slovakia and that it affects the clerical activity and the advancement of spiritual values. The Slovak Army chief of staff has already adopted a measure regarding the preparation of troops in 1995, according to which all units and garrisons are to prepare rooms for clerical services and establish contacts with Slovak churches by 30 September 1995.

[Sasky] Have you also discussed these questions with some church dignitaries?

[Sitek] Yes, I have received Monsignor Rudolf Balaz, chairman of the Conference of Bishops in Slovakia, and

Pavol Uhorskai. We discussed these questions, too, and agreed that rapport must be reached, so a chaplain in the Army could represent all of the churches and facilitate coordination and the attendance of services for the believers of religions other than the one he himself represents.

Hungarian Parties Cite 'Critical' Situation

LD1503221195 Budapest MTV Television Network: in Hungarian 1830 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A new memorial was inaugurated in Dunajska Streda [Dunaszerdahely] this afternoon, the first in the Upland [Felvidek—reference to much of Slovakia when it belonged to Hungary before 1918] since 1918, the speakers at the inauguration said. [passage omitted]

According to Laszlo A. Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party, the anniversary [of the 15 March 1848 war of independence] urges us to forge unity because the ethnic Hungarians' situation in southern Slovakia is becoming critical.

[Begin recording] [Nagy] [Passage omitted] They wish to take away from us our schools and to educate our children in a foreign language. We receive no money to nurture our culture, despite the fact that we too are taxpayers of this country. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Speaking on behalf of the coalition of the Hungarian parties, Miklos Duray, chairman of Coexistence, stressed that passive behavior, based only on a wish for survival, is no longer sufficient:

[Begin Duray recording] The message of 1848 is that we ourselves want to sort out our own affairs. The 15 March 1848 event was a dignified declaration of self-determination, which was supported by the popular will. Self-determination is not a speculative value; it is a natural, innate demand, like love and desire. [end recording]

Three Platforms Formed in Coexistence Movement

AU1403190295 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by "dos": "Formation of Three Platforms Within Coexistence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Klasov/Bratislava—The National Council of the Coexistence movement met at Klasov on 11 March to discuss preparations for the Fifth Coexistence Congress. The National Council familiarized itself with proposals for the formation of platforms within the movement. The proposal for the formation of a Conservative Platform was presented by Z. Komlosy; the proposal for the formation of a Social Platform by Deputy E. Bauer of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; and the proposal for the formation of a Liberal

Platform by Z. Boros and L. Florian. The formation of platforms is in conformity with Coexistence statutes. The National Council adopted the principle whereby leading representatives of the movement will not join any platform. It also approved the proposal to incorporate the conclusions from the Komarno rally of January 1994 into the Coexistence program. In the opinion of Coexistence, the treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovak Republic will contribute to stability and integration only when relations between the two countries are built on a foundation of trust.

Culture Minister: Media Situation 'Unbearable'

AU1403183695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Mar 95
p 2

[TASR report: "Who Dictates Opinion? Ivan Hudec Does Not Consider Fekete's Proposal Bad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Two problems need to be sorted out at present. On the one hand, how to secure freedom of expression and the citizen's right to information and, on the other, how to prevent the dissemination of incomplete and half-true information

that, in the final analysis, is damaging to the citizens," Culture Minister Ivan Hudec told TASR in an interview.

The minister voiced the conviction that the impact of foreign capital on the Slovak mass media market was very strong, as a result of which the formation of public opinion and, hence, political influence also assume a completely different nature. Therefore, he does not consider the proposal submitted by Deputy Jan Fekete that did not concern just raising the value-added tax on periodicals with foreign capital up to five times and that needlessly provoked a wave of resentment to be bad. "I agreed with many parts of that proposal because they fitted in with my ideas," Ivan Hudec continued, adding that "in essence, the issue was to make each periodical denote its publisher or owner so that the reader knows who is supplying information to him."

Ivan Hudec regards a situation in which 90 percent of the information supplied to the citizen of the Slovak Republic is at odds with that provided by the official state power, elected by a majority of the population, to be unbearable. According to his words, this fact raises the question of whether mass media in Slovakia are not in the hands of a narrow group of people who dictate their opinion to the majority of the population.

Treaty With Romania Not Ready by 20 Mar*LD1603115395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 16 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty will not be ready by 20 March, the date when the European stability conference begins, it was announced a short time ago in Budapest after discussions between the Hungarian and Romanian foreign ministers. Laszlo Kovacs and Teodor Melescanu agreed that there is no possibility of reaching agreement on the open issues in the days that remain. The talks between experts, however, will continue. Correspondent Levente Sukosd supplies the details:

[Sukosd] Neither side regards today's round of talks as a failure, but they acknowledge that it would have been advantageous for both countries if the basic treaty had been ready before the European stability conference in Paris.

Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs considered it fruitful that a decision was made today not to break off or discontinuation the talks, but to continue talks—at the level of experts—on the remaining open questions concerning minority issues. Neither side objects to the content of the disputed issues, but opinions diverge considerably in interpretation and wording, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said.

It was said that both sides will continue to work to conclude a basic treaty as soon as possible. Both ministers believe that the talks will just be facilitated by the fact that, from now on, there will not be the constraint of having a specific deadline.

Kovacs Discusses 'Difficult' Slovak Negotiations*LD1503174295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's visit to Budapest tomorrow, Peter Marvanyi questioned Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs on the phone:

[Begin recording] [Marvanyi] You should really be present at two meetings tomorrow.

[Kovacs] Yes. The meeting with Foreign Minister Melescanu will start at 0900, and a prime ministers meeting between Gyula Horn and Vladimir Meciar will take place [in Komarno, on the Slovak-Hungarian border] at 1500. If the Romanian-Hungarian foreign ministers meeting takes longer than planned, I will probably not take part in the talks in Komarno.

[Marvanyi] It seems the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty has become the more difficult one.

[Kovacs] Indeed, yesterday the Slovak side came up with a new draft text leaving out already coordinated passages, particularly those in which the text mutually agreed on was closer to the Hungarian side's position;

and they included the Slovak proposals in those questions that have been left open so far during the expert consultations. Well, naturally, I told Minister Schenk that on this basis—assuming that we would accept the Slovak position in order to simplify the matter—we would certainly not be able to agree.

As far as the border issue is concerned, this is typically a kind of matter in which Vladimir Meciar earlier, last Saturday [11 March], already indicated his readiness to agree, to which we can return. This matter will be solved there. As regards the minority issue, the debate is about which European norms to refer to. Hungary interprets the European norms in a wider sense. We list more documents here, while the Slovak position accepts a narrower interpretation and defines the European norms with fewer documents. Tomorrow, the two prime ministers will have to decide which documents the treaty will refer to and what kind of definitions will be included in the basic treaty, after all. [end recording]

State Secretary Tabajdi Views Basic Treaties*AU1503183695 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 14 Mar 95 p 4*

[Interview with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Office of the Prime Minister, by Zsolt Ivan Nagy; place and date not given: "The Domestic Political Debate Can Increase Divisions Among Hungarians Abroad—State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi on the Basic Treaties, the World Federation of Hungarians, and the 15 March Celebrations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Nagy] Will you, as a political state secretary supervising the Office for Hungarians Abroad and the National Ethnic Minority Office, see it as success or a failure if the Hungarian-Slovak and the Hungarian-Romanian bilateral treaties are signed by 20 March, and if these happen to contain fewer national minority protection guarantees than wished for by the Hungarians living abroad?

[Tabajdi] In the past few months, we have made it clear a number of times that we do not wish to sign either bilateral basic treaty without asking the Hungarians abroad. In the past months, we have held 15 consultations with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Transylvania [RMDSZ; in Romanian, UDMR] and 10 with the Hungarian coalition in Slovakia, and the 1 March meeting of the Hungarian prime minister and the leaders of the Hungarian communities of the Carpathian Basin was a culminating point in this process. The Hungarian Government's stance on the basic rights and guarantees necessary for Hungarians abroad was reiterated at this meeting. This means a legally binding representation of three international documents in the basic treaties: the CSCE's Copenhagen decision, the UN statement on national minorities, and the Council of Europe Parliamentary General Assembly's Recommendation No. 1201.

The issue of guarantees is the other key element on which Hungarian politics has neither made nor wishes to make any concessions. We consider it necessary to set up bilateral joint committees with the aim of examining how the stipulations of the basic treaties are implemented, especially the documents that are seen as legally binding and the prescriptions of the national minority framework agreement. It is a further important element of the guarantee system that the national minority high commissioner of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the Council of Europe monitoring system, and the future control mechanism of the European stability cooperation should also have rights and a role in this area. We would like the affected governments to be able to turn to these international forums if they deem it necessary. In my view, this is a clear and unequivocal stance: This can mean the minimum for the Hungarians abroad that can be achieved with the neighbors; and, for us, the minimum without which a basic treaty cannot be accepted from a national minority point of view.

[Nagy] However, the minority Hungarians expect more.

[Tabajdi] At the 1 March meeting, the minority organizations considered the Hungarian draft that had been handed over in early February as basically acceptable. They naturally also explained at the meeting that they could imagine more than this. At the same time, the question has to be asked in the form of: What is the minimum that does not damage our national interests and that can be accepted by our partners? Naturally, we could also start from a higher level; then we would risk even those achievements that can possibly be reached, still within this phase. This is a big dilemma and all political forces, the government, and the opposition have to face it.

[Nagy] Following his talks with Gyula Horn, RMDSZ Executive Chairman Csaba Takacs said that the RMDSZ has not yet seen an acceptable draft.

[Tabajdi] I do not know how exactly this was said, because RMDSZ Chairman Bela Marko has said differently. Differences on one or two important issues—namely the issue of regional autonomy—did exist between the RMDSZ's stance and the Hungarian draft handed over in February. However, the organization's statements reflected the above opinion. [passage omitted]

[Nagy] We have mentioned that the views of Hungarians abroad are not united. Is it possible that some people might be disappointed with the government's policy and turn to the World Federation of Hungarians instead, for support and help?

[Tabajdi] In the case of the basic treaty, rather than discussing the concrete texts and the concrete facts, the issue has long been a subject of explicit domestic political battling, which is a sign in itself. Therefore, both the government and the opposition should reconsider their

views before this debate becomes more aggravated, because its effects would mainly be felt by the ethnic Hungarians. This makes them even less certain when they already have many uncertainties. Much of the hope has been lost, and problems exist in their obtaining true and credible information. In contrast with the Hungarian side, Bucharest launched an essentially public and almost national debate on the issues in question that, in its one-sidedness, has contributed to the ethnic Hungarians' becoming less certain as to where the ethnic Hungarians will turn and what tools they will choose. One thing is obvious: The current Hungarian Government has resources, tasks, and obligations that cannot be taken on by any kind of civic organization. At the same time, Hungarian public life appears to be becoming dangerously polarized regarding these already delicate issues, and here we have had no really effective politics to show since Trianon. [passage omitted]

[Nagy] To remain with this issue: What processes can be launched among the ethnic Hungarians by the signing of the basic treaties and the debates and differences of opinions?

[Tabajdi] I do not think we should answer this with predictions. The question is tendentious from the outset in assuming that the basic treaty can only cause damage to the ethnic Hungarians. It leaves out the chance for which it is expedient to make this agreement alongside adequate national minority guarantees. This chance means that Hungarian national minority policy and Hungarian foreign policy could be made free, because none of our neighbors would be able to say that the Hungarian Republic has other, suspicious, intentions behind justifiably raising the cause of ethnic Hungarians.

[Nagy] The question was not intended to be tendentious, it only referred to the well-known conflicts that exist within and among the ethnic Hungarian organizations and parties.

[Tabajdi] This is precisely the reason I consider the domestic political debate dangerous—because it can even increase this polarization and disharmony among the Hungarians abroad. It is a fact that these divisions exist anyway. [passage omitted]

Bank Launches New Forint Devaluation System
AU1603130795 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by "B.K.": "The New Forint Devaluation System Starts Today—According to Suranyi, the Growing Indebtedness Can Also Be Managed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new exchange rate policy of the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] goes into effect today: In the first six months, the forint will be devalued by 0.41 percent every Thursday, and in the second half of the year by 0.29 percent each week, MNB Chairman Gyorgy Suranyi announced at a news conference on 14

March. Suranyi indicated that, according to their calculations, inflation of 24-26 percent can be expected this year.

Suranyi said that the balance of payments deficit was \$3.9 billion last year, which resulted in a total state administration deficit of 450-460 billion forints. This is 9 percent of GDP. On the basis of its current stabilization measures, the government wishes to reduce this deficit to 6 percent of GDP. In agreement with the government, the central bank rejected the idea of further reducing the business sector's credit needs: Entrepreneurs can take on 300 billion forints in loans this year and they can also get almost \$1 billion worth of loans from abroad. Their decision was motivated by the desire to avoid a deep recession's accompanying the unavoidable strict measures. Reducing expenditure was the only alternative left. The central bank is building its strict 1995 monetary policy, which equally serves sustainable growth and balanced improvement, on the government's stabilization measures.

The MNB is launching the new exchange rate system today. The essence of this is that, in place of the tactics of small steps, it will apply a preannounced, fixed-rate sliding devaluation from now on. According to Suranyi, this method makes the exchange rate policy more predictable for the economy's participants and makes it easier to counter speculation. After the 9 percent forint devaluation on 13 March, the MNB will devalue the forint compared with the basket of currencies at an equal weekly rate, by 1.9 percent per month until 30 June and then by a maximum of 1.3 percent a month in the second six months.

Suranyi described it as an important enterprise stimulation measure that the business sector's obligation to exchange its foreign currency will be abolished. They will be able to deposit certified foreign exchange income from foreign trade activities with domestic banks. Until the necessary legislation is completed, the MNB will authorize the opening of foreign exchange accounts by enterprises on an individual basis. Suranyi also said that a new code of foreign exchange will soon be drawn up.

The rules for trade banks to keep compulsory reserves are also becoming stricter, Suranyi indicated. The compulsory rate of reserve will be increased by 1 percent as of 16 April. (The reserve of investment banks will increase by a smaller amount.) Suranyi believes that, along with the stricter conditions, it will be possible to increase the competitiveness of trade banks. Also as of 16 April, the MNB will increase the level of interest paid: instead of the previous 12 percent, 14 percent will be paid on the reserve kept in forint deposits and 5 percent more will be paid on reserves in foreign currency deposits. It is a further constraint that the banking system's short-term refinancing order will also change from mid-April: The MNB is reducing the repo limits.

Suranyi said that according to their calculations, inflation will be at 24 to 26 percent this year. With the

balance-improving measures, the country's gross foreign indebtedness will increase. However, they will be able to manage the debts—along with adequate reserves and relatively favorable debt servicing rates.

Article Says Budget Deficit Continues To Grow

*AU1603081295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
11 Mar 95 p 5*

[Unattributed report: "The Budget Deficit Continued To Increase This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a Finance Ministry report, the budget deficit stood at 83.6 billion forints [HUF] in February, a figure deriving from expenses of HUF252.1 billion and income of HUF168.5 billion. The deficit approved by parliament for this year is 18 percent higher than the one approved for 1994, but the budget deficit in the first two months of 1995 is already 40 percent higher than the one prevailing at the same time in 1994. The February budget deficit is connected with the uncertainty of budget incomes. The delay in payments and saving measures could not counterbalance the lack of incomes. Economic units paid into the budget a surplus of HUF15.5 billion, but these billions could not counterbalance the lack of HUF25 billion planned from privatization income and the delay in the flow of consumer taxes estimated at HUF20 billion.

In the first two months of 1995, the budget received HUF52.4 billion from the economic units. Income from the value-added tax [VAT] in the second month of 1995 was considerably behind the prognosis. The income from VAT in February made up only 0.4 percent of the planned sum—HUF154 million—while the 1994 VAT income stood at HUF12.1 billion. At the same time, compared with the HUF33.3 billion in February 1994, the general VAT claims increased to HUF52.9 billion in February 1995. Budget payments made by the population reached HUF47.8 billion in the first two months of 1995, some HUF5.2 billion more than at the same time last year. The greater part of this surplus income, namely HUF4.5 billion, appeared at the payment of personal income tax.

Budget support for economic units in the first two months of 1995 stood at HUF17.1 billion. Some HUF4.3 billion were paid as consumer price compensation and HUF5.3 billion were paid as government investments at the end of February 1995. The budget contributed HUF7 billion to the social security expenses. The budget paid HUF17.8 billion as family allowances and HUF14.8 billion as welfare benefits and compensations. No budget payments were made for the partial compensation of the energy price increases in February. The budget paid HUF33.5 billion on subsidies to central budget bodies in February. Budget expenses connected with the domestic debt made up HUF54.1 billion in the first two months of 1995, with most of this sum—about HUF32.2 billion—used for interest payments. The budget allocated a total of HUF53.9 billion to servicing the debts.

A net financing need of HUF73.5 billion appeared in the first two months of 1995. In addition, there was also need to renew the payments on credits, shares, and treasury bonds worth HUF181.1 billion. Thus, the gross financing need grew to a total of HUF254.6 billion.

MIEP Leader Accuses Government of 'Dictatorship'

LD1503204895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Like last year, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] and the Hungarian Way Circles held a rally in front of the building of Hungarian Television at Szabadsag Square today. The keynote speaker was Istvan Csurka. Attila Kert reports from the scene:

[Kert] An anti-Hungarian, treacherous, and corrupt government is ruling Hungary. In its history, the nation has never been in greater danger than it is now. Istvan Csurka told a rally of at least 10,000 people at Szabadsag Square. The MIEP chairman spoke about the strangers who have foisted themselves upon the nation and said that a dictatorship is ruling the country; it is the rich nomenklatura that decided on who should have the opportunity to pursue a career. A rational, calculated destruction of the nation is taking place because room is needed for somebody else, Csurka said.

Csurka then outlined a short program to his followers. This included the temporary suspension of foreign debt repayments, the introduction of a privatization that reflects the interests of the nation, and the allocation of land to all those who are eligible for compensation. The chairman of the MIEP, which has no parliamentary seat, demanded the election of new chairmen to head Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television on the basis of a broad consensus, and he also demanded that the people elect the president of the Republic directly.

'Extreme-Right-Wing' Leader Addresses Gathering

LD1503134295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the 15 March event of the Hungarian Welfare Association, the government was sharply criticized and described outright as antination. Cochairman Albert Szabo, who was earlier the leader of the World Nation-People's Rule Party, which was banned because of its being unconstitutional, was speaking in front of 200-250 shorthaired young people wearing leather jackets with Arpad stripe armbands.

Albert Szabo, who was greeted as a leader in the crowd, stated: The country's leaders are mercilessly gutting [kiszigerel] the population—but in his opinion there is a way out. The extreme-right-wing politician said that racial and national self-awareness must be strengthened

[eroesiteni kell a faji es a nemzeti oentudatot], but for this there is first of all a need to gain political power.

Compensation via Land Said Damaging Agriculture

95CH0121A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Jan 95 p 13

[Article by Jozsef V. Farkas: "The Damages of Land Compensation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It has become certain by now that compensation—the most important land distribution in Hungary—has caused damages that are difficult to repair. The fragmentation of land property, unprecedented in Hungary's history, is contrary to modern agricultural practices and makes sensible farming by the new owners impossible.*

The property settlement that followed the change of regimes involved half of Hungary's land, i.e., 5.1 million hectares. These areas were assigned, or will be distributed in the near future, to 2.2 million owners. The picture is not too as bright when one considers that 2.5 million hectares were distributed among 600,000 compensated persons, with each person's receiving an average 4.2 hectares of property.

According to the official terminology used in this new distribution of land, 1.3 million proportionate owners—most of whom are retired members of cooperatives—acquired an average of 1.6 hectares land. The 500,000 state farm workers who had not owned any land earlier did not fare any better either, for they too received only 1.7 hectares of land each.

They Are Concentrating in the West

While the land surveyors are diligently walking the Hungarian fallows and distributing properties, the exact opposite is happening in the West. Properties are being concentrated. In Denmark, which is often referred to as a model country, the average size of land properties has increased from 20 hectares to 31 hectares in ten years. During the same time, the income of an average farm tripled, while the number of farmers decreased by 37 percent. The situation is similar in France, where the size of farms has increased from 21 hectares to 29 hectares. These averages reveal significant efforts toward concentration. Sixty-nine percent of the Danish farms and 72 percent of the French farms are larger than 30 hectares.

Unsuitable for Business

The deviation from the desired western models is spectacular, all the more as the land properties distributed as compensation are not necessarily single, continuous pieces. The method of compensation forecast its shadow, and it was apparent at its announcement that farmers would bicker for the better-quality lands that are available. The average 4.2-hectare properties of the 600,000 new owners are in excess of one million pieces—which

has a negative effect on the efficiency of farming. Obviously, farming on smaller lands is relatively more expensive, and these small farmers cannot even make a living by farming.

Experts who are capable of separating themselves from politics have voiced the opinion from the very beginning of compensation that, because of the size of the properties and the lack of capital by the owners, the new property structure is unsuitable for family businesses. This view is now supported by the numbers. According to statistics, 35,000 full-time family businesses started farming, and about two-thirds of them have 10-20 hectares of land. They would need 60 billion forints' worth of buildings and 100 billion forints worth of machinery to increase the efficiency and success of their businesses. Even if the new owners do not make the investments all at once but spread them out over a five-year period, they would have to spend an average of one million forints annually. Obviously, few entrepreneurs have that kind of money.

In addition, it is difficult for them to get loans, for they cannot provide any collateral demanded by banks. The land credit bureau, for which people have been waiting for a long time, will not offer any solutions either. At the biddings that followed the compensation, a piece of land that was worth one gold crown was sold for 600 forints, i.e., the value of one hectare of land is 12,000 to 15,000 forints. This sum covers less than half of the overhead and, consequently, collateral for loans continues to be lacking.

Even the more cautious farmers, who had little hope for successful farming to begin with, fared badly. Although they leased their lands to hopeful people and to cooperatives, they asked ridiculously low fees—3,000 to 5,000 forints per hectare—which cannot even be considered supplements to pensions.

Remnants of Property With No Yield

Most Hungarian farmers continue to live off the cooperatives, with gradually decreasing standards of living. These joint farms operated for years in an antagonistic political climate and under gradually deteriorating economic conditions. They used up their equipment and reserves. Most of them, having lost most of their assets, became bad credit risks, and their remaining assets bring no yields, i.e., they are less and less able to provide a haven for the owners who believe in the [idea of the] cooperative.

Thus, the method of agrarian privatization based on compensation, has ended in failure. It began certain processes in agriculture—which was declining to begin with—the damage of which will be extremely difficult to repair.

Political Scientist: SZDSZ Controls Media

95CH0177B Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian 23 Feb 95
pp 8-9

[Interview with Bela Pokol, professor of political science at Lorand Eotvos University Law School, by Andras Mink; place and date not given: "There Are Also Other Roosters in the Barnyard"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Bela Pokol is professor of political science at Lorand Eotvos University Law School. (His colleagues include Mihaly Bihari, who has won a seat as a Socialist MP; Istvan Schlett, well known from the media; and Laszlo Urban, affiliated with FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats].) In recent weeks Pokol has been in the thick of politics. In MAGYAR NEMZET he published articles that provoked several people to debate him. And the mysterious meeting he organized in his departmental office has received much publicity. It was a meeting for the opposition, but without Torgyan and his followers. However, two popular MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] politicians also attended.*

[Mink] You recently wrote two articles in MAGYAR NEMZET. The leitmotiv of each was that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] conquest of the cultural sphere has to be stopped, specifically by ousting the party from power. Why do you think that the cultural struggle is the most important terrain of Hungarian politics?

[Pokol] During and after the change of political systems, the development of Hungarian politics was based on the media. The reason behind this was that the parties, lacking real prehistories, emerged through the media rather than from their natural, traditional, historical bases, which is the customary way in the developed democracies. Culture, and within it the media, are the main forum and terrain for shaping the political will. That is why the media have been the key issue, and the main scene, of political struggle from the very first moment of the change of political systems. But there is also a deeper projection to this question. It can be said that the whole of Hungarian culture, and even Hungarian scientific life, are media-oriented. To be a serious scientist or artist in Hungary, one has to reach that status through the media. Anyone stranded outside the media virtually does not exist. Intellectuals, specifically the ones who gain a role in the media, are the real shapers of politics and culture. And since everything is centered in Budapest, it essentially means that a rather closed elite within the capital's intellectuals, espousing identical views and occupying decisionmaking positions, plays the principal role in this.

[Mink] If this is true, it is not exactly healthy. Should we not be concerned that the shifting of cultural struggle to the forefront of attention will reproduce this unhealthy situation?

[Pokol] It is indeed unhealthy, but that is the situation. And if that is the situation, it cannot be swept under the rug. We cannot pretend that it does not exist. The

ousting from this sphere of those who do not belong to the elite, and of dissenters, is taking place before our very eyes. Specifically those who are in possession are the ones who refuse to talk about this. In the autumn of 1993, at the time when the media bill failed to pass, an SZDSZ notable said that we really did not need a Media Law.

A small but militant and vociferous group of Free Democrats—or rather, a group of intellectuals behind them—controls the media. That of course does not mean the entire SZDSZ or its present leadership. Indeed, one often hears the present leadership complain that the small group of militants is causing plenty of problems for them as well, but the leadership either does not dare or is unable to oppose them.

[Mink] Specifically whom do you have in mind?

[Pokol] It was Henrik Havas who said, about two years ago, that no radio program could be produced without "the third floor," regardless of who was president. The third floor meant the editorial office of *168 ORA* [*168 Hours*] and its associated parts. That speaks for itself.

[Mink] And they were fired from Hungarian Radio. But what made them Free Democrats?

[Pokol] Well, their vast majority were Free Democrats. Moreover, they represent the most militant wing of the SZDSZ. Sandor Szenasi, Peter Gyorgy and Tamas Ungvari constitute, let us say, the real hard core. They are the ones who respond the most aggressively to everything. The mildest criticism triggers streams of hatred from them. This became so irritating that, after a time, they were sidelined.

[Mink] If they were sidelined, then what constitutes the SZDSZ's formidable conquest?

[Pokol] They were sidelined only temporarily. The most extreme among them are perhaps still sidelined. But Peter Gyorgy, as Gabor Fodor's adviser, is one of the top men in the Ministry of Culture and Education. In their time, Csurka and his followers were ousted from power. There is no sign of that happening now.

[Mink] The ouster of Csurka and his followers was not very perceptible within Hungarian Television at the time. If the scenario for stopping the SZDSZ were realized, how would that make information more balanced?

[Pokol] It is not worth pondering who started it all. Who is in power is what counts. And the experience is that those who are in power today are mercilessly settling scores with their opponents. There were *Apak és Fiuk* [*Fathers and Sons*] and similar things here. Szuhay's *Parabola*, its level and tone, were inexcusable, although understandable to some extent. These people were not simply Csurka followers. Here dozens of persons bore decades-old wounds. It is one thing to hate in full

possession of power, and quite another thing to do so completely cornered. The risk is not the same.

[Mink] There are no large-scale dismissals within either Hungarian Radio or Hungarian Television. Or at least one does not hear about them.

[Pokol] Dismissals are going on quietly nevertheless. One by one, people are placed in an impossible situation, after which can come retirement or some other, more refined, form of bloodless separation. It is not necessary to fire someone to take him out of circulation. Szilard Nyakas, for instance, has been squeezed into a 4-square-meter cubbyhole in one of the building's rear wings. He fits in only if he hangs his feet out the window. And it is not worth firing someone, because he could then collect severance pay. If there is nothing else he can do, he will eventually leave of his own accord.

[Mink] Zoltan Bathory, Janos Csirik and Istvan Borbolya occupy the top posts within the Ministry of Culture and Education. Although the SZDSZ, or rather Gabor Fodor, brought them there, they have never been linked directly to the party and they do not belong to the inner circles of "the capital's intellectuals." Of the newer top officials, mostly Andras Torok might be included here, but he too could hardly be called a militant. To my knowledge, there have been no mass dismissals in the ministry, either. What do you say to that?

[Pokol] The information I have is quite different. To my knowledge, there has been a complete change of guards, down to the section-chief level. That should be investigated. But perhaps this is not what is essential. Rather than they, it is Peter Gyorgy and Andras Torok who personify the ministry politically. One of them has repeatedly proved to be intolerant and aggressive; the other admits to complete ignorance of state administration. That is explicitly a violation of the Constitution.

[Mink] In your opinion, why are these media intellectuals linked to an SZDSZ that had no power previously and has only limited power now? What can the SZDSZ give them that they could not get elsewhere?

[Pokol] That linkage stems from a common culture, from identical socialization. After the war, intellectuals in Budapest quickly came together and found each other, led also by their legitimate grievances.

[Mink] If I understood you correctly, you mean the capital's Jewish intellectuals?

[Pokol] From a sociological point of view, that group does indeed play a decisive role among them, but that does not mean the Jews in general. In fact, the reception of my articles in that quarter has been directly favorable. This militant group irritates them as well. And they sense more keenly what dangers this situation harbors.

[Mink] Peter Tolgyessy wrote in *BESZELO* last week that it was in the opposition's obvious interest to leave

the SZDSZ stuck in the coalition. But you are urging that the SZDSZ be gotten rid of as soon as possible.

[Pokol] There are opposition leaders—Viktor Orban, for instance—who believe that the ruling parties ought to fall together. In my opinion, the present situation is dangerous. The SZDSZ's preponderance in the media and the cultural sphere is so great that it demands immediate action. The prevailing one-sidedness is about to threaten the feasibility of public life, of the democratic exchange of views and the freedom of political choice.

[Mink] Do you consider it possible that the opposition parties, which wanted to lay down before the "Warsaw express," will find a common tone with the Socialists?

[Pokol] Politics is the art of opportunities and compromises. The opposition parties and the Socialists have common interests. Stopping the SZDSZ is an important common interest, and is urgent also from the country's point of view.

[Mink] In your opinion, why did the media bill fail to go through?

[Pokol] After the elections, Andras Sajo and his associates drafted a media bill that would have handed over the mass media entirely to the [journalistic] profession. That would have been intolerable, because a narrow power elite within the profession would have gained

permanent control of the media. The Socialists, too, recognized this danger. The media bill's defeat was due to the opposition of Ferenc Kosa and his followers.

[Mink] The mass media cannot be handed over to the profession, and strengthening the government's influence raises constitutional concerns. The Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation attempting to strengthen the government's influence was unconstitutional. What, then, is the solution?

[Pokol] The solution is very simple. Supervision of the media ought to be entrusted to a wide board of trustees, on which every important opinion-forming group within society would be represented. That would make it impossible for a single group to expropriate the media. The churches, minorities, political parties, and various professional organizations would have seats on this board.

[Mink] If there were so many players in the game, would they be able to agree on anything? Who would be producing the programs, while the board debated endlessly?

[Pokol] I am not saying this would be easy, but everyone must take cognizance of the fact that there are also other roosters in the barnyard. It would still be better than the uncontrolled and exclusive power of a small group.

Presidium on NIK, Presidential Election

WS1603124295 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish
16 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by "ASS": "The Presidium of the Sejm on NIK and Presidential Elections: Insoluble"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *During its first news conference, the new Presidium of the Sejm was unanimous in saying that there currently exist no rational reasons for dissolving parliament. The speaker and deputy speakers also discussed the operations of the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) and the presidential elections.*

"According to the Constitution, the presidential elections must take place between 22 October and 22 December. At the moment, I do not see any reason to hold them at the first possible date," said Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych on Wednesday. He voiced the reservation, however, that it is still too early to talk of any specific date. Zych ensured that he will consult with other political groups on his decision concerning a date for the elections.

Journalists also inquired about the possibility of replacing the president of NIK in connection with the new NIK law. Speaker Zych did not rule out the probability that Lech Kaczynski might be demoted, but he did state that this would occur no earlier than in one month's time. "No decisions have been made on that issue as yet," said Zych, adding that one of NIK's deputy presidents, Antoni Pietkiewicz, has already handed in his resignation.

For the time being, the Presidium of the Sejm has decided to "activate NIK operations." The speaker reported that parliament has required NIK to carry out several audits, for instance at Bank Handlowy and the Agency for Farm Property. The operations of Michal Strak, former head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and the privatization process will also be examined.

According to the Presidium, there are no legitimate reasons for parliament to be dissolved. "The Sejm continues to work normally," the speaker and deputy speakers agreed. Only [Deputy Sejm Speaker] Olga Krzyzanowska admitted the likelihood of such an eventuality. "Not everything depends on the Sejm itself. If, for example, the coalition clashes again and creates a new government, problems will arise," said Krzyzanowska.

Oleksy Answers Glemp on Communists in Government

LD1503222195 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish
2000 GMT 15 Mar 95

[From the "Panorama" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Primate Glemp has reminded everyone that, so far, there has been no moral settling of

accounts with the People's Republic of Poland and the Polish United Workers Party. Many people in the government and the parliament come from the old structures. I am not accusing them of anything, said the primate, but I ask: Have the changes been deep enough to guarantee the new Poland?

[Begin Glemp recording] Can a man who for years was trained and brought up by the Marxist system and who ended up reaching a high enough level of proficiency and Marxist maturity to become a member of the Central Committee, and who is now having to build new Poland... [changes thought] I simply have doubts about this kind of thing. [end recording]

We have asked Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy to comment on this statement:

[Begin recording] [Oleksy] There is too much of the confessional kind of context in this. This is a terribly private affair for each person. I could say jokingly: The primate and the episcopate cannot answer a similar kind of question: namely, can they guarantee that the believers in Poland will every day observe the Ten Commandments? This is not a matter of guarantees, this is a matter of human conscience.

[Correspondent] I quote: One should ask a question—Is Poland really governed by communists today? There are no correct answers to this question because there has been no settling of accounts with the Polish People's Republic or the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], no settling of accounts in the moral sense. That is why we see in Poland people, many of them in the government and the parliament and in many official offices, who come from the PZPR. Hence, this rather reasonable question: By whom are we governed?

[Oleksy] I think this question is badly put. I am concerned that the primate puts it this way. This is a question asked not as one of moral issues but as a question of very political issues. If someone shouted out: The primate is encouraging me to settle scores with everyone who today holds public office, such a person could be motivated by this kind of statement made by the primate. I am very worried about this, and I am most surprised by such a challenge. After all, there is a challenge contained in this question that can only be answered by saying that the wrong people are in the government. This kind of thing is pure politics. [end recording]

Oleksy Remarks on 'Unfriendly' Media Atmosphere

LD1503211395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program
Network in Polish 1800 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has decided that the reaction of government spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska to the way that television's "Wiadomosci" [news] bulletin provided information on the work of the new Cabinet was too harsh. The primate

minister said that the unfriendly atmosphere surrounding his government is sufficiently documented and that he does not have to make statements on the subject:

[Begin Oleksy recording] I have been accused by the newspapers of attempting to gain control of television. It seems that someone is just talking about this because it did not even cross my mind. Nevertheless, this has become a topic of comment in the press. Perhaps it has to be this way. The unfriendly atmosphere around this government has been sufficiently documented, and I do not have to make statements about it.

People in Poland saw for themselves what the attitude was toward the government, which was in the process of being formed, where the stresses were put. However, this is probably a principle that applies to political pluralism and free mass media. [end recording]

Plenipotentiary on Reform of Economic Ministries

WS1503142995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Ministries of Treasury, Economy, Economic Infrastructure, and Integration Will Be Set Up; Center Reformed by New Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reform of the economic center is to come into force on 1 January 1996. In the regulation adopted yesterday, the Council of Ministers decided that the government should appoint its plenipotentiary, who would be responsible for preparing this reform. Last week Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said that a good candidate for this post would be former Industry Minister Marek Pol. Oleksy stated yesterday: "Reform of the economic center has already been decided; however, it will not be carried out just for show. This reform must be implemented really well and, if possible, in a short time." Appointment of a plenipotentiary will be possible only after the regulation of the Council of Ministers comes into force.

The tasks of the plenipotentiary will comprise initiating and organizing the work related to preparing legal acts, to preparing the schedule of work on the reform, and to initiating this work and coordinating it.

The plenipotentiary is supposed to present agreed draft laws by 30 May. The government also decided that it is necessary to link work on next year's budget to the reform in question. Therefore, he obligated the finance minister to allow for changes in the structure of the central governmental establishments in the budget bill.

Marek Pol, candidate for government plenipotentiary for the reform of the economic center, decided to assume this office only yesterday. He submitted a condition that the Council of Ministers should approve the aforementioned schedule. The Council of Ministers accepted this condition—that is, it committed itself to implementing

the reform. This means not only that several ministries will be combined, but also that the functions of some of them will be changed.

During the first stage of the process, new ministries would be set up: the ministry of the economy, state treasury, economic integration with the West, and economic infrastructure. Marek Pol told RZECZPOSPOLITA that the final decision of the government and the coalition on the structure of the center must be made in May because the 1995 budget bill must provide for the new structure of the government. "If it turned out that the date 1 January is out of the question, I would resign from the office of plenipotentiary," Marek Pol told us. "For me, this is a contract to do concrete work, and I assume that this work will be done by the end of the year," he said.

According to him, neither the coalition nor the opposition put in question the necessity to carry out a reform of the center, and this necessity is seen as increasingly more urgent as the new government comes to power. The previous governments did not do it not because they did not want to, but because this was difficult—from a political, legal, and organizational point of view. Therefore, there is a risk that everyone will be in favor of the reform, but each of them will understand it a little differently, the plenipotentiary said. He believes that the present configuration, convenient to many people because of personal and branch-related interests and going back to the times of the reform carried out by Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner, does not fit in the current situation.

Marek Pol lists four reasons that a reform of the economic center is indispensable:

- difficulties in coordinating economic policies and making decisions in the government;
- the need to set in order the state's ownership issues and problems of administering property; an inventory of this property must be drawn up; and the supervision and administering rules must be uniformed;
- adjusting the administration to the surroundings—to the reformed economy and the European structures;
- changing the model of the functioning of the Finance Ministry—it should focus on public finances; according to plans, the new Ministry of Economy will deal with long-term programs, while the Finance Ministry will work on one-year programs, mainly seen from the viewpoint of the budget's interests.

Bills on new ministries should be prepared in the first half of this year. In the second half it will be necessary to amend a few dozen other laws. Some of these amendments will be minor; however, all laws concerning the economy should be reviewed to make them more uniform.

Marek Pol believes that the reform of the center must be carried out in stages, so that the administration performing its duties right now will not be disorganized. For example, the new Ministry of Treasury does not necessarily have to take over all of the ownership functions immediately and start administering the great property of the state. It can do this gradually, step by step; first, it may focus on setting the legislation in order.

The concept presented by Marek Pol is similar to the proposal of reforming the economic center prepared by a team headed by Jan Monkiewicz, one of the closest aides of Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko. Implementation of this concept was one of the conditions that Kolodko submitted before he agreed to remain in the government. Professor Monkiewicz's team will cooperate with Marek Pol, who now says that, thanks to this, he will not have to start from scratch. The office of the plenipotentiary will be set up in the Office of the Council of Ministers. Marek Pol believes that the office will employ over 20 persons, including experts.

"I used to work with most of the members of the present government, and I believe that at least some of them trust me. I want to take advantage of this fact and try to win them over to the decisions and actions that are inevitable anyway. This is a process that is extremely difficult, but it is possible," says Marek Pol.

Okonski Outlines Criteria for Army, Arms Industry

*LD1603140095 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program
Network in Polish 1105 GMT 16 Mar 95*

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] National Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski has announced that, together with the

chief of staff, he will carry out a reorganization of both the civilian and the military parts of the ministry because of overstaffing.

The minister starts talks today to discuss the situation in the Army. The first person he will meet is Jerzy Szmajdziński, chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission.

Okonski said that Poland's prospective admission into NATO arouses concern. Officers must learn foreign languages. We must adapt to the command and information standards prevailing within the alliance. He emphasized that those who oppose this will simply have to take early retirement. There is no other option.

[Okonski] "Each change certainly results in uncertainty and concern about what will happen. It is obvious that officers have to learn foreign languages, particularly the younger ones. It is a known fact that younger people learn foreign languages more quickly. One cannot conceal this fact—there is a certain amount of opposition. The supreme commanders of our Army have accepted the fact that we are going to join NATO as their own doctrine. We are meeting our NATO partners and are adapting to their command-and-information standards. Those who oppose this will have to take early retirement."

The minister said that the ministry will place orders with Polish arms-industry enterprises provided the equipment is of the highest quality.

[Okonski] "We want the Polish arms industry to be modernized with the help of, among others, orders from the Polish Army. However, we must have the best available equipment. Polish industry will have greater opportunities to supply such equipment but must increase its efforts to meet our needs. There will be competition, there will be foreign suppliers who are in free competition in our market. We will see who is the best."

Minister Thanks Citizens for Behavior on 15 Mar*AU1603102095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 16 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The date of 15 March, Hungarians' most important holiday, was celebrated yesterday in several localities with ceremonies organized by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

The Cluj County prefect [Grigore Zanc] issued a communique expressing his appreciation for the citizens' dignified conduct, terming it a possible example and impetus for dialogue that should be followed by the politicians who try to perpetuate interethnic tension to suit their own purposes.

About half an hour ago we received a declaration issued by Mr. Doru Ioan Taracila, minister of interior, which we quote in full:

After the conclusion of the commemorative ceremonies organized on 15 March in certain localities in Transylvania, I am pleased to assert that no negative events were signalled during the time they took place. This state of facts demonstrates once more that, despite the pessimistic premonitions of certain extremist elements or press bodies, the citizens of the respective localities showed tolerance, civic maturity, balance, and wisdom, for which I wish to thank them warmly, unquote.

Military Cadres 'Placed on Reserve Duty'*AU1503182495 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Mar 95 p 16*

[Article by Oana Maiuga: "The Army has Placed 246 Military Cadres on Reserve"—all figures as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] In January 1995 the Ministry of National Defense placed 11 officers, 44 warrant officers, and 91 noncommissioned officers on reserve duty.

Five of the officers and four of the warrant and noncommissioned officers were found guilty of grave violations of laws and military regulations, meaning that they had caused losses, excessively consumed alcohol, and so on. Nine officers and seven warrant and noncommissioned

officers resigned. A total of 15 officers and 53 warrant and noncommissioned officers were placed on reserve for medical reasons. The latter were declared unfit for military service by medical panels.

Marko Denies UDMR Wants Close Ties to PDSR*AU1503165795 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11 Mar 95 p 2*

[Article by "S.P.A.": "The Hungarian Leaders in Our Country Need Allies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Bela Marko made a statement saying that the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] did not withdraw from the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] upon the initiative of the ethnic Hungarian party but that, rather, withdrawal was imposed on it by the position taken by the CDR [a reference to the 17 February CDR ultimatum demanding that the UDMR issue an unambiguous declaration acknowledging the national character of the Romanian state].

The UDMR decision was made following probing and attempts that lasted over several weeks and months intended to strengthen the alliance, although all these efforts were doomed to fail, eventually. The UDMR considers that it badly needs allies and therefore, while sticking to its current place in Romanian political life, it will make efforts to develop close ties—even partnership relations—with Romanian political parties. So far, they have not received any partnership offer from the so-called great coalition.

The UDMR leader considers the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] assessment claiming that his party favors rapprochement with the principal government party [the Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR] to be ridiculous. Marko pointed out that on 1 March, the PDSR published a communique harshly incriminating the UDMR, followed two days later by a UDMR reply categorically rejecting all their accusations. However, Marko did not deny that his party is ready to engage in a dialogue with the PDSR.

Ganic Predicts Recapture of Occupied Territories
*AU1403195595 Vienna ORF Television Network in
German 1830 GMT 14 Mar 95*

[Article by Ursula Stenzel, including recorded statements by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnian-Croatian Federation and a member of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, in Vienna on 14 March; Ganic speaks in English with superimposed German translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stenzel] One year ago, the Bosnian-Croatian Federation [as heard] was formed with the vigorous support of the United States. So far it has existed only on paper. Now the Bosnians and Croats [Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats] want to breathe life into this piece of paper. The Federation is to be confirmed once more during a ceremony in Washington on 16 March. Senior Bosnian and Croatian representatives have been discussing the project, which exists more in theory than in practice, in Vienna today.

The debate took place in the limelight at the Hofburg Palace today at the invitation of Foreign Minister Alois Mock and under the leadership of U.S. Ambassador Swanee Hunt. Like all events of this kind, the differences were more visible than the things that united the Bosnian and Croatian sides. Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation, stressed that he was speaking as a Croat and not as the highest representative of the Federation. Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation and vice president of the Bosnian Republic [title as heard], described the situation as follows: In this common home, the roof was built first. It is now important to establish the foundations. This is no simple task if one takes into consideration that this building has been torn into three pieces—the western part surrounding Bihac, central Bosnia, and a small enclave in the east, with the exception of the safe haven around Sarajevo. The whole territory is a battle zone, with a large part occupied by the Serbs. How should the Federation work?

[Ganic] Well, we have to establish the Federation on the territory that is free. We must be strong there so that we can recapture the occupied territories with this strength. That is the only way.

[Stenzel] A joint supreme command has already been created. How realistic is a Balkan army consisting of Croats and Bosnians?

[Ganic] We invite experts of friendly powers to supervise the formation of the joint army. Peace in the Balkans is only possible if Croats and Bosniaks join forces to create a balance with the Serbs—not necessarily to fight against them but to discourage them from further aggression.

'Revival' Deadline for Bonn Agreement Too Short
*LD1503135995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1236
GMT 15 Mar 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 15 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim and Croat representatives have said the deadline was too short for meeting provisions of an agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation 'Revival', signed in Bonn on March 10.

The Government of the Bosnian Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna has rejected the April 15 deadline for constituting all bodies necessary for the Muslim-Croat Federation to start operating, the Bosnian Croat radio Herceg-Bosna said Wednesday. The Bosnian Muslim side, the nominal Federal partner, does not believe, either, that these deadlines will be met, the deadlines set by the agreement reached under the patronage of German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

Bosnian Muslim party of Democratic Action Secretary-General Mirsad Ceman told a Muslim paper OSLOBODJENJE that the set deadlines were 'a result of a good intention rather than a possibility of actually implementing them.' Under the latest agreement on the 'Revival' of the Federation, which is virtually a dead letter, the future armed forces will carry no religious or national insignia. The Muslim-Croat Federation now has a formal joint army command without any authorization or directly subordinate units because the federal partners will not give up any of their state attributes such as army, police, currency, customs.

All disputes existing on the Federal level are even more drastic on the local level where they are increasingly often being resolved in arms. The nominal Federal partners have been trading obstruction allegations since the Muslim-Croat Federation was formally set up in Washington last March under the U.S.-sponsored Washington Agreement.

The Bosnian Croats keep saying that they have been unevenly represented in the Federation and illustrate this by saying that the Muslims account for two-thirds of the Federal Government, headed by Muslim Haris Silajdzic, while the Croats receive marginal offices.

Radio Herceg-Bosna on Tuesday quoted Herceg-Bosna Deputy Prime Minister Perica Jukic as saying that he would soon disclose damaging materials about Muslim leaders if they went on blackmailing and blaming the Croats alone for the crisis in the Federation. Jukic said that in Bosnian Muslim-controlled territories, Muslims ambushed and killed Croats, blew up their houses and forced their children to attend school classes based on Muslim curriculums strange to them.

Radio Herceg-Bosna said the Croats faced the most difficult situation in the central Bosnian town of Zenica where 5,200 of them had of late fled Muslim terror. The radio said the situation was much the same in the towns of Bugojno, Travnik, Vares, Kakanj, Fojnica and Usora, central Bosnia, Tuzla and Brcko, northeastern Bosnia, and in Sarajevo.

Silajdzic: West Trying To 'Suppress' Problem*MM1503145695 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 15 Mar 95 pp 1, 4*

[Unattributed report: "Bosnian Prime Minister Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: West's Desire To Impose Political Solution Serves Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Copenhagen, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has expressed pessimism about the current critical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He accused the international community of trying to "suppress" the problem.

He reaffirmed the Bosnian people's determination to "continue the struggle" and urged serious action by the Western states to resolve the situation "by force." In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on the sidelines of the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, he said that the West's desire to impose a political solution to the Bosnian crisis would ultimately serve the Serbs.

On his view of the latest developments in Bosnia, Silajdzic said: "The situation is critical now and, as in the case of political factors, the world community's reactions, and the activities of the Contact Group, it seems that the international community's main strategy is to suppress the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense of not doing anything to save the situation. That is very clear. They do not allow us to defend ourselves and they do not intervene to resolve the situation and stop the aggression. In doing so they side with the Serb enemy, ignoring its continuing aggression, with much talk of justice while the situation on the ground remains the same."

On the Bosnian delegation's contacts with the United States and the West circles concerned, the Bosnian prime minister said: "There is nothing new in these contacts. The Americans and the other parties want the problem solved without the use of force by them or by us, which is impossible. Based on the present situation, the solution is political as far as the international community is concerned. Very regrettably, that attitude only makes a very bad situation worse."

On the way out of military escalation and political inaction, Silajdzic said: "The way out is in the passage of time, God willing, in the sense that we will continue this struggle because our freedom, territory, and homeland are at stake here and we must continue to defend ourselves."

On international and European initiatives to tackle the critical situation, the Bosnian prime minister said: "There are no new initiatives. The current initiatives are old initiatives and there is nothing new in the current diplomatic activity, which is meaningless. In other words, that activity has no solid grounds. It is all talk."

Delic: Arrests Made Over Santic Disappearance*AU1503180595 Paris AFP in English 1746 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[Report by Francis Curta]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat officials Wednesday [15 March] demanded that the Moslem-led government come clean on the fate of a Bosnian Croat general, missing in the northwest Bihac pocket and whom many believe is dead.

The disappearance of General Vlado Santic, commander of the Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Force] militia in Bihac, is threatening to strain difficult relations between Moslems and Croat authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the eve of the first anniversary of their uniting in a joint federation. The Federation, set up under U.S. auspices after 10 months of war between Moslems and Croats, was formed on March 18, 1994.

Santic, 44, went missing on the night of March 8 to 9 while attending a social gathering to mark International Women's Day at the "Flamingo" cafe, just outside Bihac town. Three Bosnian Army 5th Corps soldiers—from the military police—have been detained in connection with his disappearance, Bosnian commander-in-chief General Rasim Delic has said.

Initial accounts suggested the disappearance resulted from "a settling of personal scores," Delic suggested. And he went on to deny that the disappearance was motivated by "political or military reasons." Informed sources here suggested the case might be linked to black-marketing, which would have involved contacts with the besieging Serbs.

Fifth Corps commander, General Atif Dudakovic, for his part has said that "everything leads to the conclusion it was a criminal act." Reports here suggested a row broke out at the cafe between Santic and Bosnian Army officers. Santic later moved on to the nearby Sedra Hotel where his bodyguards were disarmed and he was arrested. One bodyguard was allegedly wounded by gunfire.

UN Protection Force spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Coward said the United Nations was also investigating the disappearance of the general, but it was "unable to substantiate any suggestion that he has been killed." [passage omitted]

Delegation To Investigate Case*LD1503223895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidency of the Bihac municipality has accepted a proposal by the 5th Corps command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that a political and military delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation should visit Bihac as soon as possible, in order that the case of missing Bihac HVO

[Croatian Defense Council] Commander Vlado Santic may be resolved as quickly as possible. This was announced by Hamdija (Kabiljagic), president of the Bihac municipality.

Government Authorities Arrest UN Interpreter
AU1503123695 Paris AFP in English 1212 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Government authorities have arrested a local UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) interpreter, the latest in a series of such moves by both of the warring parties, the UN said Wednesday. Haris Demir was picked up Tuesday night in the eastern Moslem-held enclave of Gorazde and imprisoned without explanation, UNPROFOR spokesman Alexander Ivanko said, adding that UNPROFOR was demanding his release.

Another interpreter employed by UNPROFOR in Gorazde, Goran Posvandzic, has been in detention for 20 days and government officials said he would be sent to do military service when he is released in 10 days' time. Relations between UNPROFOR and Bosnian authorities in Gorazde, one of three Moslem-held enclaves in the east of the country, "are pretty strained" at present, Ivanko said.

Last month, the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo also detained a woman employee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Svjetlana Boskovic, on charges of spying. And they seized a doctor, Vojin Boskovic, who had sought to escape into Serb-held territory aboard a Russian UN armoured vehicle.

Meanwhile, there was no news from a Bosnian woman interpreter, also employed by UNPROFOR, seized at gunpoint by the Serbs from a French armored vehicle on Saturday. Two journalists, a Bosnian and a dual national with both Bosnian and Jordanian citizenships, have also been held by the Serbs for several weeks after being seized at checkpoints outside the city.

In addition, five members of a humanitarian organization, *Pharmaciens sans Frontieres* (Pharmacists without borders), remain in Serb hands more than 10 days after losing their way on leaving the capital and entering Serb-held territory. A high-level UNPROFOR delegation vainly spent several days here attempting to obtain some releases and UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi confessed Tuesday to having to win the release of the detainees.

Warring government and Serb forces at one stage negotiated a swap of several prisoners, but the deal fell through at the last minute.

UN Protests Serb Attack on British Troops
LD1603110995 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1027 GMT 16 Mar 95

[By Charles Miller, defense correspondent, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations commanders in Bosnia are to send a written protest to the Serb Army today following a ferocious cannon and machine-gun attack on British troops.

A 12-man patrol from the Royal Welch Fusiliers came under sustained fire for the second time in less than a week on the outskirts of the Muslim enclave of Gorazde. Although nine soldiers managed to escape, three were pinned down in a gully for more than four hours last night by the notorious Rogatica brigade.

UN commanders were furious at the attack as the Serbs had been notified 24 hours earlier of the patrol's planned route. And even when the brigade was contacted by the United Nations, it was unrepentant, said UN spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward.

"Their response was that the patrol should not be there and that they would continue to fire," he said. NATO warplanes were called in and the Royal Welch Fusiliers' quick reaction force was rushed to the scene.

Although no request was made for the jets to attack Serb positions, the British troops fired 400 rounds from their SA80 rifles and 7.62mm guns. "The men could not move from the gully as they were under deliberate, fixed fire from an anti-aircraft cannon and machine guns fired over their heads," said Lt-Col Coward.

"It was a totally unprovoked attack by the Bosnian Serb Army, which had been informed of the patrol and which approved it." The trapped troops were eventually able to leave at around 8pm last night and there were no casualties.

Lt-Col Coward said a written protest from Brigadier General Case Nicolai, United Nations Protection Force chief of staff, would be sent to the Bosnian Serb Army later today. Serbs also launched a fierce attack on British peacekeepers in Gorazde on Saturday and the British forces returned 700 rounds.

British UN soldiers have been protecting Muslim civilians in Gorazde since a Serb attack was halted in April 1994. However, the Royal Welch Fusiliers have been in Gorazde for just 10 days and it is common for Serb forces to test new units.

Silajdzic Opposes Herzegovinan Import Taxes
AU1503202695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic, head of the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today sent a letter to the Croatian prime minister, in which he informed him that at the border crossings from the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina the local authorities of western Herzegovina had introduced compulsory taxes on all goods imported or exported from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This measure has caused a major delay in the import and export of goods and has visibly affected trade between the two states. This has put the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina and availability of goods in an even more difficult situation. These measures are not in line with the positive developments concerning the setting up of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially after the recently signed agreement in Bonn, the letter states.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister proposed to his counterpart Valentic that the Government of the Republic of Croatia and he personally do something on the suspension of these measures and that normal trade be restored. We will appreciate that as a concrete contribution to the implementation of the agreements reached on setting up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was stated in Silajdzic's letter to Prime Minister Valentic.

More on Imposed Tax

AU1603074395 Paris AFP in English 2202 GMT
15 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Croats have imposed a 20-percent tax on all goods entering or leaving the Republic, a levy which has cost the Bosnian Government 1.5 million German marks [DM] (\$1 million) over the past few days, Bosnian television said Wednesday.

The DM1.5 million represents sums paid for some 700 lorries, impounded at the Bosnian-Croatian border because importers could not pay the 20-percent tax. All roads connecting Bosnian Army-controlled areas to Croatia lead through the self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna in the south of the country. Since its creation Herceg-Bosna has financed itself thanks to customs taxes which in the past even applied to humanitarian aid.

After the setting up of the Moslem-Croat Bosnian Federation in March 1994, Croats, as one of the Federal partners, were to hand over income obtained by custom taxes to the Federal Government. A year later the two economies—that of the Bosnian Republic in territories controlled by the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army and that of Herceg-Bosna—still function separately.

Bosnian Premier Haris Silajdzic has written to his Croatian counterpart, Nikica Valentic, calling on him to use his influence over Bosnian Croats to abolish the new measures, television said. "The measure caused a stand still in the import and export of goods and has led to more difficulties in supplying the Bosnian market," Silajdzic said.

"The tax is not in accordance with the positive development in establishing the federation, particularly after the recently signed agreement in Bonn," he added. The Bonn agreement, signed March 10, provides specific dates for completing the establishment of the Federation.

Mostar SDA Criticizes Koschnick's Comment

AU1503163495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Executive Council of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Mostar has sent an open letter to the EU administrator in Mostar, Hans Koschnick, concerning his statement in an interview with state television on Friday, 10 March, that a civil war had been waged in Mostar.

In its open letter the Mostar SDA Executive Council warns Koschnick that Mostar did not experience a long and acute civil war, but a long and acute war against civilians, against the civilians of Mostar and everything that is civilian in Mostar. The letter also states that Mr. Koschnick should not publicly tamper with things that hurt the residents of Mostar most, nor make incorrect claims because of everything that happened in Mostar, and out of respect for those killed, the truth, and history.

WFP: Serbs Strengthening Blockade on Bihac

AU1503160595 Paris AFP in English 1443 GMT
15 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Mar 15 (AFP)—Malnutrition and hunger are threatening thousands of people trapped in the northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac, the U.N. World Food Programme [WFP] said in a statement here Wednesday [15 March].

Though ten convoys carrying 920 tons of humanitarian aid supplies reached Bihac enclave in February, that amount fell short of the 2,000 tons needed monthly by some 200,000 people trapped in the pocket, the statement said. "Only 20 percent of Bihac's mainly Moslem population has received any food over the last six months," according to the WFP statement. It added that since February 27 no food convoys have been allowed into Bihac and "what is worse, the Krajina Serbs seem to be strengthening their blockade of humanitarian relief."

The Krajina Serbs are secessionist Serbs who control Croatia's Krajina region located near the Bosnian pocket. The WFP said that last week the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which distributes humanitarian aid, decided to cease all its deliveries to areas under the control of the Krajina Serbs until access into the pocket is guaranteed.

"So far there has been no improvement in access to Bihac", Jean-Marie Boucher, WFP's director for ex-Yugoslavia said. Distribution of food to the general population has been possible only once in the last three months, WFP officials added. The food is usually delivered to hospitals in the towns of Bihac and Cazin.

The WFP statement said that five soup kitchens have been established throughout the enclave, "but only 5,000 people can get regular meals out of 200,000 who are besieged." It said that patients in hospitals are receiving only one meal per day and doctors are reporting that

pregnant women and newborns have been severely affected by malnutrition-related problems.

"In the past, the Krajina Serb border authorities have allowed one or two convoys through, creating the illusion for the outside world that the situation has improved," Boucher said, adding that the situation has taken a turn to the worst with food convoys stopped for weeks.

The pocket has been the site of fierce battles between Bosnian Government forces pitted against a coalition of Bosnian and Croatian Serbs allied with rebel Moslem troops loyal to local warlord Fikret Abdic.

3d Corps Commander Predicts Victory in Doboj

AU1503211995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The ceremony for the promotion of the units and commanders of the 37th Division of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held today in Tesanj. Mirudin Aldobasic prepared a report on this event.

[Aldobasic] Apart from the soldiers and commanders of this newly founded military formation, the ceremony was also attended by Brigadier Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Brigadier Nedžad Ajnadic, commander of the 37th Division of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, many other prominent public figures from Tesanj, Doboj, and Teslic, and several thousand people from these free areas. [passage omitted]

Clearly satisfied with the demonstration of the power and strength of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in these areas, and the successes achieved by the soldiers from the area, 3d Corps Commander Brigadier Sakib Mahmuljin said:

[Begin recording] Three years of fighting are behind us and a time of fighting and a war are ahead of us. I stand before you today, before the soldiers of the 37th Division, who are respected by both their friends and enemies, to greet you on behalf of all the members of the 3d Corps, on behalf of General Delic, the chief of the General Staff, and myself. [applause]

You, dear comrades-in-arms, rose to defend the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, along with all the other patriots throughout our homeland, oppose the destruction of a nation, and its cultural, historical, and religious values. We can say at present that we have made the impossible possible. We have the free territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and our state, thanks primarily to the heroic fighting of its people, organized into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is becoming increasingly popular abroad. We are prepared for peace, but also for war. Now we are in a position to be able to provide an adequate response to the evil that has been done, and to the Bosniak blood that has been spilt. [applause]

We, members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been chosen to carry the banners of victory, to bring light into the three-year darkness of our occupied towns, primarily Doboj and Teslic. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Fikret Abdic Interviewed on Division of Bosnia

95BA0178B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 17 Feb 95 pp 22-23

[Interview with Fikret Abdic, president of the republic of western Bosnia, by Novo Scekic; place and date not given: "We Are Not Bosnjaks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For two days I waited at the Maljevac border crossing to receive a "visa" to enter Velika Kladusa, the only city of western Bosnia under control of Fikret Abdic. In spite of the good offices of the RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina], it was only on the fourth day that we managed to enter and interview the president of the "youngest European state." Fikret Abdic's return to Velika Kladusa has attracted much attention from the media. To illustrate, the date that I conducted this interview Fikret Abdic gave an interview to Ukrainian state television, the BBC, and RAI Uno. They told us in the president's office that another dozen television networks and newspapers were waiting in line for an interview this week with a man who enjoys unprecedented prestige with his people.

The effectiveness of his National Defense, measured by the soldier's yardstick, is not all that impressive. National Defense entered Velika Kladusa after 30 days of fighting. Several villages have now been liberated, so that the front line is some 10 km or so from Velika Kladusa.

[Abdic] I cannot but be satisfied with the result achieved, because our army has been disciplined in abiding by the postulates established at the outset. Our basic objective was to liberate land with minimum destruction and casualties on both sides. Our desire was to liberate Velika Kladusa as soon as possible, and that we have done.

[Scekic] Why Velika Kladusa in particular?

[Abdic] There are several reasons. Velika Kladusa is above all a synonym for resistance to Alija's fundamentalism and the only place where the conditions could be brought about for rapid return of the refugees. However, our enemy knew of our intention and chose to offer strong resistance here, committing various fanatics and foreign mercenaries to halt our offensive. The configuration of the terrain is such that it requires quite a bit of courage, skill, and personal sacrifice to take elevations such as Rezervoar, Hukica Brdo, and Keserovica Brdo. We knew that quite a few elderly and frail people who had not managed to get out before the assault of the 5th Corps had remained in Velika Kladusa, so we were taking their lives into account, and, on the other side, we

also were thinking about the industrial zone. In practical terms, we liberated everything without major casualties or destruction of property.

[Scekic] A tactic from which an enemy who has not shown you any mercy might learn something, but also one that I would say made it easier for him.

[Abdic] During our withdrawal last August tens and tens of thousands of unfortunates remained in western Bosnia because they were unable to get out of Atif's hell (the reference is to Atif Dudakovic, 5th Corps commander). Those who tried and were caught were marked and immediately conscripted into the 5th Corps. In addition, many families were split into two, and there were cases when brother faced brother, father son, or son father over gunsights. Those are horrible human dramas. Our tactics were aimed at softening the confidence and encouraging surrender of members of the 5th Corps, and we had excellent results in the first days of the offensive: Hundreds of hundreds of fighting men surrendered without a fight, and immediately, after a routine check, they joined our forward fighting ranks. But there was a halt after those first results, and then there were fierce skirmishes.

[Scekic] You were forced to change your tactics?

[Abdic] Our enemy changed the tactics. Facing the fact that large numbers were coming over to our side, he sent the 503d and 517th Cazins Brigades into the front line; they consist of people devoted to us or against the war, while the 506th Buzim Brigade, which has a reputation of being the most extremist and bloodthirsty, stood behind them and simply forced them to fight for life or death. Those tactics were invented by Alija's mind, in order to show the other Muslims in Bosnia, and indeed the world as well, how war is being waged in western Bosnia between impoverished Buzim and rich Kladusa. Buzim is the poorest region of western Bosnia, but that is not the reason for the conflict between Muslims. The conflict goes much deeper, and it can be defined only as a conflict between Alija Izetbegovic's fundamentalists and Fikret Abdic's followers, who want to resolve all disputes through negotiation and by peaceful means. We have had no conflicts in this region with the Serbs, not even at the height of the fiercest war in Bosnia, and that is what bothered Alija Izetbegovic the most.

[Scekic] You think that the tragic inter-Muslim conflict was planned in Sarajevo?

[Abdic] I no longer think it, I assert it. It was prepared, we see only now, in Alija's mind much earlier. An association of people from Sandzak was active in these areas even though we had no particular economic or cultural cooperation with Sandzak. We recently discovered traces of that kind of activity even in Velika Kladusa. They came in 1990, some even earlier, by order of Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic. These were mainly teachers, physicians, and church officials. They had special tasks and precise instructions about how to

perform them. The war must be brought to an end, and it will end to our advantage. Those from Sandzak will have to go back where they came from, and all those who are from here and who acted on their orders out of careerist or financial motives will have to take responsibility.

[Scekic] You were still a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time?

[Abdic] I was constantly opposing Alija's policy in a way that kept me in the Presidency, but when I saw that this was not yielding results and that his policy was aimed at picking fights on all sides, I joined in the initiative of citizens of western Bosnia to create an autonomous area. We created an autonomous area which through a number of political moves showed the former Yugoslav and indeed also world public that we favored a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am referring above all to the signing of the Declaration With Herceg-Bosna and the Declaration With the Srpska Republic. The first document was signed in the presence of Franjo Tudjman and the second in the presence of Slobodan Milosevic. The documents were accepted by everyone except Alija, who at a wink from Ljubijankic sent the 5th Corps to break the will of the citizens who had committed themselves to peace. We abandoned western Bosnia without resistance and went into voluntary exile. They did not let us go outside, and the international community remained blind and dumb to our status. There was nothing left for us but to organize and return to our homes by force of arms.

[Scekic] The international community offered you certain guarantees?

[Abdic] The offer made to us was that we sign an amnesty, but we had already seen on numerous occasions that this was a lie. That is, 1,500 of our prisoners in Bihac in one room signed the amnesty, and in another room, before the hour was over, they were given their military assignments. And they fought in the war until an occasion arose to flee and join us in the refugee centers. And now you see what irony it is and what a compromise on the part of the international organization. To one and the same man they make an offer if he signs the amnesty, and they tell him that he will not be going off to war, but he has already felt this for himself and realized that it is a lie. I cannot say that these are political charlatans, because their point of departure is the fact that Alija's Bosnia is an internationally recognized state, that Alija is the president of that state, and that the president, by the nature of the office he holds, is not a liar. That is their illusion, because that leadership personified by Alija Izetbegovic lies every time it opens its mouth. We no longer believe anything it says.

[Scekic] Izetbegovic's ticket to political life was a big rally which he held in September 1990 in Velika Kladusa?

[Abdic] Right. As a construction superintendent, then a pensioner, and before that the author of the illiterate Declaration, but with recognizable postulates whose consistency would cost immense human casualties—he came to Velika Kladusa and promoted himself and the Democratic Action Party [SDA] before 400,000 people at a meeting during the election campaign. Everyone at the time saw that this was a party that had a leader, and we thus led him into political life through the front door, never suspecting that later he would arrange an exodus such as Europe does not remember. Those people, those sober and honest Muslims scattered all over the world, will never forgive him for that.

[Scekic] You mean the Bosnjaks?

[Abdic] No, because we are not Bosnjaks. We were and have remained Muslims. There have been no changes with us. We Muslims in these parts neither recognize nor accept what has been cooked up during this war by Alija Izetbegovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic, but their blind followers have taken a private conversation as a "scientific discussion" in the absence of sound argument. These people were never called Bosnjaks, nor will they ever be called that.

[Scekic] I would like to remind you that after the autonomous region was set up, you supported the Washington agreement on the confederation of Bosnia and Croatia. Even in exile, you maintained some hope that all was not yet lost and that negotiations were still possible.

[Abdic] We supported the Washington agreement in the belief that it would be mindful of our reality. I wrote to Kresimir Zubak (leader of the Bosnian Croats), and I was talking to him on the telephone every day, asking him to take a position concerning our problem, that is, the offensive of the 5th Corps. His persistent reply to me was: "I assure you that I also am horrified by the brutality of the 5th Corps. I will see Alija to get that straightened out." If at one time we wanted to be a part of the federation, we no longer have that desire. Because we have opted for an armed return and because we have already returned and liberated territory important to us, we can now only be the republic of western Bosnia. That was first the demand of the disabled veterans, then the fighting men of the National Defense, and now also of the citizenry. And we will fulfill that desire of theirs. For that matter, that possibility already exists in our documents.

[Scekic] Does that mean that there are now four states in the former Bosnia?

[Abdic] Our point of departure is that we should regulate relations within the borders of internationally recognized Bosnia, but on the principle: western Bosnia, the Srpska republic, Herceg-Bosna, and "the rest of" Bosnia. It is up to us to agree how we are going to live. Surely, Europe is not going to tell me that I am a conqueror and

a rebel! I am proud to be a rebel, because I rebelled against an evil and against a man who spread that evil.

[Scekic] There has been quite a bit of speculation related to your National Defense, from guesses as to its strength to the way it was mobilized. Why have you not reacted to those speculations?

[Abdic] Those speculations were cooked up in Alija's kitchen in Sarajevo. The truth is this: The mobilization was carried out on a voluntary basis, from enlisted men to officers, something unprecedented in the world. We have more than 10,000 well-trained and armed fighting men. Now I ask you: Who is the victor? I, who have a voluntary army behind me, or Alija, who is forcibly mobilizing boys of 15 and all the way up to men of 70?

[Scekic] Izetbegovic has consented to talks with Karadzic. Do you want to comment on that surprising decision?

[Abdic] It is incredible that he has not talked before and it is incredible that the Presidency did not force him to. No one has the right to make such a decision on his own. A few days ago one of my associates told me that Alija and his associates listen to me most of all. That ironic observation is true, but it is a pity that this is 16 months late. That right to reflect, which has taken so long, has left behind it immense human casualties, and Alija and his associates will one day have to take responsibility for their heedless moves.

[Scekic] You renounce cooperation with the Arab countries?

[Abdic] I am willing to cooperate with the Arab countries, but for the present that cooperation is not possible. Many of the people around Alija speak of me as a negativist, as an unbeliever, and as a man who does not respect the basic principles of Islam, which is not true.

[Scekic] You are now grasping for a straw. Can you tell us what that straw looks like?

[Abdic] For us, the solution is for western Bosnia to become a demilitarized zone, to have a well-organized police, to have good relations with our neighbors, and to be a place where the business world will be on the move.

Muslim-Croatian Federation Problems Examined *95BA0179A Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in* *Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 4*

[Article by Ibrahim Prohic: "A Flawed Project"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the first election assembly of the large-parish committee of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] of Soli in the Tuzla settlement of Husino (15 February 1995), Dario Kordic, president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that the Federation is something that is good for both nationalities and added that the foundations of the Federation are now under attack and that any house is only as sound as its foundation—

an old truth in which everyone concurs. But it is also true that a house cannot have two foundations. What are the foundations of the Federation? Its principal "designers" (the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the HDZ) differ concerning foundations, and is that all on which they differ? Is there also a difference about the direction the windows and doors will face? Are there differing interpretations of the nature and character of the Washington agreement and its spirit, and what are the practical consequences?

Differing Interpretations

One year into the agreement it is clear that it did not resolve all the dilemmas. Either at the moment when the agreement was reached the objective was narrower than the real needs for an overall solution and constitutional transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in the meantime the principals have developed greater appetites and with differing interpretations are trying to pursue differing political interests and objectives. In any case, it is now clear that the problem of establishing the Federation is not one of pace (the speed at which the Constitution is being implemented), but of a lack of political will to carry out the project, that is, the differing conceptions of the political entities.

Even D. Kordic acknowledges that there are a number of open questions. The HDZ still has not responded to the SDA pro memoria with a similar integral and cogently argued document. President Izetbegovic said in a recent interview with AVAZ that he is waiting for that kind of response. That would seem to be a debt of the HDZ not only to its own membership, but also to the public at large. It would, of course, be desirable for the other relevant political factors in the opposition to also set forth publicly their position concerning the fundamental constitutional solutions and character of the Federation. It is obvious that differing interpretations of the Washington project are involved.

For the HDZ, the Federation is a station on the road to confederation with Croatia, which Srecko Vucina, vice president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, spelled out in Husino, adding that the Federation should help to "put the finishing touches" on the Croatian national project, i.e., realization of the objectives of creating a state. He rejects reintegration of the earlier constitutional framework. For the SDA, by contrast, that reintegration is precisely the objective, and the Federation is a means toward that end. Along the same line, in spite of certain differences, the SDA is joined by a number of political parties: the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], HGS [expansion unknown], SDP [Social Democratic Party], UBSD [Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats], LS [Liberal Party], LBO [Liberal Bosniak Organization], MBO [Bosnian Muslim Organization], and the Republican Party. There is agreement concerning the fundamental commitment to an integral and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example: Dr. I. Komsic said that the Federation is the only model for preservation

and reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Komsic goes a step further and says that Bosnia-Herzegovina can neither be preserved nor reintegrated without the Serbs. He is not alone in taking that position. Even D. Budisa said a few days ago in Tuzla that the Croatian national interest is an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. In view of the growing influence of the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and its president, that statement carries a certain weight.

Flawed Premises

Let us look at the problem of the Federation from another angle. The SDA and HDZ are the strongest political parties and the winners in the 1990 election. But no one was given a mandate to alter the constitutional character of the state. The war, of course, has taken its toll. The influence of the citizenry and their resistance are diminished. There is a willingness to buy freedom by consenting to somewhat less democracy. But there are limits. The SDA and HDZ have imposed a simple formula: The essence of social relations lies in the relations among the nationalities. We are representatives of the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. We have legitimacy to define the character of society.

The conclusion is logically correct, but the premises are flawed. First, social relations cannot be reduced to ethnic relations, nor can human needs and interests. Second, neither the SDA nor the HDZ are absolute victors, so that they cannot represent all the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Third, in the Constitution of the Federation nationality is only one of several criteria.

During a recent visit to Zepce, E. Ganic, vice president of the Federation, said in answer to a question about the new opstina in that region that in principle he has nothing against new opstinas, but territories are a problem. One can easily concur in that, but the problem does not lie only in territories. What has happened to the principles of the Washington agreement and the principles of the Constitution?

According to the Constitution, the Federation is a state of cantons, not of ethnic entities. However, as time passes, that principle is being neglected. There was also strong insistence on the ethnic principle at the HDZ conference in Husino already mentioned: the "national project and creation of the state of Croats, Croatian ethnic space," and so forth. The political position was clearly stated that Croats can realize their interests only by organizing within the framework of the nationality, that is, by establishing their own (Croatian) opstinas.

Is the situation really such that the needs and rights of citizens can be reduced to ethnic interests? Can ethnic and other interests be satisfied solely when administrative units are defined as rounded-off and exclusively ethnic territories? Instead of replying, let us recall that organizing the state and social structure on an ethnic principle is anachronistic and historically superseded,

and that it entails great difficulties in its practical realization. What is more, there are political entities in this country (parties and associations) that have a different view of the Constitution and the character of society.

A definitive solution has to do with the vital interests of citizens, and political elites cannot be granted the exclusive right to make decisions. The final decision should be made only after the war. Then the citizens, after becoming thoroughly familiar with the differing constitutional conceptions and their consequences, can demonstrate their political will in a direct vote. That would not only be in the spirit of democratic traditions, but would also help to create the conditions for more stable social relations and greater social effectiveness.

Local Government Problems, Cooperation Debated

95BA0179B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in
Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by S.L.: "Cantons Without Influence of the Bosnian Muslims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirsad Ceman, general secretary of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], has registered the objections of that party to the formation of the Bosansko-Posavski Canton. While welcoming the official creation of its assembly, he said that it was prepared without a willingness on the part of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] to cooperate with the SDA and with the Bosnian Muslim population of the Sava Valley in Bosnia. This is also evident from the fact that the Bosnian Muslim population in the various opstinas has not been appropriately represented. Ceman cited Modrica as an example; before the war, the Bosnian Muslims were in the majority there, but in the canton parliament they are entitled to two of the five deputy seats, while three go to the Croats. Nor did the HDZ recognize the motion that the credentials of the deputies in dispute not be verified until an agreement is reached on this.

Ceman also objected to parts of the Brcko, Gradacac, and Doboj Opstinas being included in the Bosansko-Posavski Canton without a political agreement first being reached between the HDZ and SDA. A territory of 350 square kilometers is included just within Ravne-Brcko Opstina. Nor were SDA representatives able to present their views concerning appointments of personnel either.

"An arrogant attitude has been manifested toward the SDA and the Bosnian Muslims," Ceman said, and he called for the leadership of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HDZ of the Sava Valley in Bosnia to take a position on these issues and to demonstrate a readiness to cooperate. The SDA general secretary mentioned that he did not want to heat up the overall atmosphere, but he feels that political consent needs to be obtained in advance concerning many issues in dispute, as has already been done at the level of the Federation.

Government Conflicts Reflect Federal Problems

95BA0179C Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in
Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 pp 4-5

[Article by Vehid Jahic: "An Opstina That Defies Order and Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Relative calm prevails on the Brcko battlefield for the present. In politics, the atmosphere is increasingly fragile. The reason lies in the attempts of the local HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] to sanction in law the organization of the Croatian opstina Ravne-Brcko. They have established all the opstina bodies, they have put up a sign on the building where the opstina headquarters are located, but the police of the Brcko MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] removed the symbols of the opstina on 18 January. There have been no incidents, which inspires hope that the dispute will be settled peacefully. A top-level delegation of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Dario Kordic, visited Ravne on 17 February.

Ravne Exists

For the Bosnian Muslim side, Ravne does not exist in Brcko, but the HDZ people think otherwise. For them, Ravne-Brcko is an opstina that exists and will remain in the Posavski, not the Tuzlansko-Podrinjski, Canton. We talked about the views and arguments supporting this position with Dr. Ivan Hudulin, vice president of the HDZ, and Marko Amidzic, director of the administrative section for General Administration and Information of Brcko-Ravne Opstina.

"Ravne-Brcko exists as an expression of the political will of the population here. The opstina is organized with all the bodies and agencies foreseen by the Constitution of the Federation; our brigade has two zones of responsibility here; we have police, the Opstina Council, and administrative agencies. The only dispute is over the sequence of legal steps, which we interpret a bit differently from the Bosnian Muslim side," Dr. Hudulin said.

Our informants say that the Croatian opstina dates from April 1992, when alongside the Serbian opstina a Croatian opstina was also formed, and there should have been a Muslim (Bosnjak) opstina. The actions that followed were preparations for defense against the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressors, which, they say, were conducted separately, but on 22 May 1992 the Bosnian Muslims joined the 108th Brigade of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], and after that they fought in concert. That was the situation until 13 March 1993, when two 108th Brigades were formed—the motorized brigade and the HVO brigade.

"When the Bosnian Muslims left the 108th HVO, we formed the Ravne-Brcko HVO and joined the Herceg-Bosna community of opstinas. Some people object to this, because the executive agencies of these two opstinas

work separately, while community remains in daily life and combat," Dr. Hudulin said.

Disputes with the Bosnian Muslim side have been escalating since the opstina was formed. One aspect of these problems is inclusion of parts of Srebrenik and Gradacac Opstinas in the newly formed Croatian opstina, and another is internal life, especially the activity of the police, the tax agencies, the schools, and other bodies, while the third is the decision of council members of the HDZ to have Ravne-Brcko included in the Posavski Canton.

"For us, there is no dispute here. Only Croatian settlements have joined us—Hrgovi Donji in Gradacac Opstina, and Croatian Spionica, Cerik, and Gornji Hrgovi in Srebrenik Opstina. We have established opstina bodies and agencies according to the Constitution of the Federation, and we naturally have police, tax authorities, and other agencies, and the right to one's own language, culture, and religion is guaranteed, and we have extended that through the school system. However, this is where the Bosnian Muslim part of the government is setting up obstacles and putting pressure on officials, from the sending of tax bills to calling in the principals of public schools because textbooks are used that we obtained from Herceg-Bosna, because we did not get them from the authorities here. As for inclusion in the Posavski Canton, we have been oriented toward the Sava Valley for centuries, not toward Tuzla. For that matter, we have a right under the Constitution to choose that canton," Marko Amidzic said.

In Ravne-Brcko Opstina they say that there is no persecution, but there are pressures on the Croats, from the tax notices mentioned, to hair-splitting over various transportation permits that must be obtained in the Tuzlansko-Podrinjski Canton. They see the sequence of legal action in forming the opstina—to which the other side refers—as a pretext, while they see the actual motive in the desire of the Bosnian Muslim side to dispute the right of the Croats to form their own opstinas. In this connection, they point to the fact that during the war the Bosnian Muslims formed new opstinas in Teocak, Celic, and within the canton they also accepted deputies from opstinas that had been occupied, such as Vlasenica, Bratunac, and so on, whose territory was temporarily occupied.

"If in the Federation there is not a single new opstina, then we will abolish ours," Dr. Hudulin said, adding, "We are not departing from the project which has been sketched out, because this is the constitutional right of the Croatian population."

It Is Not a Local Problem

On the Bosnian Muslim side, they are categorical—the Croats have the right to form their own opstina, but they cannot do so unilaterally and in defiance of law. That means that when all the conditions are defined for resolving the issues in dispute—which the law will

define, then let Ravne-Brcko be a separate opstina. They then offer figures. Brcko has an area of 493 square kilometers. In the last census the opstina had a population of 87,332: 38,771 Bosnian Muslims, 22,163 Croats, 18,133 Serbs, and 8,265 others. As to land ownership: 122 square kilometers are public property and 371 square kilometers are privately owned.

"According to their study and the borders that they themselves sketch, they have taken a major part of the town, but in the recent census they had between 2,000 and 2,500 in the town, while the Bosnian Muslims have an absolute majority in the town. Second, they have 'pulled' into their opstina parts of Gradacac and Srebrenik without an agreement and decision on the part of those opstinas. They have also taken villages that are not Croatian enclaves, such as Cerik, where in the census there are only five Croats, while the others are Serbs, and Gornja Spionica in Srebrenik Opstina, the second largest settlement in that imagined opstina, where in a population of 1,792 there are only 12 Croats, while the Serbs are a majority, and there are tenfold more Bosnian Muslims than Croats. These are only some of the indicators that testify to the attempt to define borders arbitrarily. Nor is that the problem, because those illogicalities can be corrected by agreement. The main problem is the unlawful attempt to organize the opstina. When the law defines all the circumstances, I repeat, there will be no problems at all about formation of Ravne Opstina, but as the law provides, because we must build a law-governed state, not an ideological state," said Dr. Sejfudin Zahirovic, assistant chief executive in Brcko.

They went on to assure us in Brcko that there are no forms of harassment, persecution, or pressure on Croats at all, nor sanctions against initiators of the formation of the Ravne-Brcko Croatian opstina.

"They are deliberately switching arguments. Enforcement of positive legal statutes is not pressure, nor is it harassment and persecution. The legal and legitimate authorities on the free territory of Brcko are in Rabic. The Croats are also proportionately represented in them, but at the call of the HDZ they left their jobs or posts, except for Ivan Krndelj, who is assistant chief of the SJB [Public Security Station]. Until the Croatian opstina is formed under the law, the authorities here will be exercising their prerogatives over the entire free territory. Accordingly, we have filed 10 criminal charges against certain private operators for failure to pay their obligations, because they want to pay taxes to 'Herceg-Bosna,' not to Brcko Opstina. They have occupied the PTT [Postal, Telegraph, Telephone] offices without authorization, and we filed charges against an individual. The regular inspectorate has filed seven misdemeanor charges and issued 11 temporary notices prohibiting individuals from engaging in a particular activity for which they do not have permits from our competent secretariat."

The contradictions are felt particularly in the school sector. The competent authorities have filed charges

against school principals in Zovik and Bijela—Slavko Zecevic and Ivo Miskovic, in the interpretation of the Croats, because textbooks from "Herceg-Bosna" were used, but on the other side?

"We are aware that the specific aspects of the Croatian language and culture must be honored. That is why we agreed that in the syllabus and curriculum in their schools they could have 20-percent representation—primarily in the study of language and history, as well as music, but after three days they began to use the syllabus and curriculum of the Republic of Croatia 100 percent.

This is, after all, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this state has to be recognized. This is also causing problems in the schools which we are trying to correct," Dr. Sejfudin Zahirovic said.

Every day, contradictions on free Brcko territory resulting from these circumstances are growing. One gets the impression that the problem of opstinas by way of implementing the Constitution of the Federation has pushed aside the question of forming the canton, and politics is slowly but surely pushing aside laws. This is already extending beyond the local level.

RSK Army Will Maintain Combat Readiness*AU1603121795 Korenica Srpski Radio Korenica in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The defense of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] is more important than the interests of any party, the leaders of most political parties of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem concluded at today's meeting held in Erdut. The party leaders met with Major General Dusan Loncar, commander of the RSK army Slavonia-Baranja Corps; Borivoje Bogunovic, vice president of the RSK assembly; and Milan Milanovic and Ilija Koljic, assistants to the defense minister and the interior minister.

Maj. Gen. Loncar said that today's meeting with party leaders was very encouraging. He said that the unity expressed at the meeting existed throughout preparations for a possible Croat aggression and today they had specified the tasks of the party leaders in the event of a possible aggression. Commenting on Croatia's change of heart regarding the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate, Maj. Gen. Loncar stressed that, as far as the RSK army is concerned, nothing has changed and that it will maintain the highest level of combat readiness.

Parties View Decision on New UN Mandate*AU1503213295 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 95 p 6*

[Article by Andrea Latinovic, Goranka Juresko, and Branko Podgornik: "UNPROFOR Is Leaving; New Forces Are Coming"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

New Mandate on International Presence

1 April 1995 marks the end of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate in Croatia. Together with the UN Security Council and its partners in the international community, Croatia will try to negotiate with the UN Security Council a new mandate for the international presence in Croatia, which will:

1. Control the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] (Serbia and Montenegro), and between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in those places where the main border crossings are not currently under the Republic of Croatia's control.
2. Control UNPROFOR's communications and those of other international humanitarian organizations for Bosnia-Herzegovina and access to areas that are not currently under the control of the Republic of Croatia.
3. Enable the continued implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994, and the economic agreement of 2 December 1994, the implementation of future agreements whose goal is reintegration into Croatia, and

enable the implementation of all relevant UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions.

What do the leaders of the parliamentary political parties in the Republic of Croatia think about this?

Zlatko Tomicic, president of the Croatian Peasant's Party [HSS]: Quality progress in Croatian sovereignty.

Based on information in the press, the HSS in principle regards the president's decision as positive, since our party demanded on 9 January that UNPROFOR's mandate be terminated and stressed that it could only agree to a new mandate if the international forces were to be firmly deployed on Croatia's borders. However, we are very concerned, as such a decision must be followed by a Security Council resolution on the basis of which an agreement on a new mandate should be signed between the United Nations and Croatia, yet no deadlines have been set for passing this resolution.

Therefore, the HSS in principle accepts the president's decision, but we have to learn more details in order to know whether or not we can fully accept the decision. We fear, namely, that following the decision we could again be in for a protracted period of delaying the Security Council resolution, which would buy time for the Serbian side, and not for us.

The Security Council's decision regarding the forces' new mandate—which would be firmly deployed on the internationally recognized Croatian borders—is the HSS's only condition. Because without total control of Croatia's borders the Serbian regime will not recognize Croatia, nor will conditions be created for peaceful reintegration. Peaceful reintegration can begin once the Krajina regime is completely isolated from Serbia; otherwise the president's decision will not have achieved its aim.

Anto Djapic, president of the Main Headquarters of the Croatian Party of Right [HSP]: no progress.

We are not surprised by Croatia's decision to negotiate a new mandate for the UN forces, but we are embittered. All the rumors have come true. Having the UN stay will have other consequences beside the mere fact that it is staying, such as the implementation of the Z-4 plan or some such similar plan. Croatia is on the defensive and such solutions can only harm it. The HSP will be proposing a debate in the Sabor on this subject. It is not good that President Tudjman is serving the entire Croatian nation, refugees, and the assembly with a fait accompli. After this, morale will flag, particularly among the refugees. Croatian policy is not being consistent. A new UNPROFOR mandate will have no beneficial effect on Croatia. Moreover, U.S. Vice President Al Gore said that if a new mandate is not negotiated by 31 March, the old one will remain valid. There can be no quality progress until the refugees can return home and until Croatian soldiers are in every Croatian town. For the time being, there can be no talk of that.

Ivan Pauletta, member of the Presidency of the Istrian Democratic Congress [IDS]: advantage for Croatia

Even before this, the IDS considered the Croatian decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate to be euphoric. Although the current decision on special international forces to control Croatia's borders is good, it nevertheless shows that Croatia is limited in its independent activity. The IDS believes that the decision to keep the international forces is to Croatia's advantage. However, we first need to establish what authority these international forces will have. I believe that, despite outside factors, results can only be achieved once positions in Croatia become clear. I personally am sorry that that an atmosphere congenial to a peaceful dialogue has not been created in Croatia and that the hawks who advocate means other than peaceful ones are still active.

The road to Europe, whether we like it or not, leads through Knin. We cannot become a part of Europe as long as we do not settle relations within Croatia, and with its environment. There are many ways to peaceful reintegration: Silencing those who are against peaceful solutions; moreover, we need to be very patient in negotiations. I would advise the other side to do the same, but I cannot talk to them.

Veselin Pejnovic, vice president of the Serbian National Party [SNS]: first step toward a peaceful solution.

The decision to let UNPROFOR stay, that is, to allow international forces to stay, is the first more serious step toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the war in Croatia and the region of the former Yugoslavia. The decision is a good one, even more so because for the first time ever, Croatian state policy has compromised, which indicates that it is falling within international standards. The UN Security Council will certainly take into account all the essential factors that have gone into the content of former resolutions. The new resolution will probably be of use to all those who are interested in improving their international rating. More precisely, Croatia will get concessions, defined by the resolution, the FRY will get its concessions, and so will the Bosniak side.

It is certain that the new resolution will precisely define the scope of sovereignty, as well as significant political issues for realizing this sovereignty. But reintegration governed by the initial premise that the international forces' mandate can solve political issues within Croatia will again lead us in the wrong direction. The true prerequisite of an operative reintegration is the solving of political relations between the Croatian and all the other nations in Croatia, based on the civic interpretation of the necessary prerequisites.

Josip Manolic, vice president of the Croatian Independent Democrats [HND]: no comment.

I can only say one thing about this decision to have international forces control the borders: The results befit

the preparations. Consistent Croatian policy has capitulated. It was clear that when it came to UNPROFOR, Croatian policy had to take the international community into account. The moment UNPROFOR arrived, Croatia took on this obligation. However, Croatian policy is not completely unprepared for this issue. The present decision does not give any answers as to when the whole problem will be solved. The agreement does not give any clear deadlines; there is no indication how long UNPROFOR will stay in Croatia; we have not been given any guarantees. I believe that peaceful reintegration is possible, but Croatian policy must make a greater effort.

The international community has proposed Z-4, and the Croatian side must reject the negative points of the plan and demand that the international community accept its conditions. The decision to have international forces on Croatia's state borders heightens the possibility of peaceful reintegration. The international community will also pressure the Serbian side for an answer: Does it only want secession, or will it accept an agreement with Croatia? [passage omitted]

Tonino Picula, Social Democratic Party [SDP]: There are no quick solutions.

When on 12 January, we supported the president's decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, we particularly stressed that responsibility must become the central category of official Croatian policy. On that occasion, and contrary to the representatives of the authorities, we stressed that there are no quick solutions to this problem.

We in the SDP accepted the interpretation that the termination of the UNPROFOR mandate is not an introduction to war, but a form of pressure on the international community—following a long hiatus—once again to focus on the reintegration of the occupied parts of Croatia.

We are aware that there cannot be a peaceful solution without the international community's presence, but we are against keeping UNPROFOR under the present mandate.

According to the information at our disposal, the agreement in Copenhagen has not convinced us that UNPROFOR is not going to stay, that this does not just involve renaming and cosmetic changes to the present mandate.

The Main Secretariat of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]: Croatia has protected its fundamental interests.

The agreement reached between President Franjo Tudjman, Vice President Al Gore, and UN officials in Copenhagen in practice confirmed that we have achieved and will implement the decision to end the UNPROFOR mandate on 31 March 1995. Moreover, it once again affirms the Republic of Croatia's sovereignty

by the leading world power and the United Nations. The deployment of special international forces on the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia, particularly those parts that are not under the control of the Croatian authorities, the HDZ perceives as the achievement of all essential goals of Croatian policy in protecting the national and state interests. The engagement of the United States and Vice President Al Gore in this peace process implies the further strengthening of the friendship between Croatia and the United States, and other partners in international and European politics (H. Kohl). With this agreement, Croatia has protected its fundamental state and national interests. The HDZ fully supports the agreement between Franjo Tudjman and Vice President Al Gore. A new agreement between Croatia and the UN Security Council confirms respect for Croatia's position and the realistic need for the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas. The further process of peaceful reintegration depends on the Croatian Serbs, who need to decide whether they favor the peaceful option or some other solution.

With the aid of the international community and the new agreement with the UN Security Council, the present UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia ends on 1 April. Reducing the number of troops in the UN special forces implies that the process of peaceful reintegration has a chance and that Croatian policy is ready to solve its international issues peacefully with the help of the international community and the new agreement with the Security Council. Croatia expects a more forceful and effective role on Croatia's borders by the international community.

Tudjman, Valentic Set Government Program

95BA0176C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 95 p 4

[Resolutions of the Croatian Government signed by Nikica Valentic, prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, and Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, adopted on 9 February in a meeting chaired by Dr. Franjo Tudjman: "Concern for Stable Development"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—On Wednesday, the government public relations office published the text of resolutions adopted in the meeting of the Government of the Republic of Croatia held on 9 February and chaired by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia.

We are publishing the resolutions, received from HINA [Croatian Wire Service], in their entirety:

In its meeting held on 9 February 1995, chaired by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, the Government of the Republic of Croatia examined the obligations of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, of individual ministries and other state entities in conducting the policy of the state, taking as its point of

departure the program set forth in the Report of the President of the Republic of Croatia on the state of the Croatian state and Croatian nationality in the joint session of both houses of the parliament of the Republic of Croatia, as well as the actual situation in the respective areas.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted the following conclusions in that regard:

1. Main Tasks in Conducting State Economic Policy

1.1. Create the conditions for rapid economic growth under stable conditions.

1.2. Speed up decisionmaking concerning large capital investment projects. Speed up proposals on concessions and submit in advance for basic policy decisions to be made.

1.3. Speed up privatization in general, with more resolute and consistent orientation toward obtaining ready capital, especially through the sale of individual business operating units (hotels in the tourist industry, and so on), and distribution of shares of stock to particular population groups. Facilitate effective additional capitalization, especially in connection with foreign investments.

1.4. Conduct the sale of military housing units and see that housing is built to meet the needs of the Croatian Army and all casualties of the homeland war and their families.

1.5. Resolutely speed up the restructuring of large enterprises, taking into account the immediate, but also long-range, political, social, and economic impact.

1.6. Complete the tax system and the customs system consistent with a free-market economy and European integrative processes.

1.7. Continue financial rescue of the banks and construction of a sound banking system. Adopt decisions and create prerequisites for return of capital from abroad and to prevent its outflow.

1.8. Examine the status of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce in the new economic system and regulate its activity consistent with implementation of the established state policy.

1.9. Furnish Croatian names for all enterprises and public services administratively—in a specific decree.

1.10. Prepare the program for bringing the Croatian Merchant Marine back under the Croatian flag.

2. Demographic Revival

Adoption of short-term and long-range programs and specific immediate measures for demographic revival. Submit the proposed version of the program to the President's Council of Defense and National Security within one month.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

3. Organization and Commencement of Operation of the Ministry for Repatriates

3.1. Bring about the preconditions as soon as possible for initial operation of the new Ministry for Repatriates (Immigrants), by supplementing the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Ministries and State Administrative Organizations and by appointing officials. Facilitate the granting of land and other incentives in the relevant legislation.

3.2. See that Croatian children in foreign countries receive supplemental schooling.

4. Solving the Problems of Displaced Persons

Adopt a program to solve the problems of displaced persons:

4.1. Examine the possibility of return to particular areas, including dates.

4.2. Examine separately the possibility of the return of displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4.3. Adopt decisions on land grants to returnees and displaced persons.

5. Social Welfare

5.1. Improve the position of needy categories of retired persons.

5.2. Furnish effective protection to all casualties of the homeland war and their families.

5.3. Reduce the number of false declarations of unemployment.

6. Armed Forces

Take up all matters that necessarily arise in case of a considerable downsizing of the armed forces or again in case a new mobilization is necessary. The proposal of the Defense Ministry will be debated by the President's Council of Defense and National Security, and after the decision is made by the president of the republic and supreme commander, the government will make the necessary decisions in its jurisdiction.

7. International Activities

A program of international activities and of mutual state and official visits should be adopted at the national level, to serve political, economic, and cultural interests, and also to save time and resources. The Foreign Ministry should be the coordinator within the departments of the government, and the government should also propose to the president of the republic reconciliation of programs and visits at the level of the state (the government, the parliament, and the president of the republic).

8. Confederation With the Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats

There is a need for the government to examine and propose drafts for gradual realization of the Confederation with the Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9. Judicial and Administrative Authority

9.1. Ensure effectiveness of the work of all the courts and the entire legal system.

9.2. Create prerequisites for the operation of zupanija and opstina courts consistent with the new regional administrative system.

9.3. Complete the system of notary publics as soon as possible.

10. Regional Administrative Changes

10.1. Take the necessary steps to merge the Zagreb Zupanija and the City of Zagreb so that this is done no later than March 1995.

10.2. Examine other applications, especially with respect to the status of cities.

10.3. Prepare a proposal of territorial changes related to resolving the status of the occupied areas, including the principles of local self-government for areas with a Serbian majority.

11. Social Services

11.1 Create the prerequisites for further development of Croatian culture, science, and especially universities, and for their further inclusion in European and world developments.

11.2. Adopt an integral program for further development of education and health and their adaptation to European standards.

12. The Fight Against Drugs and Protection of Young People

Establish a state committee for the fight against drugs and adopt a decision prohibiting operation of nightclubs for young people and also concerning the sale of alcohol to people under age 18.

13. Adoption of New Laws

New laws need to be adopted, or current laws amended and supplemented, with preliminary preparation made for policy decisions:

13.1. Law on Protection of Market Competition.

13.2. Law on Denationalization.

13.3. Law on Reconstruction.

13.4. Law on Privatization.

13.5. Law on Issuance of and Trade in Investment Securities.

13.6. Law on Investment Funds.

13.7. Law on Bankruptcy, Receivership, and Liquidation.

13.8. Law on the Value-Added Tax.

13.9. Law on Decorations (subject to emergency procedure in view of the date of the Fifth Anniversary of Statehood).

13.10. Law on Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia.

13.11. Law on National Security. (In this connection, see that the Main National Security Committee is responsible in monitoring political developments and the activities of foreign services and also in fighting crime, drugs, and corruption, all the way to measures to reduce the number of traffic accident victims.)

13.12. Law on Housing Relations.

13.13. A law to make it possible, without affecting property rights, for empty housing to be used temporarily by defenders and their families, casualties of the homeland war, and displaced persons.

13.14. Law on the Property of Sociopolitical Organizations in the Socialist System.

13.15. Law (or enactment based on law) on the Handling of Official and Trade Secrets.

14. Committee for Marking the Fifth Anniversary of Croatian Statehood

14.1. The government should propose to the president of the republic the membership of the committee, taking into account the experiences of foreign states.

14.2. The task of the committee is to prepare the program of the celebration and all events and efforts, including the dates and names of officials.

15. Decorations for Statehood Day

Decorations for Statehood Day are to be presented as part of the celebration:

15.1. The Defense Ministry should prepare proposals for the regular Army and reserves for participation in the homeland war.

15.2. All sectoral ministries should prepare nominations according to the criterion of the number and types of decorations the committee will award.

15.3. The Foreign Ministry should examine the need and propose the procedure for decorations for foreign statesmen and diplomatic-consular representatives.

15.4. The committee shall make proposals in principle, but each sector shall nominate specific representatives of all the social services and economic activities.

16. Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory of the Antifascist Coalition and Croatia's Participation and Casualties in World War II

Arrange a fitting celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory of the antifascist coalition and scientific historical research on Croatia's participation and casualties in World War II.

17. Information and Promotion Department

17.1. Provide a news and propaganda function within the country and for foreign consumption accountable to a deputy prime minister and the foreign minister. News in this topic area should be sent to members of the government and other officials to the level of zupans and opstina chief executives.

17.2. Support the operation of the Croatian Cultural Information Bureau, whose tasks are to coordinate the flow of information and promotion of the interests of the nationality and the state in the political, economic, and cultural areas.

18. Conduct of State Policy

The government bears responsibility as a whole for the conduct of state policy, and each of its members bears responsibility for his respective sector.

The government as a whole and all its members shall carry out the program of state policy of the majority party—the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]—which it has given them and which guarantees confidence in the parliament, whose objective shall always be the interest of the Croatian state, the interest of strengthening its defensive capability and international position, its economic and cultural development, and the benefit of all its citizens.

In the conduct of state policy and the decisions made, no member of the government may make public any particular views of his own concerning any issue.

19. The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall adopt a program for carrying out these resolutions, including the dates and those who are to perform the tasks.

Iran Delegation Offers Support of Federation

95BA0179E Osijek GLAS SLAVONIJE in
Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Croatian News and Information Agency: "Iran Supports the Decision of the Croatian Supreme Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb (HINA)—Dr. Nedeljko Mihanovic, president of the Croatian parliament, yesterday received a delegation of the parliament of the

Islamic Republic of Iran headed by Hojjapoleslam Movahedi Savoji, member of the Presidium of the Iranian parliament. Dr. Mihanovic said that Croatia and Iran have historical, economic, and cultural ties, and that there are possibilities for cooperation between the two states to be still better. The foundation for this, Dr. Mihanovic said, is the aspiration for linkage of the Croatian and Muslim nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dr. Mihanovic informed the guests about the decision to discontinue the mandate of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], which, he said, "is not a political game at all, but was made because of the realization that the UNPROFOR has done nothing or very little." He also emphasized the Croatian endeavor to end in a peaceful and fitting manner the four-year drama, which, he said, was begun by the Serbs with their aggression first against Croatia and then against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hojjapoleslam Movahedi Savoji, member of the Presidium of the Iranian parliament, also emphasized Iran's good relations with Croatia. "We sympathize with the tragedy of the Croatian and Muslim peoples, who have a common enemy, and be assured that you will have support in Iran," H.M. Savoji said, emphasizing that Iran supports all the decisions of the Croatian Supreme Command. "We support the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia and you can always count on that," Savoji said. He went on to say that the federation of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be established, because the two peoples have a common enemy. He added in this connection that certain world agencies are spreading reports about bad relations between Croats and Muslims, but, he said, "we have seen in this visit that that is propaganda." The member of the Presidium of the Iranian parliament conveyed to Dr. Mihanovic, president of the Croatian parliament, the invitation of the president of the Iranian parliament to visit Iran, which President Mihanovic accepted with pleasure, saying that that would contribute to still better relations between the two states. The meeting was attended by Dalibor Brozovic and Jurica Pavelic, deputies in the Croatian Parliament.

State Border Commission Chairman Interviewed
95BA0176D Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 95 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, professor and chairman of the State Border Commission, by Josip Antic; place and date not given: "Prevlaka Is Not Negotiable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How will the Croatian decision rejecting the mandate of the Blue Helmets be received in the southernmost part of the state, the only area in which Croatia and the so-called FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] are in direct close armed contact (in contrast with certain others in which there is a buffer of rebellious hangers-on of Serbian expansionism)? More accurately,

what will happen in Prevlaka, where there are unarmed UN observers on the basis of the 1992 Tudjman-Cosic agreement?

Momir Bulatovic recently took up this question and said that "the UN forces should remain, and Prevlaka is the subject of decisive negotiations during which the FRY will continue to advocate a peaceful policy on the basis of a fair demarcation of borders."

What is the Croatian response to that announcement, in which a trade of territory is offered: "Seven kilometers wide between the border of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Trebisnjica River, in exchange for Croatian territory, at least from Molunat to Prevlaka"; we put this question to Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, chairman of the State Border Commission. The reader should know that Dr. Kacic is a person called upon to comment not only because of the post he holds, but also because he is from Dubrovnik and is very familiar with the events related to Prevlaka even before the open aggression against that part of Croatia.

[Kacic] I think that the Croatian denial of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] is not what motivated Bulatovic to speak. The Serbian-Montenegrin news media have never ceased to be concerned with the question of Prevlaka, and in the last four years there has hardly been a week when an article did not appear on this subject—another fact that explains Bulatovic's statement, which in my judgment was made for domestic political consumption and to satisfy a part of the Montenegrin public.

Bulatovic Is No One To Talk to

[Antic] What did Bulatovic actually hope to achieve?

[Kacic] As a typical representative of the so-called Titojugend and Slobojugend, Bulatovic lost the respect of many Montenegrins when he sent many young people to their deaths, and now he is trying to hide his own misdeeds and restore confidence by saying that he enjoys the respect of Croatia, because here he says that there will be "decisive negotiations." Bulatovic does not deserve the role of someone to talk to on these topics. At the moment when hostilities broke out, he clearly stated (at a meeting in The Hague with President Tudjman on 18 October 1991, when I was also present) that Montenegro has no territorial claims against Croatia.

[Antic] So, Bulatovic has one story for the world and another for the domestic public?

[Kacic] Obviously. In the plenary part of the conference, Bulatovic officially declared on behalf of Montenegro that in principle it accepts the Carrington Plan for regulation of the former Yugoslavia. We all know how that ended. Something else should be added. Bulatovic is now spreading the lie with his people that before the war began Montenegro offered Croatia a proper proposal and a fair demarcation.

"The Ustashi Are Attacking Prevlaka"

The Croatian and Montenegrin public are still not very aware even today that on 23 September 1991, less than a week after the meeting in Igalo as part of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, an armed incident similar in its methods, for example, to the Nazi torching of the Reichstag or the attack on Poland was staged in the area of Vitaljina. From the heights of Dracevica, the former JA [Yugoslav Army] opened fire on Vitaljina, but in such a way that in part they also directed it toward their own units and garrisons on Prevlaka. Then they spread the argument with the Montenegrin public that "the ustashi from Konavle are attacking Prevlaka." At that time, we in Konavle had practically no weapons unless you count hunting rifles, and there is no way that Croatia could have provoked any incidents whatsoever. So much for Bulatovic's credibility, offers, and "fair demarcation."

Negotiations Concerning the Border on the Sea

[Antic] So, Croatia will not consent to the negotiations that Bulatovic mentions?

[Kacic] The fact is that the land border with Montenegro (24 km long) has been defined, and there are representatives of Croatian authorities, mainly police, along it. This was confirmed by the Badinter Commission and subsequently by the UN Security Council. So, there is not even any room here for any kind of negotiation. But it is also a fact that the border on the sea and in airspace, that is, the region of Kotor Bay and beyond, where Croatian territorial waters have a border with Montenegrin territorial waters, has never been defined. This is what should be debated and a boundary determined, and it will perhaps be necessary to turn this over to some international body for a decision, but once again it should be emphasized: There are no talks with any negotiator who comes, if I might so put it, from those parts so long as the FRY does not recognize Croatia in its internationally recognized borders.

Bulatovic's Traps

[Antic] But what do the offers to exchange territory mean?

[Kacic] Momir Bulatovic's recent offer is nothing but a trap. Neither he nor Milosevic have the legitimacy to offer anything in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, which is a part of the territory of internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina and cannot talk about such offers. In short, to be taken in by Bulatovic's proposals would be to fall into the worst kind of trap. Moreover, the fact that Bulatovic is assuming the role of Montenegrin spokesman must not deceive us into believing that the entire Montenegrin public agrees with his opinion concerning Prevlaka.

Cetinje and Kotor Are Not Belgrade

[Antic] Has there been resistance to the manipulation by Serbian expansionists?

[Kacic] To put it metaphorically, Podgorica and especially Cetinje and Kotor are not the same as Belgrade. There have been forces and there still are forces in Montenegro that would oppose manipulations by Serbian expansionists. Here I am thinking not only of the Liberals. Although those forces have not been effective up to now, we dare not neglect the examples shown by honest Montenegrins, of which the Croatian public is not sufficiently aware. For example, high-level Montenegrin officers were murdered in the JA because they refused to take part in the aggression against Croatia. Krsto Djurovic, commander of the Maritime Corps in Boka, was murdered on 7 October 1991, and Admiral Barovic was murdered on Vis in September 1991 because he refused orders to intervene in the area of Split. The top military clique of the JA told the public he had committed suicide.

General Kovacevic was also killed.... Such examples of murders committed by their responsible people are the best demonstration of the draconian repression that prevails in Belgrade and explains why there have not been protests and voices in Belgrade as there were in Moscow concerning Chechnya. But intermediaries, Lord Owen specifically, do not recognize such forces in Montenegro, but neglect them in order to bring the "parties to the dispute" to the same negotiating table.

International Intermediaries

[Antic] Representatives of the international community are speeding up negotiations concerning Prevlaka, while Croatia by contrast, if I might so put it, is "not in a hurry," because it takes the position that the right time for negotiations concerning Prevlaka has yet to come, especially in view of the possibility of a strengthening of reasonable forces in Montenegro.

[Kacic] That is the only rational behavior. Our viewpoint is clear: Prevlaka and Ostro Peninsula are a part of indivisible Croatian territory. Our objective and the only solution is for Ostro Peninsula to be demilitarized and for the area of the former military base to become a tourist recreational center. Instead of military uniforms, tourists, swimmers, people sailing, and, if you like, even nudists. The Montenegrins must free themselves of militant dinosaur ideas, and then the conditions will be created for general security of the extended Dubrovnik area and Kotor Bay.

HEP Director Assures Electric Power Supply

95BA0176E Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by HINA: "Supply of Power—Without Difficulties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Damir Begovic, general director of Croatian Electric Power Industry [HEP], said in a news conference on Wednesday that there will be no difficulties in the coming period with the supply of

electric power, although the consequences of the lack of rain are still being felt in Dalmatia.

Emphasizing that this year marks the 100th anniversary of HEP, Begovic announced that Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the president, has agreed to be the sponsor of the celebration of that anniversary.

The general director of HEP recalled that HEP recently signed a contract with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on a loan of about 220 million kunas for financial rescue of the distribution network. Among capital investment undertakings this year, he mentioned continuing linkage of all the Dalmatian islands with medium-voltage cables, completion of reconstruction of the Peruca Hydroplant, completion of the first phase of linking the islands, linkage to Hungary with long-distance transmission lines, and continuation of work on the Plomin Thermal Plant.

The recent contract of HEP and the Istria Zupanija with the Pula firm Urbis concerning specialized work and documents on land use planning for the Plomin Thermal Plant, in Begovic's judgment, can be regarded as agreement in principle to continuation of construction of the Plomin II Thermal Plant. "However, work will not continue without final consent of the local community," Begovic said.

He emphasized that the total cost of revitalizing Plomin I and continuing construction of Plomin II is estimated at about 1 billion kunas, and that completion of Plomin II would take two years.

Commencement of work is planned for July of this year, but those deadlines, Begovic mentioned, depend above all on the purchase of systems for sulfur removal. Begovic says at the same time that HEP is ready to dredge the port of Plomin so that it can take vessels bringing coal for the Plomin II Thermal Plant. "HEP is not giving consideration to the use of any fuel but coal with a low sulfur content," Begovic said.

According to what he said, HEP's participation in restructuring volume consumers in Dalmatia, the firms TEF in Sibenik and Dalmacija in Dugi Rat, will depend on a decision of the Croatian Government. In answer to a newsman's question, he explained that HEP would be ready in the case of TEF in Sibenik to take over some of the work force, and it would be ready to free some of its claims or, in view of the quality space of that firm, it would be able to collect those claims. In the case of Dalmacija in Dugi Rat, the possibility is being examined of leasing it a diesel power plant covered by the intervention program.

Asked whether the government had given consent to the announced changes in rate ratios between residential and industry, Begovic replied that consent had not yet been granted. "It is a case of gradual adaptation of the rate system, and that program will take two years at least," Begovic said.

HDZ Becoming Largest Party in Istria

95BA0176G Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Mirko Urosevic: "The HDZ as an Istrian Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pula—Over the last five years, the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] has become an Istrian party not only in the programs it advocates, but also in its membership, which includes more and more native inhabitants, said the leaders of the Pula HDZ at a news conference on Wednesday concerning celebration of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the HDZ in Istria.

Our objective is Istria in Europe, but together with Croatia, with full respect for the rights of ethnic minorities and every citizen, on which we are ready for dialogue with the IDS [Istrian Democratic Conference], because most of our programmatic guidelines are the same, the HDZ leaders said. They added that by celebrating the fifth anniversary of the HDZ in Pula, and thereby also in Istria, they are at the same time striving for the benefit of Istria and Croatia.

Dr. Mario Glavas, chairman, and Ante Milas, vice chairman of the City Committee, secretary Ljubo Petricevic, and members Marijan Bazdanovic (the first chairman), Lucano Bastjanic, and Mario Floricic spoke about the results of the HDZ in Pula and Istria.

"In five years the Pula HDZ has become so large that at the moment it is the largest party in Istria, with more than 2,000 members, not counting the rest of Istria. The HDZ has become recognizable to the citizen of Istria because it represents his general interests—economic, cultural, and ethnic," said Mario Floricic, director of the Bank of Istria. Calling upon the IDS and zupanija leaders for cooperation, he said that we both "want to save and develop Uljanik, Mirna, to build roads, and to affirm the maritime orientation."

"Incidentally," he added, "I am traveling on Thursday to Trieste together with Zupan Delbianac and Maras, director of the Housing and Municipal Service Fund, to arrange with the Bank of Trieste a loan of 1 million German marks to solve problems in Pula. This shows that party membership is not an obstacle to improving the living conditions and solving key economic problems," Floricic said, adding that the procedure would also be the same concerning the economy in a conversation with Prime Minister Valentic concerning Uljanik and other firms. Incidentally, on Wednesday the president of the Istrian HDZ and the Board of Directors of Uljanik signed an order to pay salaries for the month of January, Mario Floricic added.

The Pula HDZ, it was said, did not agree with the draft of the Zupanija Charter, nor with the assumption of powers to which the zupanija is not entitled, especially

when it concerns the rights of the Italian ethnic community, which, they said, enjoys everything to which it is entitled, partly because this is an expression of the life which Istrian Croats and Italians have had together for centuries. The best illustration that the HDZ favors respect for those rights, it was said, is that the Lino Mariani Italian Cultural and Artistic Society performed when the HDZ was established in Pula and is performing again for the fifth anniversary of the HDZ.

The essential thing is that we see Istria as the most advanced part of Croatia in Europe, not as a separate and detached part, and it is in that light that we see the upcoming first world congress of Istrians in Pula, which has been scheduled for Easter, the leaders of the Pula HDZ told newsmen.

Article Discusses Possible Return of Communists

95BA0178E Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by Branko Podgorica: "Can the Communists Return?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many Croatian politicians who were squeezed or persecuted in the former system are afraid that former communists will once again take control of Croatia. They are afraid that the wave from Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and other East European countries in which people from the communist system have returned to the helm of government will also roll over Croatia, if only in a milder form.

Franjo Tudjman, president of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), attempted to pacify those fears last November. He said that former communists have no chances of returning to power in Croatia thanks to the HDZ. However, Vera Stanic, representative of the HDZ's "original current," replied that the "former communists have never left the government; they are in it," thereby expressing the conviction of numerous people who share her outlook.

Vera Stanic later explained to the newspapers: "It is an illusion that the HDZ is in power. In 1990 we extended a hand of reconciliation to those who earlier held high positions. Today's entire array of important officials is the legacy of that."

Independent observers of political events in Croatia say that there may be truth in the assertions of both Dr. Franjo Tudjman and also Vera Stanic. The former communists in Croatia, that is, can be divided into three main groups, the first two of which have remained in power or close to it, while the third was removed from power in 1990.

The first group of people from the former system who are today in power includes the generation of people who were party members until 1971. Because of their awakened Croatism, they were removed from their positions after the "Croatian spring" was smothered. Some of them in 1989

became founders of the HDZ, but also of many Croatian political parties in the opposition. They belong to the "original current" of the incumbent party, although as a rule that current is made up of people who were never party members and were thwarted by communism.

The second group of former communists includes those who rose to (second-rank) political or economic positions after 1978. It is not so important for them whether they were for or against the "Croatian spring," because they were above all pragmatic, and sometimes too young to have taken a direct position. Most of them joined the communists because they realized that every system allows social advancement to those people who support it, at least formally.

These "technomanagers" readily offered their services to the incumbent party, and they are offering them today as well.

The third group of (former) communists consists of the so-called hard-liners, who before and after 1971 smothered democratic aspirations and Croatian national interests. These are mainly people who lost power in 1990 and who were in the hard-line faction of the former party.

The communist hard-liners opposed transformation of the League of Communists of Croatia [SKH] into the Croatian and Civil Social Democratic Party, and as the aggression of Serbian expansionism against Croatia was mounted, they left the rails of Racan's reform movement like old railroad cars.

So, the fear of noncommunists concerning a return of the former communists to power pertains above all to their third group. Serious observers say that their return after the example of the other East European countries is nevertheless hard to imagine, because they are burdened by the mortgage of Yugoslavia.

The other two groups of former communists in Croatia mostly supported before or after 1990 the popular movement for liberation of Croatia from communism and Yugoslavia, which for decades had been growing under the wing of the main antiregime force—the Catholic Church, which was guided by the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Union.

From the time it came to power, the HDZ has greeted with open arms anyone who wanted to collaborate with it. On one occasion, Miljenko Zagar, repeating the words of John the Baptist in the Gospels, issued a public appeal to people in Croatia: "Repent ye!" saying that this conversion to the HDZ was being offered to all those who wanted to collaborate in building a democratic and independent Croatia. That is how it was. It is well known that about one-third of the approximately 70,000 members of the SKH-SDP [League of Communists of Croatia—Democratic Reform Party] just before the 1990 election switched to the incumbent party that same year.

It would seem that fear of the return of the former communists is a secondary issue that conceals a deeper, more essential, and less frequently mentioned fear. That is, the principal burden of the past carried by communists in Croatia has to do with the way they conducted politics. This was "politics that did not come from the people down below," but from ideological interethnic stereotypes and interests of the minority. Accordingly, their return could once again deface Croatian ethnic and political identity or take Croatia into some new Yugoslav community. Some observers believe that the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] was unsuccessful largely because it emerged after the top Croatian leadership had already signed the Washington agreement, not before.

In any case, the most effective barrier to return of "politics not of the people" to power in Croatia is to conduct affairs of state in keeping with the needs and interests of our own people. The incumbent party, which to some extent has gone to sleep, has already drawn a lesson from its skirmish with the HND last year: that those political forces that are first to raise and resolve urgent national problems can count on political success. If they happen to be former communists, then their popularity will grow.

Once reintegration of the occupied areas begins, then the Croatian people will look to other problems, and observers estimate that they will be problems of social welfare above all. This is the issue on which the communists have traditionally gained great support, but the old or new left in Croatia will win back broad support only if the incumbent party and the rest of the opposition neglect that problem.

Air Defense Brigade Prepared for Battle

95BA0176H Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 95 p 29

[Article by Drazen Curic: "Reliable and Resolute Defenders of the Croatian Sky"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Croatian people stopped praying to dear God to keep our cities and villages, our churches, from being demolished, to keep our women and children from being murdered, as soon as we organized our Army," Major General Ivan Basarac, commander of the Zagreb Corps District, and Corps General Janko Bobetko, special emissary of the chief of the Supreme Command, said on Wednesday during the celebration of the second anniversary of establishment of the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade, which was held in the Ljudevit Posavski Garrison in Kerestinac.

"The Croatian people," Gen. Basarac went on, "has proven that it favors an independent and democratic state of Croatia, so that no Yugoslavians or other Balkan creations have a chance in these parts."

Speaking about organization of the Croatian Army, he emphasized the need for continuous training and constant improvement of the Croatian fighting man's theoretical and practical knowledge. In concluding his

speech, Gen. Basarac appealed to the members of the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade present to develop a love for the homeland and democracy that we fought for and won in the Homeland War.

Welcoming the guests and those present, Major Ivica Kanzir, commander of the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade, spoke about the brigade's origin and its career in the war. "Without abundant combat experience, which the members of our unit gained during the Homeland War, the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade would not at this moment be what we can confidently say it is: a reliable and resolute defender of the airspace of northwestern and central Croatia," Maj. Kanzir said.

"We are especially proud," he continued, "of bringing down the MiG-29 over Djakovo, bringing down the MiG-21 and MiG-29 over Opuzen, and the great success on battlefields in Trilje, Cavoglave, and Sinj. And finally," Kanzir concluded, "because we are holding this celebration in moments that have extremely great military and political weight for Croatia, I would like to emphasize that if the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia orders recovery of the occupied territories by military means, Croatia can count fully on this unit."

Then the members of the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade displayed their up-to-date weapons, a large part of which were sophisticated equipment made in this country.

During the ceremonies commemorative medals of the Homeland War were presented to members of the 50th Light Artillery Regiment, and commendations were given to the most successful fighting men and officers of the 202d Artillery Rocket Air Defense Brigade.

Croatian Deputies Criticize Z-4 Plan

95BA0176F Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 95
p 2

[Article by Josip Antic: "Nothing Good Concerning the Z-4 Plan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The Committee of the House of Representatives for Peaceful Reintegration adopted in its first meeting on Wednesday the outline of its work program and debated the draft of the Z-4 Plan. In the meeting it passed the motion of Vladimir Seks to send to the government a request that it prepare a law for urgent procedure that would put the rights of families of the missing and imprisoned on a par with the rights of families of defenders killed in action, and also legislative amendments that would prevent eviction of displaced persons. The committee also included in its outline program the proposal of Mirko Tankosic concerning

cooperation with all religious communities, because in accordance with their doctrine they can do much to reduce enmity.

The committee has 18 members; most are deputies from the occupied or partially occupied areas. It will work continuously, its chairman is Drago Krpina, and the vice chairmen are Mirko Tankosic and Miroslav Kis.

In the debate of the Z-4 Plan, Drago Krpina emphasized that the draft "missed the target, because it did not honor the fundamental political facts." The plan of the foreign emissaries, Krpina said, did not respect the causes of the present situation, which are not to be found in the alleged Croatian unwillingness to respect the rights of ethnic minorities, but in the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro against Croatian territory, in which the Serbian ethnic community was used as a tool. Ferenc Farago believes that the draft of the Z-4 Plan signifies legalization of genocide, and he emphasizes that it does not mention in a single word the fact that the aggression threatened the rights and committed genocide against all the non-Serbian minorities. "If there is anywhere where solutions like those contained in the Z-4 Plan should be offered," Farago said, "then this should be done in the so-called FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], where a much larger number of minorities live."

Ljubomir Antic said that autonomy means above all responsibility for whoever consumes it. He believes that the Z-4 contains unacceptable provisions, and that among other things there is no guarantee that a democratic system will be achieved on the territory of the

autonomous district or human rights respected, and without that the return of displaced persons is unthinkable. According to Antic, a beginning should be made with forms of less local autonomy, but not with the maximalist demands that call for taking away territory instead of protecting the Serbian minority.

Joso Medved believes that the Z-4 is entirely unacceptable, because by way of the alleged decentralization it opens up room for some new Yugoslavia. Snjezana Biga Friganovic spoke favorably of the diplomatic level of the Croatian executive branch in its declaration concerning the Z-4, and she opposed harsh criticism of the ambassadors who drew up the plan. "They should not be raised to the level of national heroes, which has been done with U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith, but neither should they be seen as persona non grata," she believes.

Zdenko Matesic also finds the plan unacceptable, because, he says, it contains the aspirations of the rebels and "a part of their game." He was supported by Ante Dzelalija, who said that the displaced persons do not want to go back "with their heads bowed." Ante Kutle considers the plan "the ultimate of cynicism and indecency," and he called for the parliament not to debate it at all, while Mirko Tankosic asked whether the plan was the product of some new Yalta. He said that Croatian diplomacy must put forth Croatian views much more forcefully. Zeljko Busic entirely opposed the plan, as did Vladimir Cvitanovic.

Skopje Asks Butrus-Ghali To Change UN Mandate
LD1503185895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 15 Mar (TANJUG)—During the course of his visit to New York, Stevo Crvenkovski, minister of foreign affairs of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] asked United Nations Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the chairman of the UN Security Council for a change in the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate in the FYROM, it was stated in Skopje this evening.

According to a statement issued by the FYROM Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crvenkovski emphasized the need to set up separate military logistic and administrative UN structures, which would be under the leadership of the UN secretary general's special envoy.

The statement goes on to say that Crvenkovski had a meeting in New York yesterday with Cyrus Vance, UN mediator in the Macedonian-Greek dispute, which was also attended by the U.S. President's special envoy Matthew Nimitz. [passage omitted]

PDP Participates in Assembly, Explains Return
AU1603082195 Skopje MIC in English 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] deputy groups participated in the work of parliament yesterday. At the start of the session, Ismet Ramadani, in explaining their return, advised the parliament to exercise a more liberal approach to the proposals of this group. In particular when it comes to questions in the sphere of education, the use of languages, the media and the inter-ethnic relations. The independent MP Hisen Ramadani said that the Albanians hold an identical view on "the multi-cultural and multi-national character of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]," while the differences are "only in the approach and form of expression of the requests."

Gligorov Remarks on Social Development Summit
AU1503191795 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 14 Mar 95 p 1

[Article on President Gligorov's statement upon his return from Copenhagen, by S.J.: "Special Treatment for Countries in Transition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The International Social Development Summit in Copenhagen ended after midnight on Sunday [12 March] with the signatures of about 120 leaders on the political declaration and program for action. On his return from Copenhagen, President Kiro Gligorov evaluated the results of the Summit and expressed his views regarding what could be expected.

"To sum up the impressions of this summit, it is in a way a turning point in the global evaluation of developmental problems. There have been many European and international conferences on economic development, but social development was always set aside as the concern of each individual state. But this time it has become obvious that there is a growing awareness that if economic development in even the most developed countries does not correlate with adequate social development and everything that that includes, it can lead to various conflicts.

We can say that the adopted declaration and program represent a view of future development, both economic and social. For us, two things are most important. First, the international financial and banking institutions have been pursuing rigid economic programs without paying any attention to social repercussions, because of that it was recommended that all the elements that lead to a more harmonious development be taken into consideration. The second is that countries in the so-called transition stage have obtained a special place in the program, due to the fact that social problems are being manifested in a very dramatic way. Certainly, it is neither possible nor realistic to expect the immediate implementation of the declaration and program. This represents merely a global orientation and many stages will be necessary for its accomplishment. However, the present views regarding debts and assistance to developing countries in this regard represent a significant step forward."

"In this short time we also had a meeting with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus Ghali on the forthcoming negotiations to resolve our problems with Greece. I also spoke with European Union representatives, including European Commission President Jacques Santer, because the time for closer cooperation with the European Union is coming. We also had meetings with our neighbors, and I think that we availed ourselves of this opportunity to complete some things for which we would normally have required more time."

President Gligorov then announced the meeting of Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski with Cyrus Vance in New York today for the purpose of examining conditions for a possible continuation of negotiations with Greece. The President also expressed his hope that they would come about and added that Secretary General Butrus Butrus Ghali had offered his help in speeding up the negotiations as much as possible.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Estonia
AU1603090795 Skopje MIC in English 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The embassy of the Republic of Estonia in Stockholm sent a note to the Macedonian embassy, informing it that the Government of the Republic of Estonia made a decision on March 9th to establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], at embassy level.

The Macedonian Foreign Ministry accepted the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Estonia with its own note, yesterday, in accordance with the Vienna conventions for diplomatic relations from the year 1961 and for consular relations from 1963, and informed the Estonian Foreign Ministry.

Continued Political Unrest in Tetovo Expected

95BA0178F Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 95
p 19

[Article by Petar Knezevic: "Fear of Unrest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje—The interrupted 10th and regular 11th and 13th sessions scheduled for yesterday and today were postponed without the tensions resulting from the incidents in Tetovo. That is the main reason, according to the official proposal of caucuses in the parliament. However, the second and perhaps more important reason for the postponement is fear of a parliamentary crisis, because the leaders of the most powerful Skipetar party, the Democratic Prosperity Party (PDP), announced the possibility of their deputies leaving the parliament.

It is an open secret that after parliamentary debate was "frozen" by the Skipetar People's Democratic Party (NDP) fierce pressures were exerted from Albania for the PDP, whose leader is Abdurahman Aliti, to do the same.

In any case, the leader of the NDP and the leader of the informal group, also a parliamentary deputy, Arben Dzaferi, have been charging the Government of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Branko Crvenkovski, its prime minister, with what is called repression and political trials against Albanians. They are proposing an expression of collective dissatisfaction with the bodies of government on the part of the Skipetar population all over Macedonia.

Elsewhere, law enforcement agencies in Tetovo have indicted Nezvet Halili, president of the PDP-National Unity. The indictment charges him with participation in obstructing officials in performance of their duties during the demonstrations.

In a meeting of the Tetovo Opstina Assembly, the Skipetar deputies, speaking Albanian, said that the university in Tetovo was legal and legitimate. "We will not

give up on the university, which has 'already been born.'" They said the Macedonian police were barbarous and against the people. The Macedonian deputies left the meeting as a sign of protest.

Because there was a quorum, the session resumed with members all of one nationality. Resolutions were adopted condemning the repression against what was said to be the innocent Skipetar population in Mala Recica. They called for unconditional release of Dr. Fadil Sulejmani and the other demonstrators taken into custody. They demanded that the government and Ljubomir Frckovski, minister of internal affairs, be made accountable.

Yesterday about 2,000 university students organized a peaceful protest in front of the building of the parliament in Skopje against the opening of the Albanian-language university in Tetovo. Tomi Mircevski, president of the Students Alliance of Saints Cyril and Methodius University, read out a declaration calling for a unified and integral higher educational system in the official Macedonian language. The Macedonian Government was called upon to protect the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia and also to work out an educational system for ethnic minorities in strict accordance with the standards of international institutions.

Dzozef Diogardi, former congressman who is president of American-Albanian Friendship, organized demonstrations in New York in which the demonstrators gave full support to the operation of the university in Tetovo. They demanded that Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, the rector, be released immediately.

Stevo Crvenkovski, foreign minister of FYROM, received Saban Murati, Albanian ambassador in Skopje, for an official conversation and on that occasion expressed his concern regarding the demonstrations of Albanian students in front of the Macedonian Embassy in Tirana. The students of Albania, that is, gave full support to the university in Tetovo, considering it legal.

The demonstrators addressed insults to the Macedonian state and high officials of Macedonia. There is no doubt that the political situation in the FYROM is more than problematical, and unrest of Skipetar citizens in the western region can be expected.

EU Negotiations To End During French Tenure

AU1503160795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 15 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following today's first round of talks on our country's associate membership agreement in the EU, Slovenia and the EU issued a joint statement for the public. Heads of both delegations, Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler and (Gunther Burkhardt), director general of the European Commission, expressed satisfaction with the decision of the EU ministerial council to grant a mandate for the commencement of negotiations. The statement emphasizes that the negotiations are to be concluded during the French presidency of the Union. This will allow Slovenia to participate in the preparatory strategy for Central and East European countries, as envisaged by the EU Essen Summit.

Kucan Affirms Nation's Desire To Join EU

AU1503213495 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 14 Mar 95 p 37

[Interview with President Milan Kucan by Norbert Mappes-Niediek; place and date not given: "We Will Hold a Referendum on the EU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mappes-Niediek] Slovenia wants to get into the EU. Is this a dangerous prospect? After all, it is not yet clear whether the EU accepts new members and Slovenia is already orienting itself very much toward the EU in economic terms.

[Kucan] What is the alternative? It is even more dangerous to isolate oneself. One must look for the answer to the question about the EU's position on enlargement in Europe's prospects. And these are revealed by the political statement after the fall of the Berlin Wall: Europe as a common home for big and small peoples. The question arises as to whether Europe has any prospects if it remains divided into EU and non-EU countries, more developed and less developed countries, secure and less secure countries.

[Mappes-Niediek] However, the EU has two contradictory prospects: enlargement or deepening.

[Kucan] For would-be members this gives rise to the question of how much they are willing to pay for membership. Any country that joins after Maastricht gives up part of its sovereignty. Behind this, there is the even more important question about the ideas, the soul, the system of values of the future Europe. Which ideas are worth giving up part of one's sovereignty for? Europe cannot simply be a perfect mechanism of quotas, contributions, and commitments. Yugoslavia disintegrated because it did not have a common system of values.

[Mappes-Niediek] The EU is interested in stable, democratic states oriented toward a market economy on its eastern borders; it does not want a harsh line between poor and rich. However, is it a tempting prospect for

Slovenia to be the poorest country among the rich soon instead of being, as in Yugoslavia, the richest country among poorer ones?

[Kucan] You are right about the EU's interest. However, to survive, Slovenia must live up to the European standards anyway, regardless of whether or not we become a member. If we achieve this, membership will become a political question; now it is still a question of facts. Slovenia already fulfills all the conditions for the interim step of association.

[Mappes-Niediek] A matter of survival?

[Kucan] For us it is not so much a question of how to get into the EU but of how we prevent being thrown out. As soon as we have reached the above-mentioned standards, the question becomes real. We will hold a referendum, as the Austrians, the Finnish, and the Swedes have successfully done.

[Mappes-Niediek] By leaving Yugoslavia, Slovenia has not only left a state but also the southern Slav cultural area. Is such a small country, with its own language spoken by only 2 million people, threatened with a cultural implosion now?

[Kucan] There never was a Yugoslav culture, only a political area with various national cultures. Of course, the creative relationship of these cultures with one another, this multicultural quality, had its special value. One can see this in Europe, which is a multicultural continent. Any nation must, of course, be able to decide in favor of protecting and developing its own culture. For the Slovenes, who are a small nation, this is a particularly sensible question. In the course of time, we, as a nation, have constituted and integrated ourselves with the culture, also in political terms, and then declared ourselves independent in our own state. Thus, membership in the EU is very important for us, not only economically but also culturally and in terms of civilization.

[Mappes-Niediek] So far, all Slovenes have been bilingual, speaking Slovene and Serbo-Croatian. This will soon be over, I suppose.

[Kucan] Yes, but in Yugoslavia many Slovenes already spoke English, German, or French because the country was open and oriented toward exports. Today Europeans do not have any prospects if they do not speak two or three foreign languages.

[Mappes-Niediek] If Croatia sends the UN mission back home, could you then imagine being host to the headquarters?

[Kucan] I hope that Croatia has considered all the potential consequences of its decision. However, I do not see what UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] could do based in Slovenia.

[Mappes-Niediek] Slovenia is almost the only country that preserved far-reaching continuity in terms of personnel during the upheaval from 1989 to 1990. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage?

[Kucan] Some—and I stress, some—of the people stayed at the head of Slovene politics—after two democratic elections! Why did the people decide in this way? Because they assessed the work, the responsibility, and the skills of the new and the former politicians. One must understand that the only party at that time, the League of Communists of Slovenia, played an active role in making the process of transition from the old to the new system peaceful. There was a dialogue between the reformist wing of the party and that part of the Slovene intelligentsia that acted as a recognized or unrecognized opposition. This dialogue still exists on vital issues for the Slovene people, the living standard of the current generation and prospects for the future. Everyone can participate in it who accepts the democratic rules and the Constitution. In a democratic country the citizens distribute their trust in individuals, structures, and parties by means of elections. The parties are paid—so to speak—for their contribution to improving the living standard and to more social and safer political prospects.

[Mappes-Niediek] The mood in the political arena is not particularly good. You yourself have been attacked, and so has Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. Is it necessary to hold a great debate about the past so that the mood improves?

[Kucan] I would say: The political climate in Slovenia is specific in some aspects [sentence as published], but nothing special compared with what is going on in countries with a similar fate. There is polarization, elements of bipolarity, on the Slovene political scene. Basically, this would be nothing alarming. However, the reasons for this bipolarity are alarming.

[Mappes-Niediek] What are they?

[Kucan] There are several elements. It is often heard that it is a confrontation between former communists and former dissidents. I interpret this differently, as a conflict between former communists and those dissidents who became dissidents only after the upheaval in 1990. Instead of taking over responsibility for reforming the party and social conditions in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia's peaceful transition to new social conditions, a peaceful path into independence, and international recognition, they took over the role of anticommunist dissidents when there was no longer any communism. Another, very worrying element of bipolarity is the division of the Slovenes during World War II, which has its roots in the first Yugoslavia of the interwar period, and the tragic events during and immediately after World War II, with their consequences for life in socialist Yugoslavia after the war.

[Mappes-Niediek] Why is this still so important?

[Kucan] In World War II the Slovene people were slated to disappear. A large part of the Slovenes understandably participated actively in the struggle against such a fate. The Slovenes had a big and strong partisan army. However, unfortunately, there was also a small, active

"Domobranci" [Home Guard], who swore loyalty to Hitler and thus suffered the fate of all Nazi armies at the end of the war. Today, 50 years later, the discussion about these matters is returning to Slovene politics. However, these are no real historical dilemmas. The problems of the Slovenes 50 years ago are not their problems now. Therefore, the debate is unproductive. Any nation must accept its history as it was, with its dark and its bright sides, without any attempts at reinterpretation afterwards. Most Slovenes today proceed from a positive experience, which is concentrated on independence, and Slovene policy has to live up to that.

Coalition Parties 'Almost' Coordinate Budget

AU1503191095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 15 Mar 95

[Report by Sandi Frelih]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The negotiators of the coalition parties almost harmonized the budget within the limits proposed by the Finance Ministry, that is, around 510 billion Slovene tolar.

Janez Kopac [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, LDS] said that the agreement was a fruit borne by a group of experts who, during the coordination, had kept party interests to one side. For this reason Kopac believes that the proposal in question will not suit the ministers in the government of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek either. Kopac did not wish to say more about the contents of the agreement, but added that no special funds had been taken into consideration in the coordination of the budget, with the exception of projects that are already being implemented.

Between the government parties, or to be more exact, the LDS and the Christian Democrats [SKD] the views regarding the SKD proposal on maternity leave are diametrically opposed. Vera Kozmik [LDS] is of the opinion that the subject has been politicized and geared toward scoring electoral points. Because of the dispute, the coalition negotiations have been suspended. In conformity with the decision of the LDS Executive Committee, the LDS is offering its own proposal for discussion. [passage omitted]

Minister Declares Self-Defense Groups Illegal

95BA0180C Maribor VECER in Slovene 20 Feb 95 p 24

[Unattributed article: "The Activity of the Troikas Is Illegal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Interior Ministry thinks that the activity of the troikas is illegal, but the National Socialist Alliance of Slovenia [NSZS] claims that they always act in accordance with the laws and that they will do so in the future.

Interior Minister Andrej Ster invited NSZS President Matjaz Gerlanc for a talk on Friday, and they discussed the establishment of "troikas" in Maribor. Minister Ster warned the NSZS president that the activity of the groups, which were conducting actions that were within the jurisdiction of the state authorities and of enterprises registered for the private protection of people and property, were in violation of the legal order of the Republic of Slovenia, according to a report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Minister Ster informed the NSZS president that the Interior Ministry would take decisive measures against such activity.

The Interior Ministry also announced that on Friday, at the Maribor bus station, policemen from the Maribor Internal Affairs Administration asked for identification from members of one of the "troikas," who proved their identity with NSZS membership cards, which were also supposed to be official ID's. The policemen temporarily confiscated that document from the members of this troika, and warned them that they should immediately cease activities for which they had no legal basis. The members of the "troika" respected the warning and withdrew from the bus station.

The official position of the NSZS regarding Minister Ster's proposals is that the NSZS has always acted in accordance with the laws and that it will also do so in the future. They have sent an initiative for legalizing self-defense activities to the government and the State Assembly, and they have also proposed to the municipalities that they adopt that form of organization. The NSZS agrees that it is completely inappropriate for political parties to organize troikas, but emphasizes that its members were not only aiming at protecting members of the Slovene people, but rather all citizens. The NSZS will propose to members and nonmembers of the troikas that they cease patrolling as of 20 February, primarily in order to avoid clashes with uniformed members of the SND [Slovene National Right] in Slovene Sokol uniforms, who obviously want violence, not safety.

The NSZS emphasizes that it still supports self-initiative on the part of the people who have organized, primarily on the weekends, night watches, because of numerous break-ins and incidents of damage to automobiles.

The NSZS hopes that parliament, in its third discussion, will approve the initiative to legalize its proposal, and that the municipalities will also respond. The NSZS did not have any bad intentions in organizing the troikas, as demonstrated by the fact that only three of its members are among the 70 people in Velenje, Maribor, Ljubljana, and Jesenice, and all have been unpunished.

Personnel Reassigned in Defense Ministry

95BA0180B Maribor VECER in Slovene 24 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Reassignments in the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Government of the Republic of Slovenia appointed the new state secretary in the Slovene Defense Ministry, the deputy chief of the Slovene Army's General Staff, and the commander of the Slovene Army's Eighth Regional Command to new duties.

Miran Bogataj, who until now was a government adviser in the Defense Ministry, became a state secretary in the Defense Ministry. He will cover in particular the area of protection against natural and other disasters. The former chief of the section for the air force, Brigadier Iztok Podbregar, will occupy the position of deputy chief of the Slovene Army's General Staff as of 1 March 1995. Alojz Završnik, who previously worked as deputy commander of the Slovene Army's Second Regional Command, will be the commander of the Slovene Army's Eighth Regional Command as of 1 March 1995.

Finance Ministers Discuss SFRY Debt

95BA0180A Ljubljana SLOVENEK in Slovene 16 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Drago Lovrencic: "Clark and Gaspari on Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London—Mitja Gaspari, Slovene finance minister, spoke yesterday with his British counterpart, Kenneth Clark, primarily about the problem of the former Yugoslavia's [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—SFRY] unallocated debt. That has to do with the loans that the former state borrowed from international commercial banks.

Gaspari presented the Slovene position, according to which Slovenia, as an internationally recognized state, cannot allow the Belgrade Government, which portrays itself as the successor to the old federation, to be the only one to negotiate with the creditors. Slovenia wants the issue of the old Yugoslav debts to be settled as soon as possible, and is therefore prepared to pay its part immediately. The best solution, of course, is the one already accepted by the International Monetary Fund, according to which Slovenia would be responsible for 16.39 percent of the unallocated Yugoslav debt. According to Gaspari, Kenneth Clarke said that he viewed the Slovene position as completely reasonable and justified. Great Britain, together with France and Russia, is playing a leading role in the current attempts to settle the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Mitja Gaspari left London for Washington, where he will also discuss debts with U.S. financial officials.

Slovene Debt to Croatian Health Insurance

95BA0174E Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 10 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Milena Ule: "How Much Slovenia Owes Croatian Health Care"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia has inflated the amount and added late charges; a commission is preparing a solution for payment of the overdue obligations.

Ljubljana, 10 Feb—At the last meeting of the Croatian Government, Croatian Minister of Health Andrija Hebrang said that Slovenia owed 81 million kunas to the Croatian health insurance fund, and expressed hope that our country would settle that debt soon.

In a conversation with Irena Zagar, assistant director general of Slovenia's health insurance institute, and Boris Gacnik, director of the insurance section at the pension institute, we learned that Slovenia actually owes Croatian health care a considerable amount of money, namely for contributions for health insurance for Slovene retirees who are permanent residents in Croatia. That debt was incurred during the period from April 1992 to April 1994. During the period before that, the payment of contributions for retirees who did not have permanent residence in Slovenia was regulated by a republic law, just as for retirees with permanent residence in Slovenia. The new law on pension and disability insurance that went into effect in April 1992 simply left out and avoided the payment of contributions for retirees who did not have permanent residence in Slovenia, and likewise regulation of that problem was not specified in the law on health insurance and health care. To put it simply, a legal vacuum arose in that area in April 1992.

The Croatian authorities have been warning for a long time about the fact that Slovenia has not been paying contributions for health insurance for retirees in Croatia who earned their pensions through work in Slovenia. Because of those pressures, last year the Slovene Government adopted a decision that as of 1 April 1994 the pension institute would again pay the contributions (indirectly through a health insurance company) for health insurance for retirees without permanent residence in Slovenia, on the basis of reciprocity. The Slovene debt for the above-mentioned two-year period, however, remains unsettled. Essentially, it is our country's obligation to cover it. Boris Gacnik of the pension institute also said in this regard that the Croatian state had considerably inflated the total amount and also added late charges on its own. According to calculations by the ZPIZ [health and pension plan], the Slovene debt amounts to about 431 million tolar. We also found out that the Slovene Government has appointed a special commission composed of representatives of the responsible Health Ministry and the Ministry of Labor, Family, and Social Affairs, which is preparing a solution for the payment of overdue obligations to our retirees in Croatia, as well as an appropriate legal solution for the future, which has to find a place either in pension or health legislation. The obligation to pay contributions for health insurance for those of our retirees who do not have permanent residence in Slovenia as well has thus already been included among the proposed changes and additions to the pension law.

Central Bank Requires Deposits for Foreign Loans

95BA0174C Maribor VECER in Slovene 11 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Jelka Zupanic: "Interest Rates Should Not Jump"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Governor Arhar thought that domestic interest rates should not jump as a result of the mandatory deposit of 40 percent of financial loans incurred abroad.

Before the Bank of Slovenia [BS] board decided that as of yesterday all domestic persons that received a financial loan abroad with a repayment period of up to five years, even for collateral, would have to deposit in an account at the central bank a 40-percent zero-interest tolar deposit, it assessed what happened in Slovenia in the monetary sphere last year. Because the BS is abiding by last year's goals, i.e., concern for a stable tolar and long-term foreign exchange liquidity, it could not overlook what was happening in exchange offices and the large increase in foreign borrowing last year. The central bank's board therefore wanted to use the measures adopted at its last three meetings to keep the exchange rate from lagging behind inflation.

To be sure, at a news conference yesterday Governor France Arhar did not say a word about specific effects of the measures adopted upon exchange rate trends. Before he presented the measures, he said that last year there had been a turnover of 6.8 billion German marks [DM] at 1,500 exchange offices in Slovenia. For the sake of comparison, let us note that last year Slovenia exported \$6.8 billion in goods, i.e., the exchange offices achieved an enviable turnover. In contrast to 1993, however, when the exchange offices sold DM97 million more than people bought, last year the purchase of foreign exchange at exchange offices was almost DM560 million more than sales. According to Arhar, the amount gives rise to suspicion that the exchange offices are not only conducting purely exchange transactions, but also large monetary transactions that could be covered by the law on preventing money laundering that is already in effect. Because a large amount of foreign money flows through the exchange offices, the BS is thinking about how to regulate that area differently.

An additional signal for the measures was the amount of foreign loans. Last year Slovene entities concluded loans for \$950 million, with \$231 million last December alone; \$657 million, or 70 percent, went into the private sector. Financial loans, which amounted to \$339 million, were also particularly significant, and Arhar emphasized that they constituted an additional supply of foreign exchange in the Slovene money market and that many of those who had concluded the loans did not even draw upon them. That foreign borrowing also increased the country's indebtedness by almost 20 percent, which amounts to \$2.2 billion. The governor mentioned that with that kind of foreign borrowing last year, Slovene

banks approved \$153 million in loans to domestic enterprises, i.e., considerably less than they could have. He also warned about the unfavorable structure of savings, which did not support long-term loans.

The BS, of course, is not indifferent to what happened in the monetary sphere. That is why it decided that as of 1 April it would monitor and increase the number of levels of mandatory reserves for commercial banks. For tolar deposits for more than one year, for example, no banks will have to have mandatory reserves. For the sake of greater foreign exchange liquidity, the central bank's board also adopted a decision on a 100-percent foreign exchange minimum. In order to reduce the gap between the price of domestic and foreign money, they raised the price of the current BS treasury notes and announced a new issuance of treasury notes denoted in tolars that could be purchased only by banks, with money from the sale of foreign exchange to increase solvency.

The most important measure to prevent a flood of foreign loans in Slovenia is the introduction of the 40-percent zero-interest tolar deposit for domestic persons that obtain loans abroad. Governor Arhar thought yesterday that interest rates at Slovene banks would not jump as a result of this.

Interior Ministry Secretary on Public Safety

95BA0174A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Feb 95 p 29

[Interview with Borut Likar, state secretary for public safety in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Zarko Hojnik; place and date not given: "Everyone Does Not (Yet) Need To Be Afraid of Bombs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 11 Feb—*The security situation in Europe is still threatening security in Slovenia as well, and consequently this year's goal for the Slovene police is a high degree of objective and subjective safety of the residents. We talked about the police guidelines for work related to public safety with Borut Likar, state secretary for public safety in the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MNZ].*

[Hojnik] Your "mission statement" says that the goal for the police is a high degree of objective and subjective safety for the inhabitants of Slovenia. With the concept of objective safety, have you replaced what was previously the most frequently used concept of joint-collective security?

[Likar] We are measuring the level of safety from two points of view. We talk about objective safety when we are dealing with and assessing information on the number of various crimes and misdemeanors, and also information on how quickly police deal with crime. We can conclude from a comparison of this information with various European data that Slovenia is a safe country: There are fewer crimes (per capita, of course), and more perpetrators are discovered. Much less "objective" and reliable are judgments about how much crime is not even discovered and reported. We in the police do

not deal with that either, but criminological research is of assistance to us. The situation in that area is probably reflected in what we call subjective safety. That simply means what kind of sense of safety people have, how safe or threatened they feel, what they are afraid of, and whether they have the feeling that crime is being stopped. Information on this is extremely important to modern police because it allows more accurate management of various activities, from completely operational ones to communication activities, by which an individual can be guaranteed the kind of level of safety that allows him to live and work well. This year we are also starting to determine the level of subjective safety in our country, and will compare it with information from other countries. Joint, collective safety is a concept that is used in international relations for the defense sphere.

[Hojnik] In a brief description of the circumstances of police activity this year, you say that in accordance with the predictions and guidance, there were fewer crimes last year, and the level of investigation either stayed the same or partly increased. Weren't the predictions different? Some police officials were even talking about an increase in the volume of crime.

[Likar] We wrote even last year that everything possible had to be done in order to keep the number of crimes from increasing. To be sure, we did predict an increase for the more serious crimes with elements of organization and violence, and that prediction, unfortunately, came true. We also expect that kind of development in the future. Because of limited personnel and material resources and other obstacles we are attempting constantly and on an ongoing basis to establish a balance between preventing classic crime and this modern, organized, and violent form. We must not get into a situation in which we would no longer be able to or want to deal with so-called petty crime, on the grounds that we are too busy with more difficult crimes. Petty crime, which there is more of, is much more of a threat to the majority of people, although it is not as spectacular and not as much of a media attraction as organized crime. Bombs, extortion, violent debt collection, and so forth, are phenomena that do not threaten most citizens directly.

[Hojnik] There has been an increase in criminal activity with elements of organized crime. Can you be more specific? How much of an increase is there, and what are the characteristics of organized crime?

[Likar] In organized crime, the perpetrators no longer act individually, but are instead more and more organized, and the hierarchical composition of their organizations is increasingly clear; the use of violence to achieve their goals is also becoming an everyday occurrence. We also have information about very good ties with important members of criminal gangs abroad. Our findings indicate that there has been approximately a tenfold increase in the number of crimes related to prostitution, which accompanies many other worse crimes. There has been a one-third increase in the illegal deprivation of freedom,

robberies have increased two and a half times, and extortion has increased by almost one-third. However, there has been a decrease in the amount of counterfeit money and there is less drug trafficking. The numerous explosions that we have seen recently are primarily associated with insurance fraud.

[Hojnik] Let's dwell on organized crime a little longer. You say that crime in Slovenia originating from the former Warsaw Pact countries is growing. Is it just white slavery, or also some other form of crime?

[Likar] Crime from the former Warsaw Pact countries has so far penetrated here mainly in the form of prostitution. That step is characteristic of all the countries in which criminals from the East now play the main role. We are already accelerating preparations for the following steps, with respect to which we will follow the English model that was presented last year at an Interpol symposium on organized crime. We have also discovered some attempts to launder money from the former Soviet Union countries, but through enterprises from Western Europe. We have also identified links between Slovene and foreign perpetrators, especially in the international trafficking in stolen automobiles. We have also arrested thieves from the East who stole automobiles in Slovenia without any connection with our own thieves.

[Hojnik] Last year the problem of the theft, smuggling, and sale of radioactive materials occupied even heads of state. Are the Slovene police trained and equipped with the appropriate technology to uncover in time possible attempts to bring in radioactive materials?

[Likar] In our work we have certainly noticed that some Slovene citizens have tried to participate in international trafficking in radioactive materials, but not in our country. In the known cases, our citizens have only played a side role in other countries. The police themselves do not have the appropriate technology to detect those materials, but some Slovene institutions that are equipped to detect radioactive materials and deal with them do. Thus, for instance, the German police discovered the smuggling of radioactive materials with the help of information from the German intelligence service [BND], which operates abroad, and the Interior Ministry's office for the protection of the constitutional order.

[Hojnik] You police chiefs emphasize at every opportunity the police's getting closer to the public, accessibility, and visibility in the field. Isn't that process a slow one, however, perhaps even very slow?

[Likar] The public safety project has been seriously under way for five years now, and that is the reason for the misgivings about slowness. Although as state secretary I am intensively involved with that project, I agree with that assessment. We lacked a few foundations for serious progress and implementation of the project. We tested the project for a full year in Upper Carniola, and included some experiences in the draft law on the police, which is waiting for parliamentary discussion. Only that

law will allow us to transfer the Carniolan experiences to other internal affairs administrations. Many innovations, of course, are also associated with regulation of the relations between the state administration and local self-government.

The project's goals include streamlining operations, which should not reduce the extent and quality of our services. We have begun, gradually and very cautiously, to open police offices, which have successfully replaced police departments. Specifically, the latter are completely formalized organizational units that have to have their own officers, office operations, and so forth. They are advisable if the volume of work is large enough, but it has turned out that that is not the case everywhere. It is enough to have an area where a policeman is available to citizens for a certain period. In spite of the explanations and the good work, former municipal delegates asked why we were taking away their police. I realized that we could start most of our work on bringing police closer to the people—victims or wronged parties—even before we develop the project as a whole. Right now we are completing a review of last year's guidelines in connection with bringing policemen closer to the people, in order to determine through an analysis what we should do next. Modern work also requires more modern equipment, and especially a new approach to police thinking. In the second third of the year, as part of the plan for police work aimed at the community, we will start to train policemen suitable for contacts with people, including at institutions where they will act as security advisers. For that purpose, they will need in particular knowledge of how to work, how to make contacts with people, and we will have to teach them how to recognize their difficulties and "arm" them with experience in how to protect people against dangers. Also in preparation is a reorganization of the former police stations, and especially the police organizational structure in Ljubljana and Maribor.

[Hojnik] Are the former rules for militia stations still in effect, and when will you present the new police rules to the public?

[Likar] No one has revoked the previous police rules, which of course have been improved. We are just now finishing the preparations for more major changes, although these are still adjustments to the old police rules. We will find in them, for the first time, the police office as a new form of police work, and the role of the head of the police district as a policeman for public relations will also be a new one, as I have already said. Police discipline will be defined, among other things, for instance, whether policemen in uniform will have beards.... After the adoption of the new law on the police and internal administrative acts, we will issue new police rules, which will not apply only to police stations, but also to all the uniformed civilian police.

[Hojnik] Some mayors are already demanding the establishment of police stations in the areas of their municipalities. How will you respond to such demands?

[Likar] The issue is undoubtedly urgent because there really are several such demands. This is also an issue of how the police will be subordinate to local self-government. In spite of that, we in Slovenia are not thinking about opening new police stations or units. The draft law on the police allows for a local community to establish a constabulary service to maintain public order and traffic safety, which will have certain powers. We will furthermore provide those services with technical assistance, because that is also in our own interest. The fact that the police are a state body still does not mean that we will not establish ties with the locals and the leaderships of local self-government units.

[Hojnik] In regard to traffic safety, you note that your predictions about a further deterioration in the traffic safety situation had come true—something that probably was not difficult to predict. But don't the police have a special strategy for measures to be taken by traffic policemen?

[Likar] In addition to the strategy, we also have specific guidelines for ensuring traffic safety. Last year's traffic safety situation was catastrophic. We are aware of the causes of accidents, and we also know the critical days and hours. As long as penalties are not issued or enforced, police work will be in vain. The government has adopted a decision on establishing an interagency working group to prepare a national traffic safety program. We expect that with the new laws on safety in highway traffic and violations, and with the national program, we will obtain a basis for more effective controlling measures.

[Hojnik] Among the basic guidelines in individual areas of public safety, you also wrote that it was necessary to reduce response times and increase the quality of interventions. How do you intend to achieve that? Are you perhaps leaving implementation of that directive to the lower levels?

[Likar] The successes in that area are obvious, and the guidelines have been carried over from last year. The police are arriving at the scenes of accidents more quickly. Still unresolved are certain technical capabilities that will make it easier to monitor and guide police patrols in such a way that we will reduce response times even more. Cases are known in which, through rapid intervention, we have arrested perpetrators at the scene of the crime or as they left it. We are developing the system at the MNZ, but we are only implementing it at the lower levels.

[Hojnik] Individuals are talking publicly about the establishment of three-man constabulary patrols that are supposed to watch out for public order along with the police. What do you know about that? Are these perhaps neighborhood watches, after the Western model?

[Likar] I am not familiar with the ideas about three-man patrols in detail. They certainly should not be any sort of "parapolice"; no law provides for them, and consequently any different police measures would be associated with violations of the law. The establishment of such groups requires decisive measures by us. As far as we know, those three-man patrols cannot be included in any known concept of a neighborhood watch as it is known in many Western countries. There are specific residential communities there that have more oversight over what is happening and establish special watches, but police missions remain the responsibility of the police.

[Hojnik] How do you assess the Slovene police force's cooperation with the Croatian police?

[Likar] Our cooperation with the police forces of the neighboring countries is good. We also confirmed that a few days ago in Vienna in talks with the secretary general for public safety, and in Ljubljana at a meeting with the Hungarian police on the occasion of the signing of a memorandum on police cooperation. We are also cooperating well with the Croatian police, especially at the local and regional levels. More and more messages are also being exchanged with the Croatian office of Interpol, and we have also agreed that we will form joint commissions on preventing organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and drug abuse.

[Hojnik] Will the Ministry of Internal Affairs provide its report on last year's work to parliament?

[Likar] As part of the government's report, parliament will also receive an overview of the MNZ's work. In accordance with the new European image of the Interior Ministry, which is no longer the police ministry, there is also a clearer distinction between the report on the security situation and the report on the ministry's work. We are urging that parliament jointly discuss the report on the security situation prepared by the Interior Ministry, and the report from the prosecutor's office, the courts, and the misdemeanor judges, in order to assume a role in formulating crime policy. That is much more than we can do within the framework of the MNZ. The state and society have to formulate their values with respect to what are acceptable forms of conduct, and how we can prevent unacceptable ones and by what means.

Federal**Army Officers Arrested for Spying for Croatia***LD1503184895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1809 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Mar (TANJUG)—The General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia announced this evening that three officers of the Army of Yugoslavia have been arrested on the well founded suspicion of spying for the Croatian Intelligence Service.

The following joint statement was issued by the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia:

"In a joint action the Security Service of the Army of Yugoslavia and the State Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia succeeded in thwarting intelligence activity by three officers of the Army of Yugoslavia who were acting on behalf of the Croatian Intelligence Service. The three officers involved are: Enver Cavkusic, captain from the garrison in Backa Topola; Zoltan Kovac, lieutenant from the garrison in Podgorica; and Benjamin Zuban, lieutenant from the garrison in Subotica.

"The above-mentioned persons were arrested on 11 March 1995, and were taken to the Belgrade military court's remand prison. An investigation is under way into the criminal act of spying under Article 128 of the Law on Criminal Proceedings of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," the joint statement says.

Statistics Detail Feb Industrial Production*LD1603120395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1054 GMT 16 Mar 95*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 16 (TANJUG)—Despite the total economic blockade, industrial production in Yugoslavia recorded a 9-percent rise in February in comparison with January. The blockade was imposed on Yugoslavia in May 1992. It has affected industrial production the most, with only 50 percent of production facilities being used due to a lack of imported raw materials.

Yugoslav economists say that a comparatively high growth of industrial production in the country under the economic blockade, results from the successful implementation of the Yugoslav Government's economic recovery program. Under the January 1994 program, the national currency, the dinar, was pegged at a par with the German mark on the basis of hard currency backing. Inflation has dropped to nearly zero, which has created basic conditions for the operation of Yugoslav companies.

The Federal Statistics Bureau has said that industrial production rose for 22.6 percent in January and February 1995, compared to January and February 1994. The bureau said that production increased for 20.5 percent in February 1995, compared to February 1994.

Federal Statistics Bureau assistant manager Mirjana Rankovic has said that production is usually the lowest in the first two months of a year and that a more considerable industrial production growth should be expected as of April.

Statistic figures say that production has increased in all sectors of industry. Chemical and paper industries recorded a 70.8-percent rise. They are followed by electric power industry with a 49.3-percent rise, metal industry with a 47.7-percent rise and food-processing and tobacco industries with a 42.8-percent rise.

Serbia**DSS Leader: Prospects for Peace in Danger***LD1503153595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1346 GMT 15 Mar 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 15 Mar (TANJUG)—Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], today said that prospects for peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] were in danger because the international community had in effect allowed Croatian President Tudjman to blackmail it.

Kostunica told reporters at a news conference that the peace process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina was deadlocked because "at least two of the five members of the Contact Group are militarily involved in the conflict." Kostunica said this was confirmed by unhindered deliveries of weapons to the Muslim side via Tuzla Airport.

The DSS leader said that "economic and political negotiations between Zagreb and Knin were threatened by the essential change of the status of UN peacekeeping troops."

"On the other hand, perhaps the immediate danger of war was removed when German-American vassal Tudjman changed his decision to terminate the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate," Kostunica said. He pointed out that the change of the name of peacekeeping troops in Croatia to, as he said, UN Forces in Croatia was a substantial change. He added that so far the "blue helmets" did not bear the name of the country they were engaged in and that this change is an indication that the Croatian state borders are internationally recognized. [passage omitted]

Commentary: Martić's Defeat Over Confidence Vote*AU1503160195 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 95 p 5*

[Commentary by Milan Bozokin: "Radicals Were Mistaken"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Much ado about nothing! This would best express the essence of the meeting of the assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina held the day before yesterday [8 March]. Awaited with impatience as it was supposed to discuss a proposal by President Milan Martić and 20 deputies on holding a confidence motion in Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic, the assembly session in the end did not turn out as many had expected or wished. Although a turbulent debate was expected since, during the "prologue," both sides had already voiced a lot of grave accusations, the Krajina deputies "calmed down" the debate and voted against Martić's proposal to put the debate about the government on the agenda.

Before the 8 March Krajina assembly session, great public tension had developed regarding the dispute between Martić and Mikelic. This atmosphere was carried over into the assembly as well and created by those Serbian Radical Party deputies who had remained loyal to Vojislav Seselj and who, probably following the example of their colleagues in Serbia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly, had tried to make a performance out of the assembly session, to present unfounded accusations, and to slander and demean the assembly and the government. The Radicals and a few like-minded people did not manage to carry through their intentions as other deputies "saw through them," considered the problem in a reasonable manner, and concluded after all that there is no need at the moment for the assembly to start a debate and confidence vote in the government. [passage omitted]

The latest events in Krajina have also led to some new party shifts in the assembly. With Babic's Serbian Democratic Party moving to Mikelic's side, there was no more dilemma about the government's survival. "Babic's men" were joined by other deputies as well, so the situation had become clear even before the session began. "Did anybody really think that we were going to topple the government at this moment?" asked Babic, leader of the strongest Krajina party. In this new assembly party reshuffle, the Radicals are increasingly alone and, in their impotence, are trying to disgrace the official bodies in an improper way. For the time being, they enjoy the support of President Martić, but there is the problem of how long this will last.

It is uncertain how President Martić will react after such a denouement, as he has suffered a defeat over this. He did not find it appropriate even to attend the 8 March assembly meeting, but that does not stop him from criticizing the government and the prime minister for refusing to cooperate and for "being in Belgrade too much." However, in 11 months, Martić did not find time to attend a single government session (!?) or to discuss problems with the prime minister and other ministers. The issue of crime in society cannot be solved from the assembly rostrum. There is also the question of why Martić did not take measures earlier to prevent the Krajina prime minister's treachery and criminal activity—assuming that there had been any and Martić knew

about them. All these questions need answers and show that the intentions of the motion's proposers had been completely different. However, the deputies "saw through" Martić and prevented his speculations and arrangements with the Srpska republic.

On 8 March, Martić lost one more battle, as the internal affairs portfolio slipped away from him. It was in fact exactly about the election of the internal affairs minister that the dispute between Martić and Mikelic came about in the first place. The president had been trying to keep this post for himself at any cost or at least to place his man there. Mikelic opposed that, the deputies supported him, and Krajina therefore got its first civilian minister of police.

Whatever moves he would like to make, after this defeat Martić can choose between dissolving the assembly or leaving. The third solution—to have everything remain as it was before he submitted his request for a confidence motion in the prime minister—would hardly be tenable.

Seselj Doubts Sanctions Will Be Removed

95BA0178D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 95
p 6

[Article by A.M.: "Position of Republic of Serbia and Republic of Serbian Krajina More Difficult"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], expressed doubt in his news conference that the Western countries would consent to complete removal of sanctions from the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in exchange for recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. He believes that after that Belgrade will be expected to make new concessions, the next time in connection with the status of Kosovo and Metohija, Sandzak, and Vojvodina.

"That game will continue to the detriment of Serbian national interests, because on this occasion time is not on the side of the Serbs," said the leader of the Radicals.

In an agreement between parties, the SRS has undertaken to prepare a study of the problems of the metal complex in Serbia, and Tomislav Nikolic has already had contacts with the Independent (Nezavisni) Trade Union of Metalworkers, and the results will be made known in a session of the parliament. Meanwhile, if the Radicals do not conduct debate in the Assembly, they will conduct it in city squares. The Radicals will also issue an ultimatum to put "usurpation" of BORBA on the agenda of a session of the Federal Government.

In connection with the demand of the opposition that the media be debated even in the republic parliament, he mentioned: "If we do not conduct the debate of the free media in the chamber of the Assembly, we will conduct it in the squares of Belgrade, in the presence of tens of thousands of people, and we will see the results of that debate."

Seselj said that an organizing committee had been formed to direct all the extraparlimentary forms of struggle, and the principal task is to organize rallies. An interparty committee has also been formed with the task of drawing up an ethics code, which is to be done by competent people from the parties.

Kosovo

Kosovo Albanians and Tetovo Conflict Examined

95BA0178C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by Radojica Barjakterovic: "The Albanians From Kosovo and the 'Case of Tetovo'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The self-styled "Republic of Kosovo" and its government in exile, led by Ibrahim Rugova and Bujar Bukosi, are involved most directly in the events in Tetovo and western Macedonia and in the internal affairs of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], BORBA has learned. The Albanian leaders from Kosovo and Metohija, with "their" self-styled ministers for education and underground rectors in Pristina (Ejup Statovci) and Tetovo (Fadil Sulejmani), have for months been elaborating a "scenario" for a "trial balloon" to test the functioning of the underground state of Albanians in Macedonia, known as Ilirida. According to the Pristina "formula," the university of Albanians was first formed underground, and then, after first obtaining foreign observers and a large number of journalists from abroad, including some 10 or so from Kosovo and Metohija, an incident was provoked with the police there. And as though they knew in detail how things would develop, certain parties of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, with Rugova's Democratic Alliance in the lead, had already prepared news releases condemning the actions of the Macedonian state authorities and the arrest of Albanians, although it was not known whether the underground rector Fadil Sulejmani and his associates were arrested for calling on the citizens to resist the authorities of the state. A kind of "green light" to opening the university of Albanians in Tetovo was given by Ibrahim Rugova, who in his regular news conferences was declaring that he had "constant and good relations" with the leaders of the Albanians in Macedonia and that the Albanians in the neighborhood "have not been neglected." Rugova has always and mainly gone before the international public with the option of "solving the problems of Albanians on all their ethnic territories," often positioning himself above the policy conducted by Albanian President Sali Berisha. Several times Ibrahim Rugova has practically boasted that the local self-government of Albanians in Tetovo and more broadly in western Macedonia was functioning "irreproachably and apart from the government agencies of Macedonia." He meant to say that he (Rugova) held the "lead strings" even in Macedonia.

Large Appetites

Be that as it may, opening the self-styled Albanian university, which Rugova's collaborators set up in

Tetovo, was only a trial balloon for the functioning of Ilirida as a state (underground). After the university, according to the "scenario" from Pristina, they would set up and proclaim ministries for education, health, culture, the economy, social welfare...and would adopt some kind of Tetovo constitution, then they would schedule an election to the parliament of Ilirida, and, finally, there would be a referendum on a possible "confederation of self-styled states of the Republic of Kosovo and Ilirida," which would go before the international public with the proposal for formation of autonomous communities of Albanians in Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Appetites are large, as are the "scenarios."

Rugova's "government of Kosovo," which condemned the intervention and "destabilizing undertakings in Macedonia and the region," was behind the recent events in Tetovo, and more broadly. As though the Macedonian "police set up their own barricades and fired on one another," as the incident in Tetovo is seen on the other side of Sar Mountain by the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. Encouraging the Albanians in Macedonia to be idle, Rugova's "Government of the Republic of Kosovo" officially announced that the "Albanians cannot be second-class citizens."

What, according to what was published in BUJKU, did Bujar Bukosi announce from abroad in the name of the "government"?

"The prime minister of Kosovo has condemned the intervention of the Macedonian forces against the university and citizens of Tetovo. The Government of the Republic of Kosovo expresses its great concern over the uncontrolled and irresponsible behavior of the Slavic Macedonian officials toward the Albanian population, which is demanding education in the Albanian language."

Support for the "Rector of Tetovo"

"The behavior of the Macedonian officials began to change as soon as the international community began to recognize The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Albanians in this republic have displayed their readiness to create a state in which they would be equal, but never once have they been willing, and no one can demand of them that they accept the position of second-class citizens."

Then, after saying that "President Kiro Gligorov is to blame" for this escalation of the situation, Rugova's "Government of Kosovo" supports the demands of the Albanian population in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for an Albanian-language university and calls upon the international community to seriously reassess its views toward Macedonia and halt the concessions detrimental to the Albanian population. This "Government" is calling upon the Macedonian authorities to "urgently release Rector Fadil Sulejmani and his associates from pretrial custody." It is also issuing a

warning about "an increased escalation of tensions" in this "fragile republic and tensions in the region."

According to certain sources close to the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, these and similar reports were conceived and written in some kind of Information Center for Dissemination of Information in Pristina. The "scenario" for Albanian representatives to leave the Assembly of Macedonia was also forwarded from Pristina to Skopje, but the "formula" about Albanians leaving their jobs ("being expelled") as a sign of political protest is still hovering under a question mark.

Vojvodina

Peace Groups Protest Tank Movements to Serbia

LD1503171795 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 14 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Novi Sad, 14 March (BETA)—Peace groups in Vojvodina have sent a public protest to the authorities in Serbia against what are described as "ominous movements of tanks" toward the UN Protected Areas in eastern Croatia.

Vojvodina peace groups last weekend held a joint meeting in Backa Palanka at which they adopted the public protest under the heading, "we do not consent to death," and in which they claim that tanks are being amassed "on both sides." [passage omitted]

New Vojvodina Hungarian Party Outlines Policy

LD1603112295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0825 GMT 16 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Senta, 16 Mar (TANJUG)—The founding assembly of the Civic Movement of Vojvodina Hungarians [Gradjanski Pokret Vojvodjanskih Madjara] will be held in Senta on Saturday, 18 March. This was announced today by the initiative committee charged with setting up the new political party of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.

The initiative committee chairman, Jozef Berec, said that those behind the initiative to set up the new party are displeased with the activities of the two existing political organizations, whose futile policy has done nothing to protect the interests of Vojvodina Hungarians.

"Insistence by the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [Demokratska Zajednica Vojvodjanskih Madjara] and the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [Savez Vojvodjanskih Madjara] on autonomy is pure utopia. We are against the three-tier autonomy or any kind of territorial autonomy, because any isolation within a national framework would be fatal for the Hungarian minority", Berec said. In our program we have opted for the "third option," which we see as sensible, and which implies agreements with political parties and authorities in both Serbia and Yugoslavia. We think that Hungarians of Vojvodina can safeguard their national identity within the existing constitutional and legal provisions, and without any autonomy, Berec said.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 562
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

- Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.